



PREDICTABLE AND PREVENTABLE:

WHY FIFA AND QATAR SHOULD REMEDY ABUSES BEHIND THE 2022
WORLD CUP

AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL



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Cover photo: Workers seen at the construction site of Lusail Stadium, a venue for 2022 FIFA World Cup football matches. © Valery Sharifulin/TASS

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GLOSSARY

WORD	DESCRIPTION
BOARD (THE)	(independent) Human Rights Advisory Board
BWI	Building and Wood Workers' International
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association, football's international governing body
CESCR	Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ILO	International Labour Organization
<i>KAFALA</i>	sponsorship-based system of employing migrant workers
LOC	Qatar 2022 Local Organising Committee
NGO	non-governmental organization
NHRC	(Qatar's quasi official) National Human Rights Committee
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Q22	FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 limited liability company (LLC)
SUPREME COMMITTEE	(Qatar's) Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy
UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES	UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In just six months, when the 2022 FIFA World Cup kicks off at the Al Thumama Stadium in Doha, Qatar's crowning moment will have arrived. Following 12 years of enormous financial investment, huge construction projects and no shortage of controversy, the world's most watched sporting event will be broadcast to billions of people around the world. Behind the World Cup's opening event, however, are the stories of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who travelled to Qatar to build and service the stadiums, hotels, and transport systems needed to make the tournament possible. Leaving their families in search of better jobs, many found themselves caught in a deeply exploitative labour system, denied their fundamental rights to decent working conditions and access to remedy.

Since FIFA awarded the World Cup to Qatar in 2010, much has been lost by workers and their families – money, freedoms and even lives – and too little has been done to put right these wrongs. In recent years, both Qatar and FIFA made some progress with Qatar introducing important and promising measures aimed at improving workers' rights and FIFA recognizing its human rights responsibilities. However, the lack of enforcement of Qatar's labour reforms, and the narrow group of workers covered by FIFA's commitments, have limited their impact. Even if these measures were fully effective, they would not negate FIFA's responsibilities and Qatar's obligations to address and remedy the historical labour abuses suffered by so many workers over so many years.

The scale of abuses requiring remediation since 2010 remains vast. Hundreds of thousands of workers who toiled to make the World Cup possible have paid exorbitant and illegal recruitment fees, yet few have ever been reimbursed. Thousands of others have been cheated of their wages by abusive employers, made to work excessive hours, or subjected to conditions amounting to forced labour. Workers have even paid the ultimate price, losing their lives after labouring without adequate protection in Qatar's extreme heat. Yet their deaths were rarely investigated, and their families hardly ever compensated.

In awarding the World Cup to Qatar without conditions to improve labour protections, and then subsequently failing to adequately prevent or mitigate abuses, FIFA contributed to a wide range of labour abuses that were both preventable and predictable. While it is too late to erase the suffering of past abuses, FIFA and Qatar can and should act both to prevent further abuses from taking place, and to provide remedy to all the workers who made the tournament possible.

For this report, Amnesty International has drawn on over a decade of investigating labour abuses in Qatar, as well as reports from others. Researchers also reviewed a wide range of FIFA's policies, strategies and documents relating to the 2022 World Cup. The organisation also reviewed documents from FIFA's main partner in Qatar, the "Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy", – the Qatari body in charge of planning and delivering the World Cup infrastructure. Amnesty International shared its findings and recommendations with FIFA, Qatar and the Supreme Committee. FIFA responded sharing the measures it has taken to protect workers' rights, and stated it has "taken note of and are assessing the proposition" to set up a remediation programme.

FIFA'S FAILURE TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE ABUSES

When FIFA awarded the World Cup to Qatar in 2010, the country's extreme dependence on migrant workers, and the existence of severe labour abuse and exploitation in the country, were already well documented. NGOs, the ILO, UN Special Procedures, the US Department of State, regional and international media outlets, and even Qatar's own National Human Rights Committee had for years highlighted the grim situation of migrant workers in Qatar as well as other human rights violations and abuses. It was therefore

entirely foreseeable that without serious and strictly enforced reforms to Qatar's labour laws, a huge number of migrant workers would suffer a wide range of abuses to enable the tournament to happen.

Despite this knowledge, FIFA granted the multi-billion-dollar tournament to Qatar without imposing any conditions or guarantees to protect migrant workers. Risks for workers were not even considered during the bidding process. FIFA's 38-page evaluation of Qatar's bid for the tournament, for example, did not include the word "worker" or "labour" once, nor the phrase "human rights". In one section the health risks of Qatar's extreme heat were considered for, "players, spectators, officials and the FIFA family", but risks for workers were not mentioned. In awarding the World Cup to Qatar in this way, FIFA contributed to the widespread and severe labour rights abuses of migrant workers that followed, and laid the foundations for further and widespread abuse.

FIFA also failed to prevent or mitigate risks of labour abuse in the years following the awarding of the World Cup. Actions taken came too late and remained too limited. In May 2016, FIFA admitted to Amnesty International that it had not raised concerns with the Local Organizing Committee until May 2015 and that before 2015 it did not consider the construction of World Cup stadiums to be its responsibility. It was not until July 2015 that FIFA's Executive Committee decided to publicly adhere to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, and not until 2020 that FIFA outlined its responsibilities specifically in the context of the 2022 World Cup through its Sustainability Strategy.

For the majority of the period following the awarding of the World Cup to Qatar, the main actions taken to protect workers' rights were taken by FIFA's partner in Qatar, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy. From 2014, the Supreme Committee introduced Worker Welfare Standards and pioneered initiatives to offer workers better protection, including reimbursing many for their recruitment fees. However, while improving conditions for tens of thousands of workers, partial enforcement of the standards limited their effectiveness, and both Amnesty International's research and the Supreme Committee's own self audits show that abuses persisted. Further, the Worker Welfare Standards covered at its peak no more than 2% of migrant workers in the country and did not cover workers on a wide range of infrastructure and services essential for the preparation and delivery of the Cup.

For years, FIFA adopted a hands-off approach and relied heavily on the Supreme Committee to fulfil its due diligence responsibilities on its behalf. Such an approach is deeply problematic and was made evident during a case in 2020 documented by Amnesty International in which around 100 employees of Qatar Meta Coats, a design and construction company subcontracted for work on Al Bayt Stadium, had not been paid for up to seven months. Despite the Supreme Committee knowing about the case for almost a year, FIFA only became aware when informed by Amnesty International.

FIFA'S RESPONSIBILITIES AND QATAR'S OBLIGATIONS

FIFA and Qatar have clear respective responsibilities and obligations under international human rights law and standards not only to prevent such widespread human rights abuses, but also to provide adequate remedy for victims of abuses. The right to an effective remedy encompasses the victim's right to an equal and effective access to justice, an adequate and prompt reparation for harm suffered; and access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.

According to international human rights law and standards, Qatar has the obligation to ensure remedy for every abuse on its territory, whether linked to the World Cup or not. FIFA must also provide for or collaborate in the remediation of abuses related to the preparation and delivery of the tournament to which it has contributed. Its responsibility to do so is regardless of, and in addition to its ongoing responsibility to prevent further harm.

FIFA's responsibility is in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles), an internationally endorsed standard of expected conduct for corporate actors, including FIFA. Football's world governing body has itself referenced its adherence to the UN Guiding Principles through its own policies. These included its Human Rights Policy, published in May 2017, the Sustainability Strategy for the 2022 World Cup, published in January 2020, and the Sustainability Sourcing Code launched in April 2020. FIFA's responsibilities have also been outlined by its independent Human Rights Advisory Body, which recognized FIFA's ultimate responsibility for migrant labour abuses in Qatar, including remedy, noting FIFA's need to "deal with the consequences of decisions taken before the organization recognized its human rights responsibilities" and calling on FIFA to "work on the past, present and future all at once."

To date, neither FIFA nor Qatar have fulfilled their respective responsibilities and obligations to provide remedy for human rights abuses. Existing remedy mechanisms, while welcome, are not currently able or designed to fulfil this historical obligation. Qatar's Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes, for

example, only address issues relating to wages and benefits and do not address cases that are more than one year old. The Supreme Committee's grievance redress mechanism only covers workers under its purview which form a small proportion from workers on World Cup related projects. FIFA's "human rights grievance and remedy mechanism" was not established until January 2022, and with six months to go until this World Cup, FIFA is still discussing ways to ensure labour rights complaints are raised and addressed during the competition.

COMPREHENSIVE REMEDIATION PROGRAMME NEEDED

To meet their responsibilities and obligations, FIFA and Qatar must work together with other actors to put in place a comprehensive programme to provide remedy for abuses related to the 2022 World Cup. They could learn from and adapt models used elsewhere to provide remedy for thousands of workers and families affected by large-scale abuse such as the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh, in which at least 1,132 people were killed and more than 2,500 injured.

Such a mechanism must be established and governed in a participatory fashion following consultation with stakeholders including workers and trade unions. An appropriate and transparent remediation programme should be developed that is easily accessible to workers or their families – many of whom will no longer be in Qatar – and offers mechanisms providing timely remedy for a wide range of abuses since 2010. Whilst this process should seek to strengthen existing remedial mechanisms available in Qatar, such as those provided by the Ministry of Labour and Supreme Committee, it is also likely to require the development of additional mechanisms adapted to deal with past abuses.

Critically, given FIFA's role in contributing to widespread human rights abuses following its decision to award the World Cup to Qatar, this remediation programme should cover not only workers directly employed on World Cup projects such as stadiums, training sites and FIFA-accredited hotels, but also the hundreds of thousands of workers employed on a wider range of projects that are necessary for the preparation and delivery of the tournament. This should include, for example, workers involved in the expansion and upgrade of the transport system, road, ports and the building of additional visitor accommodation, as well as the full range of services required for hosting over a million visitors expected to travel to Qatar to watch the tournament. It should be noted that while FIFA's Sustainability Strategy has committed to "ensure" decent working conditions and "enable" access to effective remedy for workers on FIFA World Cup sites, it has only offered a non-binding commitment to "promote" decent conditions and effective remedy for workers on "other construction projects and supply chain relationships" directly linked to the tournament.

Paying for the scale level of remedy likely to be needed – for example to make payments to the families of those who have died, to compensate migrant workers for unpaid wages and to support initiatives to protect workers' rights in the future – will require a significant investment proportional to the abuses suffered. Merely reimbursing the illegal recruitment fees of hundreds of thousands of workers, for example, would cost hundreds of millions of US dollars. Qatar, FIFA, the Supreme Committee and other actors including companies all bear a responsibility, independent of each other, to contribute financially to a remediation programme.

While the final amount required for remedy should ultimately be decided through a participatory process and subject to an independent evaluation, FIFA should reserve an amount not less than the US\$440 million prize money offered to teams participating in the World Cup, to be invested in funds to support remediation. This amount reflects a likely 'floor' for the scale of the harms suffered, in addition to the need to invest in programmes to ensure that abuses are not repeated in the future. For example, simply reimbursing the recruitment fees paid by hundreds of thousands of workers who worked on World Cup-related projects – averaging \$1,300 each - would cost hundreds of millions of US dollars, in addition to remedying abuses such as wage theft, injury or loss of life. At least matching the World Cup prize money would represent just a small percentage of FIFA's anticipated US\$6 billion revenues from the tournament and the US\$1.6 billion it currently holds in reserves. Qatar – one of the richest per capita countries in the world, with a sovereign wealth fund worth over \$450 billion - should also ensure adequate funding to any programme providing remedy for workers who were at the heart of its national flagship project, as well as those who suffered abuses beyond the World Cup.

The 2022 World Cup will be far from exemplary in terms of preventing harm, but if all workers who have suffered abuses in the preparation, staging and delivery of its flagship event receive adequate reparation it can still represent a turning point in FIFA's commitment to respect human rights. Further, by enhancing and strictly implementing its human rights criteria for future events and strengthening its human rights due diligence processes, FIFA can work to ensure that the abuses suffered in the preparation of the 2022 World Cup are not repeated elsewhere.

2. METHODOLOGY

Although this report includes analysis of Qatar's obligations to provide remedy to victims of human rights abuses, the primary focus of this report is FIFA.¹ It is based on a detailed review of all published documents and reports related to the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar including but not limited to:

- FIFA's Human Rights Policy²
- FIFA's publications related to its human rights responsibilities³
- FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board work and reports⁴
- FIFA's responses to the Human Rights Advisory Board recommendations⁵
- FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy⁶ and progress reports⁷
- FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Policy⁸
- FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code⁹
- FIFA's grievance mechanisms¹⁰

¹ The exploitation and abuse migrant workers have suffered since the right to host the World Cup was awarded to Qatar has involved, and is the responsibility of, a multiplicity of state and non-state actors. Those directly responsible are hundreds of private companies, both national and foreign, who directly employ migrant workers to provide construction and other services for the staging and delivery of the 2022 World Cup. These actors all have their own responsibilities to respect the rights of all workers and remedy any abuses they cause or to which they contribute.

² FIFA's Human Rights Policy – May 2017 Edition, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/kr05dqyhwr1uhqy2lh6r.pdf>

³ John Ruggie, *For the Game. For the World – FIFA and Human Rights*, 2016, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/Ruggie_humanrightsFIFA_reportApril2016.pdf; and FIFA, '2.0: The Vision for the Future', 13 October 2016, <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/FIFA-2-0-the-vision-for-the-future.pdf?cloudid=drnd5smfl6dhxgiyqmx>; and 'FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights', May 2017, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/ah5ghjuqbc6nzdtpxhy.pdf>

⁴ FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board. All details about the Board's work and its four reports can be found in the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre's dedicated site: <https://old.business-humanrights.org/en/fifa-human-rights-advisory-board>; the fifth report is available at: <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/4769eb55b4e22ba5/original/vforeieiz1fh06ld4a36-pdf.pdf>; and the closing report is available at: <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/committees/news/fifa-human-rights-advisory-board-provides-closing-repor>

⁵ Update from FIFA on the Recommendations of the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board covering the period of September 2018 to November 2019, January 2020, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/ot4pzfavdz5vjxbopxqz.pdf>. In the period between its first human rights report of June 2017 and its January 2020 report, FIFA reported on its human rights efforts twice through statements included in the annual reports of the Human Rights Advisory Board of September 2017 and September 2018

⁶ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy, <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-world-cup-qatar-2022tm-sustainability-strategy.pdf?cloudid=u25obd7303tdxupsjvsn>

⁷ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 - First Sustainability Progress Report, October 2020, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/qlsdbl7ipsax0ndjqyup.pdf>; and FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 - Sustainability Progress Report, January 2022, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/en/news/latest-fifa-world-cup-qatar-2022-sustainability-progress-report-highlights-key-achievements>

⁸ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Policy, <https://fifa-backend.pressfire.net/media/newsletter/sustainability-policy-Jan-2020.pdf>

⁹ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code, Version 1, April 2020, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/fxrrprncoiqqhmqdku8.pdf> (a newer version dated December 2020 was issued with no significant modifications).

¹⁰ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Progress Report, January 2022 (Human Rights Grievance and Remedy Mechanism), <https://publications.fifa.com/en/sustainability-report/social-pillar/inclusivity/human-rights-grievance-and->

- The Supreme Committee Workers' Welfare Standards¹¹
- The Supreme Committee annual progress reports and compliance reports¹²
- The Supreme Committee and Building and Wood Workers' International reports¹³
- 2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report¹⁴

The report also builds on Amnesty International's extensive body of research into the situation of migrant workers in Qatar since 2012, including:

- The dark side of migration: Spotlight on Qatar's construction sector ahead of the World Cup (2013)
- The ugly side of the beautiful game: Exploitation of migrant workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup site (2016)
- New name, old system? Qatar's new employment law and abuse of migrant workers (2016)
- Unpaid and abandoned: the abuse of Mercury MENA workers (September 2018)
- Reality check: The state of migrant workers' rights with four years to go until the Qatar 2022 World Cup (2019)
- All work, no pay: The struggle of Qatar's migrant workers to get justice (2019)
- 'I have worked hard – I deserve to be paid' Exploitation on Qatar World Cup stadium (2020)
- 'Why do you want to rest?' Ongoing abuse of domestic workers in Qatar (2020)
- Reality Check 2020: Countdown to the 2022 World Cup – migrant workers' rights in Qatar
- 'In the prime of their lives' Qatar's failure to investigate, remedy and prevent migrant workers' deaths (2021)
- Reality Check 2021: A year to the 2022 World Cup – the state of migrant worker's rights in Qatar (2021)
- 'They think that we're machines': Forced labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar's private security sector (2022)¹⁵.

remedy-mechanism/; FIFA launches complaints mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, <https://www.fifa.com/legal/football-regulatory/media-releases/fifa-launches-complaints-mechanism-for-human-rights-defenders-and-journalists>

¹¹ Supreme Committee Workers' Welfare Standards, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/documents/Workers-Welfare-Standards-Qatar-2022-EN.pdf>

¹² All reports are available at: <https://www.workerswelfare.qa/en/news-and-reports>

¹³ 2017 report available at: https://www.workerswelfare.qa/sites/default/files/reports_item/field_document/SC-BWI-report-en-2017.pdf; 2018 report available at:

https://www.workerswelfare.qa/sites/default/files/reports_item/field_document/sc-building-and-wood-workers-international-report-en-2018.pdf; and 2019 report available at:

https://www.workerswelfare.qa/sites/default/files/reports_item/field_document/sc-building-and-wood-workers-international-report-en-2019.pdf

¹⁴ 2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/fd4w8qgexnrxmquwsb7h.pdf>

¹⁵ *The dark side of migration: Spotlight on Qatar's construction sector ahead of the World Cup* (Index: MDE 22/010/2013), 18 November 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/010/2013/en/>; *The ugly side of the beautiful game: Exploitation of migrant workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup site* (Index: MDE 22/3548/2016), 30 March 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/3548/2016/en/>; *Qatar – New name, old system? Qatar's new employment law and abuse of migrant workers* (Index: MDE 22/5242/2016), 12 December 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/5242/2016/en/>; *Unpaid and abandoned: the abuse of Mercury MENA workers*, 26 September 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/09/mercury-mena-abuses-qatar/>; *Reality check: The state of migrant workers' rights with four years to go until the Qatar 2022 World Cup* (Index: MDE 22/9758/2019), 5 February 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/9758/2019/en/>; *All work, no pay: The struggle of Qatar's migrant workers to get justice* (Index: MDE 22/0793/2019), 16 September 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/0793/2019/en/>; *"Why do you want to rest?": Ongoing abuse of domestic workers in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/3175/2020), 20 October 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/3175/2020/en/>; *"I have worked hard – I deserve to be paid": Exploitation on Qatar World Cup stadium*, 10 June 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/06/exploitation-on-qatar-world-cup-stadium/>; *Reality Check 2020: Countdown to the 2022 World Cup – Migrant Workers' Rights in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/3297/2020), 18 November 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/3297/2020/en/>; *'In the prime of their lives': Qatar's failure to investigate, remedy and prevent migrant workers' deaths* (Index: MDE 22/4614/2021), 26 August 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/4614/2021/en/>; *Reality Check 2021: A year to the 2022 World Cup – The state of migrant worker's Rights in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/4966/2021), 16 November 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/4966/2021/en/>; *"They think that we're machines": Forced labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar's private security sector* (Index: MDE 22/5388/2022), 7 April 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/5388/2022/en/>

In addition, researchers drew from work published by other organizations relating to the situation of migrant workers in Qatar ahead of FIFA's decision to award Qatar the right to host the World Cup. These included the International Labour Organization,¹⁶ UN Special Procedures,¹⁷ the US Department of State¹⁸ and Qatar's National Human Rights Commission.¹⁹

Since Amnesty International started campaigning for better conditions for workers in Qatar, the organization has regularly exchanged letters and held meetings with FIFA. Ahead of the publication of this report, on 30 March 2022, Amnesty International wrote to them requesting further information, but did not receive a response at the time. The organization then shared its findings and analysis on 29 April, and on 6 May FIFA responded to both letters, a copy of FIFA's response can be found in Annex I below.

Amnesty International also sent a memorandum with its main findings and call to the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (the Supreme Committee) and the Government of Qatar on 29 April and 5 May respectively. However, the Supreme Committee informed Amnesty International of its inability to respond on time. As of 16 May, no response had been received from either the Government of Qatar or the Supreme Committee.

¹⁶ ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General Report and Observations concerning particular countries. Qatar – Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), 2009, pp. 406-408, [https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661\(2009-98-1A\).pdf](https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2009-98-1A).pdf)

¹⁷ Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Mission to Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, A/HRC/4/23/Add. 2, 25 April 2007, paras 60-68, 69 (noting the vulnerability of men in the construction industry, among others), p. 81, Conclusions and Recommendations, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/124/75/PDF/G0712475.pdf?OpenElement>. See also, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Regarding Qatar, A/HRC/14/2, 15 March 2010, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/120/77/PDF/G1012077.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁸ ¹⁸ See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Qatar, 11 March 2010 (section on “Trafficking in Persons”), <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136078.htm>; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008 – Qatar, 4 June 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/484f9a3732.html>

¹⁹ National Human Rights Committee of Qatar, Annual Reports from 2006 onwards, <https://nhrc-qa.org/en/annual-reports>

3. BACKGROUND

In December 2010, the FIFA Executive Committee awarded the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar, meaning that the tournament would be held in the Middle East for the first time. Beating Australia, Japan, South Korea and finally the USA, Qatar was a highly controversial choice because of allegations of corruption, its extreme heat and its dire human rights record.²⁰

Qatar's bid included commitments to develop massive infrastructure projects, including nine new stadiums, the renovation of three others and the creation of accommodation facilities and transport infrastructure.²¹ Later the total number of stadiums to be used for the World Cup was reduced to eight.²² The World Cup project was part of Qatar's "2030 Vision" that promised to advance its society sustainably and provide a high standard of living for its people.²³ The Qatar government has also been explicit about seeing the tournament as an opportunity to showcase their country.²⁴

Given Qatar's huge oil and gas wealth, but relatively small population and reliance on foreign workers, the infrastructure for the tournament was always going to be constructed by hundreds of thousands of migrant workers. As such, the country's population grew from 1.6 million in December 2010 to around 2.8 million in April 2022, with most workers coming from South and South-East Asia and Africa.²⁵ When the World Cup finally takes place, in November 2022, Qatar will also be host to 32 teams and over one million visitors.²⁶

LABOUR ABUSES BEFORE 2010

When FIFA awarded the World Cup to Qatar in 2010, labour abuses and exploitation were rife. Workers' rights were limited and imperilled by the country's *kafala* sponsorship system. The labour laws were poorly enforced, and unscrupulous employers were given free rein to abuse their workforce.

To come to Qatar, migrant workers had to leave behind their families and home, and borrow large sums to pay exorbitant recruitment fees to secure jobs in Qatar. Once in the country, many found that their working and living conditions were different to those promised during the recruitment process, yet they had little choice but to continue working. They were not allowed to leave the country or change jobs without the permission of their often-abusive employers. Their total dependence on their employers meant that some found themselves "undocumented" through no fault of their own, leaving them at risk of being detained and deported. Many had their passports confiscated by their employer or their pay withheld for months. Some

²⁰ The Guardian, *Qatar Wins the 2022 World Cup Bid*, 2 December 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/dec/02/qatar-win-2022-world-cup-bid>

²¹ 2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar, p. 5.

²² FIFA, *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, Destination*, <https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/destination>

²³ Qatar National Vision 2030, <https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/>

²⁴ Government Communication Office, *In Focus FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022*, <https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/focus/2022-fifa-world-cup-qatar/>; see also The Peninsula, "FIFA World Cup 2022 expedites achieving QNV 2030", 21 March 2021, <https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/10/03/2021/FIFA-World-Cup-2022-expedites-achieving-QNV-2030>

²⁵ Qatar Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Monthly figures on total population for January 2022, Overview, <https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics1/Pages/Overview.aspx>

²⁶ Al-Jazeera, *Ticketless fans may struggle for hotels during Qatar World Cup*, 24 March 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2022/3/24/ticketless-fans-may-struggle-for-rooms-during-qatar-world-cup>

were not paid at all. Many had to work excessive hours often in dangerous conditions and without adequate protection from extreme heat.²⁷

Qatar's dependence on migrant workers, and the severe labour abuse and exploitation in the country, were well documented before FIFA's decision to award the tournament to Qatar. NGOs, the International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Special Procedures, the US Department of State and even Qatar's own National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) had for years highlighted the grim situation of migrant workers in Qatar. Consequently, the years of labour abuses associated with preparing the World Cup that followed – summarized in this report and widely reported elsewhere – were entirely foreseeable.

For instance, from 2006 onwards, the **NHRC**, which is a quasi-official human rights body, persistently highlighted its concerns about the *kafala* system. In 2006, it documented the arrest and detention of migrant workers for long periods as a result of “absconding” charges brought against them by their employers and their eventual deportation without due process. It consistently pushed the government to abolish or reform the *kafala* system “in line with the Islamic Sharia and international human rights law”.²⁸

In 2009, the **ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations** noted in its observations on Qatar:

*“The NHRC is particularly concerned about the **abuses against and mistreatment of migrant workers, as well as instances of human trafficking**, resulting from the sponsorship system currently in place.”²⁹*

The Committee expressed concern about the detention of migrant workers pending the outcome of labour disputes with their sponsor, and discrimination against migrant workers on the basis of race, sex and religion. It concluded that it was:

*“Concerned about **the disproportionate dependency of the worker on the employer** created under the sponsorship system, which enhances workers’ vulnerability to abuse and exploitation and contributes to the reluctance to report abusive working conditions.”*

Following a field trip to Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar in 2006, the **Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons** reported:

*“Information concerning men and women working in the private sector, particularly in factories, construction, farms and other industries, includes **confiscation of identity documents, excessive working hours, dangerous working conditions, difficult living conditions not respecting minimum standards of safety and sanitation, no midday breaks or weekly rest and annual leave, limited freedom of movement, non-payment of wages or reduction in wages as a punishment**. The workers are sometimes made to pay for their own medical services for example, and complained of lack of access to health services.”³⁰*

In its 2009 country report on Qatar, the **US Department of State** raised its concerns about practices of forced labour in relation to migrant workers:

*“According to government figures, **more than 85 percent of the workforce was composed of foreign workers who, dependent on their employer for residency rights, were vulnerable to abuse**. For example, employers must consent to and the MOI [Ministry of Interior] must approve the granting of an exit permit to any foreign*

²⁷ See for instance, Amnesty International, *Report 2010 – The State of the World's Human Rights*, p. 266, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/pol100012010en.pdf> ; and Amnesty International, *Report 2009 - The State of the World's Human Rights*, p 267, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/pol100012009en.pdf>; and Amnesty International, *Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review - Seventh session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council February 2010*, 1 September 2009, p. 4, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/001/2009/en/>

²⁸ National Human Rights Committee of Qatar, Annual Reports from 2006 onwards, <https://nhrc-qa.org/en/annual-reports>

²⁹ ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, General Report and Observations concerning particular countries. Qatar – Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), 2009, pp. 406-408, [https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661\(2009-98-1A\).pdf](https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2009-98-1A).pdf)

³⁰ Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Mission to Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, A/HRC/4/23/Add. 2, 25 April 2007, paras 60-68, 69 (noting the vulnerability of men in the construction industry, among others), p. 81, Conclusions and Recommendations, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/124/75/PDF/G0712475.pdf?OpenElement>. See also, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Regarding Qatar, A/HRC/14/2, 15 March 2010, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/120/77/PDF/G1012077.pdf?OpenElement>

employee. Some employers temporarily withheld this consent to force foreign employees to work for longer periods than they wished.”³¹

It also reported that unskilled workers and domestic servants were particularly vulnerable to non-payment or late payment of wages.

Meanwhile, regional and international media outlets exposed the need to end the sponsorship system that was driving abuses and exploitation against migrant workers.³²



Migrant workers at Al Attiyah Market in Doha's industrial area on a Friday afternoon © Amnesty International

³¹ See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Qatar, 11 March 2010 (section on “Trafficking in Persons”), <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136078.htm>; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008 – Qatar, 4 June 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/484f9a3732.html>

³² See, for instance, The Peninsula, *Exit Permit Under Review in Qatar*, 28 May 2007 (previously available at: <http://www.menafn.com/menafn/1093154561/Exit-permit-system-under-review-Qatar>); Gulf News, *Exit Permits Must End, Says PM*, 29 May 2007, <https://www.pressreader.com/uae/gulf-news/20070529/282020437868147>; AFP, *End sponsor system: UN official tells Gulf States*, 20 April 2010, previously available at: <http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/middle-east/270-end-sponsor-system-un-official-tells-gulfstates.html>

BOX 1: THE 2022 WORLD CUP INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP

Responsibility for coordinating and managing all activities related to the preparation and delivery of the 2022 World Cup has rested on four key actors:

1. FIFA
2. The Qatar 2022 Local Organising Committee (LOC)
3. The Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (Supreme Committee), and
4. since 2019, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 limited liability company (LLC) (Q22).

Both the LOC and the Supreme Committee are government entities. Until 2019, the LOC was responsible for handling all operational planning, tournament preparedness and coordination with FIFA on tournament-related matters.³³ Since 2011, the Supreme Committee has been responsible for delivering the infrastructure and associated services as well as the coordination and delivery of host country operations required for hosting the 2022 World Cup. The Supreme Committee is also responsible for taking forward the legacy programmes and for implementing the Workers' Welfare Standards on all construction projects it oversees.³⁴

Even after awarding the World Cup to a host country, FIFA remains a key partner. As the "owner" of the FIFA World Cup and ultimate decision-making authority for the tournament, it sets the technical requirements, coordinates the delivery of the competition and manages the key tournament stakeholders.³⁵ FIFA is also a key financial beneficiary of the event and is expected to earn over US\$6billion in revenues.³⁶

In early 2019, Qatar and FIFA announced the launch of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 LLC (Q22), a joint venture which would be responsible for all projects related to the delivery of the tournament, tournament operations and services for World Cup constituent groups (e.g. team services, training sites, event volunteers, guest management, logistics, catering and accreditation). Q22 was incorporated as a limited liability company by FIFA, which holds 51% of the shares. Qatar's LOC holds the other 49%.³⁷ Given FIFA's majority stake in Q22, FIFA has become in practice directly responsible for, and the overriding decision maker in relation to all operational aspects concerning the delivery of the World Cup. While Q22 was established to focus on tournament delivery, the Supreme Committee has remained responsible for managing the development of event infrastructure and legacy programmes.³⁸

³³ Supreme Committee, 'Workers' Welfare Progress Report April-December 2015', p. 4, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/docs/Workers-Welfare-Progress-Report-Apr-Dec-2015-EN.pdf>

³⁴ Supreme Committee, Frequently Asked Questions, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/en/about/faq>

³⁵ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy, p. 11, <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-world-cup-qatar-2022tm-sustainability-strategy.pdf?cloudid=u25obd7303tdxupsjysn>

³⁶ FIFA, *Annual Report 2021 Football Unites*, p 169, <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/7b8f2f002eb69403/original/FIFA-Annual-Report-21.pdf>

³⁷ Supreme Committee, *Qatar and FIFA announce joint venture*, 5 February 2019, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/en/news/qatar-fifa-announce-joint-venture> FIFA, 'FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 LLC', 14 May 2019, <https://www.fifa.com/news/fifa-world-cup-qatar-2022-llc>

³⁸ Supreme Committee, *Qatar and FIFA announce joint venture*, 5 February 2019, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/en/news/qatar-fifa-announce-joint-venture>

4. LABOUR ABUSES SINCE 2010

2010-2017: ABUSES AND DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY

It was inevitable that Qatar's World Cup-related construction boom - both in projects directly overseen by the World Cup organizing bodies and broader infrastructure projects - would lead to a wide range of labour abuses.

The *kafala* system that existed when the World Cup was awarded to Qatar in 2010 remained largely unchanged until late 2018, when the government began slowly to introduce legal reforms following an agreement with the ILO in 2017.

During this period, a variety of NGOs, trade unions and human rights experts continued to expose the abuse and exploitation of low-paid migrant workers across different projects – including those related to the World Cup and those not - sometimes amounting to forced labour and human trafficking. Just a few examples include:

- In June 2012, Human Rights Watch published a report the problematic working condition of migrant workers in the country.³⁹
- In October 2013, the Guardian newspaper reported that 44 Nepali workers had died in Qatar over a two-month period.⁴⁰
- In November 2013, Amnesty International documented widespread labour abuse in the construction sector, including forced labour.⁴¹
- In April 2014, the UN Special Rapporteur on Migrant Rights described how “exploitation is frequent, migrants often work without pay and live in substandard conditions”, and called for the country's sponsorship system to be abolished.⁴²
- In April 2014, the multinational law firm DLA Piper issued a report commissioned by the Qatari authorities in light of allegations of labour abuses in which it highlighted a set of recommendations including reforming the *kafala* system, preventing delayed salaries and improving access to justice.⁴³

³⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Building a Better World Cup Protecting Migrant Workers in Qatar Ahead of FIFA 2022*, 12 June 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/12/building-better-world-cup/protecting-migrant-workers-qatar-ahead-fifa-2022>

⁴⁰ The Guardian, *Qatar under growing pressure over workers' deaths as Fifa is urged to act*, 2 October 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/qatar-workers-deaths-fifa-world-cup-2022>

⁴¹ Amnesty International, *Qatar: End corporate exploitation of migrant construction worker*, 17 November 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/11/qatar-end-corporate-exploitation-migrant-construction-workers/>

⁴² UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, Addendum, Human Rights Council, 26 Session, 23 April 2014, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Documents/A-HRC-26-35-Add1_en.doc

⁴³ DLA Piper, *Migrant Labour in the Construction Sector in Qatar*. The report was never formally released but can be seen at <http://engineersagainstopoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Qatar-DLA-FINAL-REPORT-MAY-2014-FOR-PUBLICATION.pdf>

- In June 2014, worker groups lodged a complaint against Qatar with the ILO accusing Qatar of forced labour.⁴⁴
- In March 2015, Amnesty International published details of serious human rights abuse of workers building the Khalifa International Stadium.⁴⁵
- In December 2016, Amnesty International warned that Qatar's new sponsorship law was merely a rebranding of the old system.⁴⁶
- In September 2017, Human Rights Watch urged the Qatari government to protect outdoor workers from the risks of intense heat and humidity.⁴⁷

The Qatari authorities rejected such accusations, portraying reported abuses as isolated cases of exploitation,⁴⁸ but in 2016 introduced a new law claiming to have abolished the *kafala* system⁴⁹. However, these changes barely scratched the surface of the exploitative system, leaving the basic *kafala* system intact.⁵⁰

Around the same time, following the introduction of the Workers' Welfare Standards in 2014, the situation of workers employed on World Cup projects directly overseen by the Supreme Committee (referred to from now on as "Supreme Committee workers") started to improve. However these standards, although they represent progress, were never fully enforced and failed to protect all Supreme Committee workers from labour abuses (see section below for more details).

FIFA'S DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY

Despite the mounting evidence of serious and systemic labour rights abuses directly linked to the World Cup including in the context of Supreme Committee projects, up until 2015 FIFA simply did not accept, in public, that it had any responsibility for the situation of migrant workers in the country.

For example, in October 2013 the then President of FIFA, Sepp Blatter argued that:

"Workers' rights will be the responsibility for Qatar and the companies – many of them European companies – who work there. It is not FIFA's primary responsibility, but we cannot turn a blind eye. Yet it is not a direct intervention from FIFA that can change things".

He also stated at the time that Qatar 2022 was not FIFA's main priority at the time, as there were two World Cups between then and 2022.⁵¹

Indeed, in May 2016, FIFA admitted to Amnesty International that it had not raised concerns with the Local Organising Committee until May 2015 and that before 2015 it did not consider the construction of World Cup stadiums to be its responsibility.⁵²

2015 appeared to mark a turning point in FIFA's general approach to human rights after FIFA's Executive Committee (today, the Council) took the decision to publicly adhere to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles). However, its response to labour rights abuses in Qatar remained limited and reactive for many years after, contrary to the proactive, hands-on approach encouraged by the UN Guiding Principles.

⁴⁴ ILO *Complaint concerning non-observance by Qatar of the Forced Labour Convention*, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_586479.pdf

⁴⁵ Amnesty International, *Qatar: Abuse of World Cup workers exposed*, 31 March 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/03/abuse-of-world-cup-workers-exposed/>

⁴⁶ Amnesty International, *Qatar – New name, old system? Qatar's new employment law and abuse of migrant workers* (Index: MDE 22/5242/2016), 12 December 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/5242/2016/en/>

⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Qatar: Take Urgent Action to Protect Construction Workers*, 27 September 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/qatar-take-urgent-action-protect-construction-workers>

⁴⁸ Based on statements made by officials at the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Interior to Amnesty International during field mission in Qatar in 2012, Amnesty International, *The Dark Side of Migration: Spotlight on Qatar's construction Sector Ahead of the World Cup* (Index: MDE 22/010/2013), 18 November 2013, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Gulf Times, *New law lifts two-year ban on expats' re-entry*, 1 November 2015, www.gulf-times.com/story/461194/New-law-lifts-two-year-ban-on-expats-re-entry; Qatar News Agency, 9 October 2016, www.qna.org.qa/en-us/News/16100918410055/Launch-of-AwarenessCampaign-on-New-Worker-Protection-Law

⁵⁰ Amnesty International, *Qatar: Migrant workers still at risk of abuse despite reforms*, 12 December 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/qatar-migrant-workers-still-at-risk-of-abuse-despite-reforms/>

⁵¹ The Guardian, *World Cup 2022: football cannot ignore Qatar worker deaths, says Sepp Blatter*, 4 October 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/oct/04/world-cup-2022-fifa-sepp-blatter-qatar-worker-deaths>

⁵² Amnesty International, *Campaign update: FIFA and Qatar government responding to our pressure*, 3 May 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/05/fifa-qatar-government-responding-to-pressure/>

In 2016, the FIFA Congress adopted a new Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes committing the organization to respect all internationally recognized human rights and to promote the respect of these rights in the context of FIFA's activities.⁵³ But it was not until 2017 that FIFA formally recognized its responsibility for workers' rights among others in its Human Rights Policy.⁵⁴

2017-2022: LATE REFORMS AND CONTINUED ABUSE

In October 2017, after years of mounting pressure, Qatar finally signed an agreement with the ILO promising to reform its labour system.⁵⁵ This agreement has been Qatar's most significant commitment to date and indicated a serious shift in its approach.

In the years that followed, Qatar introduced some important legal reforms which benefited both World Cup and non-World Cup related workers alike, including:⁵⁶

- In August 2017, the Domestic Workers Law, which stipulates limits on working hours, mandatory daily breaks, a weekly day off and paid holidays regulating working hours.
- In March 2018, the Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes (Labour Committees) to facilitate workers' access to justice.
- In May 2018, ratifying two key international human rights treaties, although Qatar reserved the right to ignore some of their key obligations, including the right of workers to form and join trade unions.
- In November 2018, a fund to support and expedite payment of unpaid wages.
- From 2019, piloting the formation of joint committees between employers and workers.
- In August 2020, a non-discriminatory new minimum wage.
- By August 2020, ending both the exit permit and No-Objection Certificate requirements, which would allow migrant workers to leave Qatar and change jobs without their employer's permission.
- In May 2021, legislation extending the summer working hours ban and introducing additional measures to mitigate the risk to workers of the harsh climate.

These reforms have the potential to transform the lives of migrant workers in Qatar and have in some cases improved their working and living standards. According to the Ministry of Labour, "242,870 workers managed to change job since barriers were removed in September 2020 and more than 400,000 have directly benefitted from the new minimum wage."

Additionally, "improvements to the Wage Protection System now protect more than 96 percent of eligible workers from wage abuse; new visa centres in labour-sending countries have significantly reduced exploitative practices before workers arrive in Qatar; and new rules extend the ban on summer working to minimise the effect of heat stress."⁵⁷

However, persistent structural problems coupled with a lack of proper enforcement means that thousands of migrant workers continue to face abuse and exploitation. All migrant workers still depend on their employers from the moment they enter the country and throughout their employment. Research by Amnesty International and other organizations show that thousands continue to face wage theft, unsafe working and living conditions, and sometimes insurmountable barriers to changing jobs.⁵⁸ They are still prohibited from

⁵³ FIFA, 'FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights', May 2017, p 4,

<https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/ah5ghjuqbc6nzdbtpxhy.pdf>

⁵⁴ FIFA, *FIFA's Human Rights Policy – May 2017 edition*, p. 4.

⁵⁵ Amnesty International, *Qatar/UN: Agreement to tackle migrant labour abuse offers path to reform*, 26 October 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/qatar-un-agreement-to-tackle-migrant-labour-abuse-offers-path-to-reform/>

⁵⁶ Amnesty International, *Reality Check 2021: A year to the 2022 World Cup – The state of migrant workers' rights in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/4966/2021), 16 November 2021.

⁵⁷ See Twitter, *Statement by the Ministry of Labour in response to Amnesty's report "Reality Check 2021: A Year to the 2022 World Cup"*, 16 November 2021, <https://twitter.com/MOLQTR/status/1460494298965753857?s=20&t=jxhmvz-Hlw-AfWv1AuyoPQ>

⁵⁸ Amnesty International, *Reality Check 2021: A Year to the 2022 World Cup – The State of Migrant Worker's Rights in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/4966/2021), 16 November 2021; see also Human Rights Watch, "How Can We Work Without Wages? Salary Abuses Facing Migrant Workers Ahead of Qatar's FIFA World Cup 2022", 24 August 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/24/how-can-we-work-without-wages/salary-abuses-facing-migrantworkers-ahead-qatars>; and Human Rights Watch, *Qatar: Wage Abuse Action Shortchanges Workers*, 22 December 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/22/qatarwage-abuse-action-shortchanges-workers>; and Migrant-Rights.org, *Job mobility in Qatar is still a mirage despite reforms; domestic workers most affected*, 5 October 2021,

forming and joining trade unions to collectively fight for their rights as guaranteed under international law Qatar has agreed to be bound by,⁵⁹ while justice evades them and compensation for abuse remains limited.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, many unscrupulous employers continued to operate with a “business as usual” approach, able to disregard the new laws with impunity.⁶¹ On top of this, migrant workers continue to face a generalized lack of appreciation of their efforts and a deep-rooted culture of discrimination.⁶²

As a result, abuses continued to pile up, as shown by some of the cases documented by Amnesty International and summarized below.

RECRUITMENT FEES

The vast majority of low-paid workers in Qatar continue to pay high recruitment fees in order to secure their jobs which is in breach of both international labour standards and Qatari laws.⁶³ With some exceptions, such as some high skilled workers, and some discrepancies between nationalities, the payment of recruitment fees is a near-universal experience for workers from countries including those from South Asia and East Africa. According to the Supreme Committee’s most recent self-audits, on average over the past four years,



Nepali men wait outside the Foreign Employment Office at Tribhuvan International Airport, in the capital of Nepal, Kathmandu. Many will be prospective migrant workers, bound for the Gulf. © Rajneesh Bhandari/Amnesty International

<https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/10/job-mobility-in-qatar-is-still-a-mirage-despite-reforms-domestic-workers-most-affected/>; and Migrant-Rights.org, *18 months of non-payment, Qatari company leaves workers in the lurch*, 14 October 2020, <https://www.migrantrights.org/2020/10/18-months-of-non-payment-qatari-company-leaves-workers-in-the-lurch/>; and Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, *Checked Out: Migrant worker abuse in Qatar’s World Cup luxury hotels*, 14 July 2021, pp. 24 – 25, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/2021_Qatar_Hotels_v547.pdf

⁵⁹ In particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

⁶⁰ Amnesty International, *All Work, No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar’s Migrant Workers for Justice* (Index: MDE 22/0793/2019), September 2019.

⁶¹ Amnesty International, *Reality Check 2021: A Year to the 2022 World Cup – The State of Migrant Worker’s Rights in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/4966/2021), 16 November 2021.

⁶² *Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance*, Professor E. Tendayi Achiume, “Visit to Qatar”, A/HRC/44/57/Add.1, 27 April 2020, <https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/44/57/Add.1>

⁶³ See, for example, Amnesty International, *Nepal: Turning people into profits*, (Index: ASA 31/6206/2017), <http://www.amnesty.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Amnesty-Nepal-Turningpeople-into-profits-v4.pdf>. And also Article 33 of Qatar Labour Law which prohibits those recruiting employees from abroad from receiving “from the worker any sums representing recruitment fees or expenses or any other costs”.

80% of its construction workers considered to be in 'low skilled' jobs paid recruitment fees to the recruitment agencies in their home countries, with an average of US\$1,333 paid per person.⁶⁴

Given that the experience of Supreme Committee workers is likely to be typical, and is in line with other research,⁶⁵ the hundreds of thousands of workers employed on World Cup-related projects (including those not overseen by the Supreme Committee) are likely to have paid hundreds of millions of dollars in recruitment fees since 2010. This figure will increase to billions of dollars when considering workers on projects in Qatar not related to the World Cup.

To give just one specific example beyond construction workers, Amnesty International recently interviewed security guards from eight companies, who also paid an average of around US\$1,300 each in recruitment fees.⁶⁶ Such a practice extended across the private security sector would mean that tens of millions of US dollars had been paid by Qatar's estimated 40,000 security guards⁶⁷ – many of whom were deployed on FIFA related events and will be deployed around the World Cup.

UNPAID WAGES

Over the course of the past decade, late and non-payment of wages and other contractual benefits remain some of the most common forms of labour abuse facing migrant workers in Qatar, who often leave the country without receiving any compensation. Amnesty International alone has documented scores of cases involving thousands of workers – some related to the World Cup, and some not – which are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg.⁶⁸

For example, in 2018, Amnesty International highlighted the plight of hundreds of Mercury MENA employees who suffered persistent delayed wages, non-provision of legal documentation, restrictions on their freedom of movement and other serious labour rights abuses. Working to provide cooled water for the air conditioning system of the new city of Lusail and the Lusail stadium (the stadium where the World Cup will both open and close), the employees suffered for months without any recourse to justice.⁶⁹ During 2020 some workers from Nepal and the Philippines finally received months-worth of unpaid wages from the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund after Amnesty International documented and pursued their cases, but others continue to wait to receive their dues despite the government's repeated promise to pay them.

In another example, between March 2018 and July 2019 Amnesty International investigated the cases of three companies not related to the World Cup – Hamad bin Khaled bin Hamad, United Cleaning and Hamton International – in which more than 2,000 workers worked for months without being paid. Many took their cases to the then newly established Labour Committees, but faced months of delays forcing most of

⁶⁴ Impactt, *Annual External Compliance Report of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy's Workers' Welfare Standards*, April 2021, figure 7, p. 32,

https://www.workerswelfare.qa/sites/default/files/reports_item/field_document/IMPA11%20-%202021%20Qatar%20Annual%20Report_Issue%202_0.pdf

⁶⁵ A 2021 study by UNIGlobal Union into recruitment practices within G4S Qatar found that 39 out of 40 guards interviewed had paid recruitment fees, with the average payment being US\$1,525. See: UNIGlobal Union, *Diligence is Due: The exploitation of migrant workers through G4S Qatar's unfair recruitment practices*, December 2021, p.6, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/Diligence_is_Due_-_Final_Report_December_2021_mDSklVv.pdf ; Human Rights Watch also found that 72 out of 93 migrant workers interviewed for a 2020 report had paid recruitment fees to secure their job in Qatar. Human Rights Watch, "How Can We Work Without Wages?" *Salary Abuses Facing Migrant Workers Ahead of Qatar's FIFA World Cup 2022*, 24 August 2020. For an in-depth look at the recruitment process see: See: Amnesty International, *Nepal: Turning people into profits: Abusive recruitment, trafficking and forced labour of Nepali migrant workers* (Index: ASA 31/6206/2017), 6 June 2017; and FairSquare Projects, *The Five Corridors Project: Nepal – Qatar*, 2021,

<https://fivecorridorsproject.org/nepal-qatar>; and Migrant-Rights, *Recruitment to the Gulf: Challenges and Solutions*, <https://www.migrant-rights.org/campaign/migrant-worker-recruitment-to-the-gulf-challenges-and-solutions/>

⁶⁶ Amnesty International, *Qatar: "They think that we're machines": Forced labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar's private security sector* (Index: MDE 22/5388/2022), 7 April 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/5388/2022/en/>

⁶⁷ The Guardian, *Migrant guards in Qatar 'still paid under £1 an hour' ahead of World Cup*, 1 June 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2021/jun/01/migrant-guards-in-qatar-still-paid-under-1-an-hour-ahead-of-world-cup>

⁶⁸ For example, according to the ILO's 2020 Progress Report, cases of unpaid salaries increased sharply from March 2020, with 8,756 companies "blocked" for violating the Wage Protection System, p. 4, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconfi/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_757599.pdf

⁶⁹ Amnesty International, *Unpaid and abandoned: the abuse of Mercury MENA workers*, 26 September 2018.

them to drop their cases and return home penniless. Others managed to see their cases through and after two years of struggle received most of their dues.⁷⁰

Similarly, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre recorded 211 cases of abuse impacting more than 24,400 workers between 2016 and 2022, most of which are related to non-payment of wages.⁷¹

The amount of money lost by workers is often life-changing for them and their families, especially given how many have taken out loans to pay recruitment fees, and the total for World Cup and non-World Cup-related projects is likely to amount to tens or even up to hundreds of millions of dollars since 2010. For instance, the average amount paid by the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund between October 2020 and October 2021 was US\$4,745 per worker.⁷²

The number of complaints made to the Ministry of Labour may also only represent a small proportion of the true number of unpaid and underpaid workers. Only a proper review and assessment of all available data, including using the Wage Protection System,⁷³ could identify the exact number of workers who have been victims of wage theft and have not received adequate remedy.

DEATHS AND INJURIES OF MIGRANT WORKERS

Since 2010, thousands of migrant workers have died suddenly and unexpectedly in Qatar, across all projects and sectors, despite passing their mandatory medical tests before travelling to the country.⁷⁴ The Qatari authorities have failed to investigate the vast majority of these deaths, issuing instead death certificates

⁷⁰ Amnesty International, *All Work, No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar's Migrant Workers for Justice* (Index MDE 22/0793/2019), 16 September 2019.

⁷¹ Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, *What did it take to build the Qatar World Cup stadiums?*, 30 March 2022, <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/media-centre/media-advisory-what-did-it-take-to-build-the-qatar-world-cup-stadiums/>

⁷² According to the Ministry of Labour progress report shared with Amnesty International. Document on file with Amnesty International.

⁷³ The Wage Protection System mandates companies to pay their employees by electronic transfer and improves the government's ability to monitor cases when companies fail to do so. In its 2020 progress report, the ILO reported that the WPS had been expanded to cover 96% of eligible workers and 94% of enterprises. The system was reportedly able to detect a broader range of wage related violations, including payment below the minimum basic wage and the new threshold for food and accommodation allowances. At least 58 companies "deemed at high-risk" were blocked from accessing government services and this number considerably increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. See *ILO Progress report 2020*, 9 October 2020, p. 8, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_757599.pdf

⁷⁴ The figures around this are controversial and disputed, and ultimately masked by the lack of effective investigations or certifications of workers' deaths. Demographic data published by the Qatari authorities shows that a total of 15,021 non-Qataris have died in Qatar between 2010 and 2019, although this should not be taken as an indication of how many workers died from work-related reasons, nor how many died in relation to the World Cup. The figure includes people from all ages, occupations and causes of death and should not be taken as an indication of how many workers died from work-related reasons, nor how many died in relation to the World Cup. See Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, <https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics1/Pages/default.aspx>



Relatives and villagers carry the coffin of Balkisun Mandal Khatwe at Belhi village, Saptari district of Nepal. Balkisun, who had been working for a company in Qatar for less than a month, died in his sleep. © Niranjan Shrestha/AP/Shutterstock

reporting “natural causes” or “cardiac arrest” as the cause of death (descriptions that are almost meaningless in certifying death), precluding any assessment of whether it was work-related.⁷⁵ As a result, bereaved families have been denied the opportunity to know what happened to their loved ones and are denied compensation from the employers or Qatari authorities.

For example, on Supreme Committee projects, only three deaths have been reported as work-related, and 33 as non-work related, from October 2015 to October 2019.⁷⁶ However, 18 cases reported as non-work related included no reference to an underlying cause of death, instead using terms such as “natural causes”, “cardiac arrest” or “acute respiratory failure”. The fact that nearly half of deaths officially categorized as non-work-related on Qatar’s most high-profile construction project have not identified an underlying cause of death suggests that these deaths have not been adequately investigated or explained. It is not known how many workers have died on other projects related to the World Cup, and this would require further investigation.

This points to a wider systematic failure to investigate migrant worker deaths and makes it difficult to identify the number of migrant workers who died on World Cup-related projects because of their working conditions.

Given the huge health risks to workers posed by the extreme heat and humidity in Qatar and the inadequate protection measures in place, many of these deaths could be related to the victims’ working conditions. One academic study, for example, showed that at least 200 ‘cardiovascular deaths’ of Nepali nationals between 2009 and 2017 could have been prevented with adequate heat safety measures.⁷⁷ This means that, when also considering the situation of workers from other nationalities employed in similar occupations, it is likely

⁷⁵ Amnesty International, *Qatar: Failure to investigate migrant worker deaths leaves families in despair*, 25 August 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/qatar-failure-to-investigate-migrant-worker-deaths-leaves-families-in-despair/>

⁷⁶ Amnesty International, *‘In the prime of their lives’: Qatar’s failure to investigate, remedy and prevent migrant workers’ deaths* (Index: MDE 22/4614/2021), 26 August 2021, pp. 30-39. The Supreme Committee told Amnesty International in an April 2021 letter that there had been three work-related fatalities and 35 non-work-related fatalities on their projects “since construction began in 2016”.

⁷⁷ Bandana Pradan, Tord Kjellstrom, Dan Atar, Puspa Sharma, Birendra Kayastha, Ghita Bhandari, Pushkar K. Pradhan, *Heat Stress Impacts on Cardiac Mortality in Nepali Migrant Workers in Qatar*, 2019, p. 46, <https://www.karger.com/Article/FullText/500853>

that many hundreds of deaths are likely to have been preventable over the full period in question. This refers to workers on all projects in Qatar, whether related to the World Cup or not.

In May 2021, Qatar finally introduced new legislation on heat protection aiming to provide better protection for workers. While this legislation will provide greater protections for workers if properly implemented, leading experts in the field of environmental health and heat stress have told Amnesty International that much more needs to be done to fully protect workers from the risks of heat stress. Indeed, Qatar has so far done little to improve its processes to investigate, certify and remedy migrant workers' deaths.⁷⁸

In terms of workplace injuries, the ILO highlights that in 2020 alone, just over 500 people were reported as having been severely injured and 37,600 suffered mild to moderate injuries.⁷⁹ Over the course of the full period since Qatar was awarded the World Cup, this means it is likely that hundreds of thousands of workers have been injured, many of them seriously. While some of these may well have received compensation, it is unclear how many have or how much they have received in the absence of any information from the responsible authorities.

While no amount of money can replace a lost loved one, the loss of a breadwinner can have a devastating financial impact on workers' families. Qatar has an obligation to provide remedy for the deaths of workers.⁸⁰ When calculating compensation, there is already a precedent to build from. The Supreme Committee has paid on average US\$43,567 for each of the three deaths that it has recognised as work-related, and an average of US\$11,360 for the deaths that they did not recognise as work-related (something that may be contested due to the lack of effective investigations). According to the ILO Standards on Employment Injury Benefit based on Convention C.121 on Social Security, in the case of the death of a breadwinner, the pension should be at least 50% from the earnings of 'unskilled' workers.⁸¹

In cases of otherwise healthy workers dying following exposure to high temperature at work, Amnesty International believes that families should be provided compensation in line with the ILO standard unless an independent cause of death is identified during a post-mortem investigation. This could potentially involve tens of millions of dollars of compensation, if comprehensively done.

FORCED LABOUR AND OTHER ABUSES

In April 2022, Amnesty International documented the working conditions of migrant workers across Qatar's private security sector where guards are being subjected to serious labour abuses that amount to forced labour.⁸² The research included guards deployed on a range of projects, including World Cup stadiums, tournaments such as the 2020 (delayed to 2021) FIFA Club World Cup, 2021 FIFA Arab Cup, the 2019 Arabian Gulf Cup, and Al Janoub and Khalifa International Stadiums.

Guards told Amnesty International about the wide range of abuses they face, sometimes working in conditions that amount to forced labour. These include excessive working hours, lack of rest days, and arbitrary or disproportionate financial penalties, as well as underpayment of overtime work, potentially dangerous working conditions, substandard living conditions and discrimination on the basis of race, nationality and language. The workers' stories also highlighted the appalling consequences of such treatment, with guards describing their physical and psychological exhaustion, suffering and anguish.

Excessive working hours and the dangerous conditions they face when deployed for long periods outside in searing heat also endangers the health and lives of these workers. At the end of their gruelling shifts, sometimes double shifts, they typically return to substandard, often insanitary company-provided accommodation, frequently sleeping on bunk beds in overcrowded rooms.

⁷⁸ Amnesty International, *'In the Prime of their lives': Qatar's failure to investigate, remedy and prevent migrant workers' deaths* (Index: MDE 22/4614/2021), 26 August 2021.

⁷⁹ ILO, *ILO publishes report on work-related deaths and injuries in Qatar*, 18 November 2021, https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/qatar/WCMS_828399/lang--en/index.htm

⁸⁰ Article 2(3), ICCPR; Article 2, ICESCR; Article 6, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Articles 12, 13 and 23 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights.

⁸¹ See ILO Standards on Employment Injury Benefit, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/genericdocument/wcms_625879.pdf; and C.102 on Social Security, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C102

⁸² Amnesty International, *"They think that we're machines": Forced labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar's private security sector* (Index: MDE 22/5388/2022), 7 April 2022.



Security stand at Khalifa International Stadium in Doha, Qatar. © Maja Hitij/Getty Images

An internal memorandum from one security company investigated by Amnesty International shows that each month it paid its guards US\$89 less than they are legally entitled to for the overtime hours they work. This is the equivalent of around eight days' basic pay every month. Assuming this policy is applicable to the majority of its 8,000 strong workforce, it could mean that workers are losing as much as US\$712,000 in wages each month, or US\$8.5 million each year, in this one company alone.⁸³

DOMESTIC WORKERS

While most domestic work is not directly related to the World Cup, Qatar also has a clear obligation to act to prevent and remedy these abuses in line with its international commitments to protect all workers. Although the government introduced a law to protect domestic workers in August 2017, Amnesty International found in research published in 2020 that they continue to face the most difficult living and working conditions in the country. Pushed to breaking point by extreme overwork, lack of rest, and abusive and degrading treatment, many women said that their rights continued to be violated daily and had seen no improvement to their conditions. They said they worked an average of 16 hours a day, every day of the week, and had their passport confiscated by their employers. Some said they were not receiving their salaries and were being subjected to vicious insults and assaults.⁸⁴

2014-2022: STRONGER BUT PARTIAL PROTECTION FOR SUPREME COMMITTEE WORKERS

The first steps to better protect migrant workers' rights building World Cup infrastructure were taken in a process driven by the Supreme Committee, when it launched in 2014 Workers' Welfare Standards based on

⁸³ Amnesty International, *"They think that we're machines": Forced labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar's private security sector* (Index: MDE 22/5388/2022), 7 April 2022, pp. 40-46.

⁸⁴ Amnesty International, *"Why do you Want to Rest?": Ongoing Abuses of Domestic Workers in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/3175/2020), 20 October 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde22/3175/2020/en/>. Also see: Amnesty International, *"My Sleep is my Break": Exploitation of Migrant Domestic Workers in Qatar* (Index: MDE 22/004/2014), 23 April 2014, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE22/004/2014/en/>

its March 2013 Workers' Charter.⁸⁵ The Charter was the first step in establishing and enforcing enhanced labour standards for workers engaged in Supreme Committee projects. However, these workers formed only a small sub-set – around 2% - of all migrant workers engaged in construction in Qatar, and even represent just a small minority of workers in World Cup-related construction.

The Workers' Welfare Standards apply to workers ("Supreme Committee workers") engaged in constructing facilities and all other activities directly under the control of the Supreme Committee associated with hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup (the Programme) and to "all entities that undertake any works or provide any goods and/or services in relation to the Programme."⁸⁶

The Workers' Welfare Standards are mandatory for all Supreme Committee contractors and subcontractors working in the construction of, or provision of services to, the stadiums and training sites that will be used for the World Cup. The Standards contain requirements on employment contracts, payments as well as working and accommodation conditions. They also include provisions designed to prevent charging of recruitment fees; deception about the nature and conditions of work; retention of passports by employers and contract substitution.

Mechanisms to monitor and enforce effective compliance with the Workers' Welfare Standards were put in place, as well as to resolve disputes and address claims of non-compliance.⁸⁷ The Supreme Committee also adopted a formalized grievance redress mechanism that includes Workers' Welfare Forums and a dedicated grievance hotline. This was later systematized into a three-tier grievance mechanism: the first tier is the Workers' Welfare Officer, the second is the Workers' Welfare Forums, and the third is the Supreme Committee's anonymous grievance hotline.

The Workers' Welfare Standards were updated in 2016 and 2018,⁸⁸ while in 2019 the Supreme Committee also enforced a temporary minimum wage for all Supreme Committee workers before draft legislation was passed.⁸⁹

The introduction of the Universal Reimbursement Scheme in 2018 was a key initiative to provide some remedy for workers. The Scheme aims to compensate both Supreme Committee workers and legacy workers⁹⁰ for recruitment fees they may have paid prior to moving to Qatar.⁹¹ Through this scheme, employers are expected to repay recruitment fees to workers who claim that they had to pay them, without the need to provide a receipt, unless the employers can prove that no recruitment fees were paid. This scheme covers workers who paid recruitment fees to come to Qatar after it was introduced and also seeks to ensure "that legacy workers on projects in Qatar prior to joining the SC programme are compensated for hardships they may have encountered when moving here."⁹²

According to the Supreme Committee, this scheme has so far covered over 30,000 Supreme Committee workers and around 18,000 others, many migrant workers who worked on Supreme Committee projects have not benefited from it.⁹³ According to the Supreme Committee's self-audit reports, this scheme has reimbursed on average US\$703 per worker,⁹⁴ compared to average recruitment fees paid of US\$1,333.⁹⁵

Supreme Committee workers also benefitted from other schemes and measures. For example, to protect them from the risk of heat stress, the Supreme Committee also introduced in 2019, additional measures that included: "cooled and shaded rest areas; water stations with cool water and rehydration salts; mandatory

⁸⁵ All details about the Workers' Welfare Standards can be found on the Supreme Committee's dedicated website: <https://www.workerswelfare.qa/en/our-legacy/our-standards>

⁸⁶ Workers' Welfare Standards, "Definitions" (p. 5) and Article 3.2.

⁸⁷ These comprise a four-tier auditing system consisting of regular self-audits by contractors, ad hoc Supreme Committee audits, independent third party audits (as of 2016) and audits by the Ministry of Labour. Non-compliance is punished by a range of measures, including suspension of payments, rectification at the contractor's cost and contract termination. *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 First Sustainability Progress Report*, p. 17, <https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/news/fifa-world-cup-2022tm-first-sustainability-progress-report-published>

⁸⁸ Workers' Welfare Standards Bulletin 1 to Edition 2 Effective February 2018, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/documents/Workers-Welfare-Standards-Edition-2-EN.pdf>

⁸⁹ *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 First Sustainability Progress Report*, p. 20.

⁹⁰ In reference to workers hired prior to the commencement of Supreme Committee projects.

⁹¹ *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 First Sustainability Progress Report*, p. 18.

⁹² Supreme Committee, *Sixth Annual Workers' Welfare Progress Report*, January – December 2020, p. 27.

⁹³ Impactt, *Annual External Compliance Report of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy's Workers' Welfare Standards*, February 2019, p. 7.

⁹⁴ Impactt, *Annual External Compliance Report of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy's Workers' Welfare Standards*, February 2019, p. 7.

⁹⁵ Impactt, *Annual External Compliance Report of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy's Workers' Welfare Standards*, April 2021, Figure 8, p. 33.

water bottles for each worker; medical care plans; annual medical checks; training for workers and medical staff on the effects of heat stress and dehydration”; and cooling suits “designed to reduce thermal skin temperature”.⁹⁶

Given the very low levels of labour rights protection for migrant workers in the country, the Supreme Committee’s Workers’ Welfare Standards certainly represent an unprecedented and significant improvement in living and working conditions for those workers. While actual implementation by contractors was slow and gradual, in its last two reports of 2018 and 2019, the Supreme Committee noted many improvements in both uptake and enforcement of the Workers’ Welfare Standards.⁹⁷ More recently, the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), a global trade union federation protecting workers’ rights in the construction industry and a key partner, described these achievements as “green patches of decent work”.⁹⁸

However, the Workers’ Welfare Standards have not been and are still not fully enforced or universally respected. Indeed, in some instances, they have failed to protect workers from abuse and exploitation or provide them adequate and timely remedy. A few examples since 2014 include:

- In September 2014, the Supreme Committee explained that there was a general lack of awareness about the Workers’ Welfare Standards and, in some instances, a lack of capacity to implement some of its provisions.⁹⁹
- In 2016, Amnesty International found that migrant workers building Khalifa International Stadium in Doha for the 2022 World Cup were suffering systematic abuses, in some cases amounting to forced labour. These included high recruitment fees for which many took out loans; false promises about the pay and type of work on offer; passport confiscation by employers; dirty and cramped accommodation; and threats for complaining about their conditions.¹⁰⁰
- In January 2018, the Supreme Committee was still saying that persuading contractors to comply with the Workers’ Welfare Standards was “a key challenge”.¹⁰¹
- In February 2018, an audit requested by the Supreme Committee of 19 contractors working on World Cup sites showed that abuses, including contract substitution and excessive working hours, were happening in a significant majority of the companies analysed.¹⁰²
- In August 2018, Qatar’s World Cup organizers acknowledged that contractors working on one of the stadiums had breached a summer hours regulation that limits outdoor work when dangerously high temperatures pose a serious risk to workers’ health.¹⁰³
- In February 2020, the Supreme Committee’s own audit raised concerns about the working conditions of workers employed by security contractors, particularly in relation to working hours and rest days, and advised that “as the demand for security and hospitality services increases,

⁹⁶ Amnesty International, “*In the prime of their lives*”: Qatar’s failure to investigate, remedy and prevent migrant workers’ deaths (Index: MDE 22/4614/2021), 26 August 2021, p. 21.

⁹⁷ These include a reported 95% of Supreme Committee workers living in Workers’ Welfare Standards-compliant accommodation by January 2018; the rolling out of a risk-based inspection criteria; targeted auditing of recruitment practices; hundreds of migrant workers benefiting from the Supreme Committee’s Recruitment Fee Reimbursement Scheme by January 2019; and a new mechanism to make contractors step in and directly pay the delayed wages of sub-contractor workers. See Supreme Committee, *Third Annual Workers’ Welfare Progress Report March 2017 to January 2018*, p. 20, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/docs/Workers-Welfare-Progress-Report-2017-March-to-2018-January-EN.pdf>; Supreme Committee, *Fourth Annual Workers’ Welfare Progress Report February 2018-January 2019*, pp. 11, 18-19, 25, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/docs/4th-Annual-Workers-Welfare-Progress-Report-EN.pdf>; Supreme Committee, *Fifth Annual Workers’ Welfare Progress Report February-December 2019*, p. 50, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/Workers-Welfare-Progress-Report-Dec-2019-EN.pdf>

⁹⁸ Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, July 2021, p. 10, <https://www.bwint.org/cms/dribble-or-goal-bwi-pushes-for-proposals-to-complete-labour-reforms-in-qatar-2379>

⁹⁹ It further explained that the Supreme Committee’s “ability to have a meaningful impact on recruitment practices has been limited, owing to the relatively small number of workers currently on our sites and that most of these workers were recruited before the implementation of the Workers’ Welfare Standards”. Supreme Committee, *Semi-Annual Workers’ Welfare Compliance Report: September 2014*, p. 5, <https://www.qatar2022.qa/sites/default/files/docs/SC-Workers-Welfare-Compliance-Report-EN.pdf>

¹⁰⁰ Amnesty International, *The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game - Exploitation of Migrant Workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup Site* (Index: MDE 22/3548/2016), 30 March 2016.

¹⁰¹ Supreme Committee, *Third Annual Workers’ Welfare Progress Report March 2017 to January 2018*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁰² Impactt, *Annual External Compliance Report of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy’s Workers’ Welfare Standards*, February 2018, p. 6, <https://impacttlimited.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SC-Annual-Report-2018-Issue-6.2-digital.pdf>

¹⁰³ Anchal Vohra, *Is Qatar failing to deliver on its World Cup promises?*, DW, 30 August 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/is-qatar-failing-to-deliver-on-its-world-cup-promises/a-45292278>

leading up to the tournament, these non-compliances must be closely monitored and remediated.”¹⁰⁴

- In June 2020, Amnesty International found that around 100 employees of Qatar Meta Coats, a design and construction company subcontracted to work on Al Bayt Stadium, had not been paid for up to seven months. Despite becoming aware of the payment issues, the Supreme Committee failed to provide timely remedy for workers.¹⁰⁵
- In July 2021, BWI was still raising the alarm about serious and persistent problems in implementing the Workers’ Welfare Standards and the gap between policy and practice, including in construction overseen by the Supreme Committee.¹⁰⁶
- In March 2022, Human Rights Watch found that migrant workers at a prominent Qatari trading and construction firm -which has multiple projects related to the World Cup- have not received their salaries for up to five months.¹⁰⁷
- In April 2022, Amnesty International found that security guards, including on projects linked to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, were working in conditions that amount to forced labour.¹⁰⁸ They all described routinely working 12 hours a day, seven days a week – often for months or even years on end without a day off. Most said their employers refused to respect the weekly rest day, which is required by Qatari law, and workers who took their day off faced punishment with arbitrary wage deductions. Neither FIFA nor the Supreme Committee conducted adequate due diligence before contracting the companies, and failed to identify and address abuses in a timely manner.



Workers seen at the construction site of Lusail Stadium, a venue for 2022 FIFA World Cup football matches. © Valery Sharifulin/TASS

The experience concerning cooling suits “designed to reduce thermal skin temperature”¹⁰⁹ - provides a good practical example of the progress made, as well as its limitations. In October 2020, FIFA, Q22¹¹⁰ and the

¹⁰⁴ Impactt, *Annual External Compliance Report of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy’s Workers’ Welfare Standards Building a legacy: laying the foundation*, February 2018, p. 7.

¹⁰⁵ Amnesty International, “*I have worked hard – I deserve to be paid*”: *Exploitation on Qatar World Cup stadium*, 10 June 2020.

¹⁰⁶ BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 26.

¹⁰⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Qatar: Wage Abuses by Firm in World Cup Leadup*, 3 March 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/03/qatar-wage-abuses-firm-world-cup-leadup>

¹⁰⁸ Amnesty International, *Qatar: “They think that we’re machines”: Forced labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar’s private security sector*, (Index: MDE 22/5388/2022), 7 April 2022.

¹⁰⁹ Supreme Committee letter to Amnesty International, 5 April 2021.

¹¹⁰ See Box 1 for more details about the Qatar 2022 institutional set up.

Supreme Committee claimed that “these innovations provide substantial safeguards to workers exposed to hot outdoor environments”.¹¹¹ While clearly positive, these remarks show that at least until 2019, Supreme Committee workers were wearing less than ideal clothing for Qatar’s dangerously high temperatures. In addition, only some Supreme Committee workers had been provided with these garments by October 2020. This means that many others were still wearing inappropriate clothing. It is not clear how many additional Supreme Committee workers were provided with the special garments from then on.¹¹²

The cooling suits example also raises the serious question of what sort of clothing all the other construction workers connected to the World Cup are still wearing, given the extremely high temperatures. As Amnesty International highlighted in an earlier report, the health risks posed to workers by Qatar’s extreme climate, especially when combined with excessive and physically strenuous working hours, can lead to heat stress and death.¹¹³

¹¹¹ *FIFA World Cup 2022 First Sustainability Progress Report*, p. 16.

¹¹² FIFA, Q22 and the Supreme Committee (SC) said: “Throughout 2019, 12,000 suits and 5,000 balaclava from the StayQool range were provided to SC workers”, see *FIFA World Cup 2022 First Sustainability Progress Report*. In its second sustainability progress report, dated January 2022, the tournament organizers announced that 30,000 Supreme Committee workers would benefit from StayQool garments and that 63,500 StayQool garments had been made to date. See “Engagement to Enhance Workers’ Welfare, (d) Cooling Technologies”, <https://publications.fifa.com/en/sustainability-report/human-pillar/workers-recruitment-and-working-conditions/engagement-to-enhance-workers-welfare/>. In a Workers’ Welfare Newsletter delivered by email to Amnesty International on 18 January 2022, the Supreme Committee said that over 15,900 StayQool suits had been distributed in 2020 and 45,694 suits had been deployed across five sites.

¹¹³ Amnesty International, *Qatar: Failure to investigate migrant worker deaths leaves families in despair*, 25 August 2021; also, The Guardian, *Qatar’s workers are at risk of heat stress for half the day during summer, finds UN*, 15 October 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/15/qatars-workers-are-at-risk-of-heat-stress-for-half-the-day-during-summer-finds-un>

5. RIGHT TO REMEDY: QATAR'S OBLIGATIONS

As a party to various international treaties prohibiting forced labour and other human rights abuses, including International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 29,¹¹⁴ 105¹¹⁵ and 189,¹¹⁶ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);¹¹⁷ International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);¹¹⁸ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;¹¹⁹ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;¹²⁰ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;¹²¹ and the Arab Charter on Human Rights,¹²² Qatar is obliged to protect all workers from being exploited in its territory.

In ratifying the ICESCR, Qatar has promised to guarantee the right to work to all in the country, including “the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right”¹²³ and to “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work”, including remuneration, rest time, paid leave, limited working hours and decent living conditions for workers.¹²⁴ It is also obliged to provide remedies when these rights are violated.¹²⁵

¹¹⁴ ILO C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029

¹¹⁵ ILO C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C105

¹¹⁶ ILO C189 - Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189

¹¹⁷ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>

¹¹⁸ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights>

¹¹⁹ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racial>

¹²⁰ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-elimination-all-forms-discrimination-against-women#:~:text=On%2018%20December%201979%2C%20the,twentieth%20country%20had%20ratified%20it>

¹²¹ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading>

¹²² Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/551368?ln=en>

¹²³ Article 6 of the ICESCR.

¹²⁴ Article 7 of the ICESCR, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/23, 10, p. 4.

¹²⁵ Article 2 of the ICESCR, and the CESCR, General Comment No. 3 on the nature of States parties' obligations (article 2, para. 1), UN Doc. E/1991/23 para 5; and the CESCR, General Comment 9 on the domestic application of the Covenant, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24.

The right to remedy is recognized under various international human rights treaties many of which Qatar has ratified.¹²⁶ It encompasses the victims' right to equal and effective access to justice and adequate, effective and prompt reparation for the harm suffered. Qatar is required to provide appropriate and effective remedy in a timely manner for victims as part of its obligation to take all appropriate measures to implement the rights recognized in these treaties, protect them from undue interference by private parties.¹²⁷ Indeed, Qatar has a duty under international human rights law to protect people from human rights abuses carried out by corporations as articulated in the UN Guiding Principles.¹²⁸

Based on norms and principles of international human rights law, Guiding Principle 1 of the UN Guiding Principles states:

*"States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/ or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication."*¹²⁹

It also notes:

*"The State duty to protect is a standard of conduct. Therefore, States are not per se responsible for human rights abuse by private actors. However, States may breach their international human rights law obligations where such abuse can be attributed to them, or where they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors' abuse."*¹³⁰

FIFA and other corporate actors bear responsibility for contributing to the harm that Qatar's exploitative system has inflicted on migrant workers engaged in World Cup-related projects and services. But it is ultimately Qatar's responsibility to undertake the necessary legal reforms and implement them effectively to ensure long-lasting and comprehensive protections for migrant workers in the country. It is also Qatar's responsibility to ensure that workers whose rights are violated (whether this is by state or non-state actors) have access to effective remedy.

However, as highlighted above, Qatar's track record on meeting its obligation to remedy abuses of workers' rights, for the vast majority of time since being awarded the 2022 World Cup in 2010, has been, despite recent improvements, slow and limited and for some, non-existent.

For instance, until 2018 migrant workers seeking justice to claim their unpaid salaries found themselves confronting a cumbersome and unresponsive justice system for years through the old labour courts.¹³¹ In 2018, the government established the Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes to quickly review labour complaints and pay workers, and set up the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund to secure compensation of unpaid wages to workers who won their cases but whose employers failed to pay them. However, despite these changes, which have improved access to remedy for thousands of workers, many others continue to struggle to secure timely remedy.¹³²

According to the ILO 2020 Progress Report, the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund has distributed a total of US\$4.37 million since its establishment to 5,803 workers, and a further US\$14.28 million was approved to reimburse over 3,000 workers.¹³³ While these tribunals, especially if compared to the labour courts, have to some extent improved workers' access to justice, they have failed to deliver fully on their promises and are

¹²⁶ Article 2(3) of the ICCPR; Article 2 of the ICESCR and the CESCR, General Comment No 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/23, para 59; Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Articles 12, 13 and 23 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights.

¹²⁷ CESCR, General Comment 9, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24, para. 9.

¹²⁸ Human Rights Council, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises*, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31.

¹²⁹ Human Rights Council, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises*, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31.

¹³⁰ Human Rights Council, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises*, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31.

¹³¹ Amnesty International, *The Dark Side of Migration: Spotlight on Qatar's construction Sector Ahead of the World Cup* (Index: MDE 22/010/2013), 18 November 2013, p. 114.

¹³² Amnesty International, *Reality Check 2021: A Year to the 2022 World Cup – The State of Migrant Worker's Rights in Qatar*.

¹³³ ILO, *Progress report on the technical cooperation programme between the Government of Qatar and the ILO*, 9 October 2020, p. 8.

not designed to tackle unremedied historical abuses as they do not address claims submitted after more than one year.¹³⁴

A particularly poignant example of denied remediation is that of the families of deceased migrant workers. As explained above, Qatari authorities have systematically failed to properly investigate the cause of death of migrant workers despite evidence of links between premature deaths and unsafe working conditions. In the absence of any proper investigation to determine whether their working conditions contributed to their death, bereaved families are automatically deprived of any possibility of compensation from employers or the government.¹³⁵

With the exception of Supreme Committee workers who can benefit from the Universal Reimbursement Scheme highlighted in chapter three, the payment of recruitment fees is another area where Qatar has failed to provide remedy for the vast majority of migrant workers in the country.



Migrant worker Tika Ram Tharu (r) and Anil Chaudhary (l) arrive along with a red coffin containing the body of their friend Buddiram Tharu, 42, at the International Airport in Kathmandu, Nepal on 18 December 2013. Buddiram went to Qatar in June 2012 as a migrant worker and died on 8 December 2013 after a heart attack. © Narendra Shrestha/EPA/Shutterstock

¹³⁴ See Article 10 and 113 from Labour Law No 14 of 2004, <https://almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=3961&language=ar>

¹³⁵ Amnesty International, *Qatar: Failure to investigate migrant worker deaths leaves families in despair*, 25 August 2021.

6. FIFA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES

FIFA's responsibility to respect human rights stems primarily from the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles) and is independent of the responsibilities of other state or non-state actors. This responsibility exists regardless of what states are doing to fulfil their own obligations to respect and protect human rights.¹³⁶ Under the UN Guiding Principles, FIFA also has a responsibility to remediate or cooperate in the remediation of abuses it causes or to which it contributes.¹³⁷

UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES

As a business enterprise, FIFA has a responsibility to respect human rights. This responsibility is laid down in the UN Guiding Principles, as acknowledged in 2016 when FIFA formally adopted the UN Guiding Principles in its Statutes (see below).

According to the UN Guiding Principles, FIFA's responsibility to respect human rights requires that it:

- avoids causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through its own activities and address such impacts when they occur; and
- seeks to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to its operations, products or services by business relationships, even if it has not contributed to those impacts.¹³⁸

Under the UN Guiding Principles, "business relationships" include "relationships with business partners, entities in its value chain, and any other non-State or State entity directly linked to its business operations, products or services."¹³⁹

In the Qatar 2022 World Cup context, the responsibility for coordinating and managing all activities related to the preparation and delivery of the tournament rests on four key actors: FIFA; the Qatar 2022 Local Organising Committee; the Supreme Committee; and, since 2019, the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 limited liability company (Q22).¹⁴⁰ While Qatar's Local Organising Committee and the Supreme Committee are FIFA's key business relationships for the purposes of delivering the 2022 World Cup, hundreds of other entities involved in construction and services are also FIFA's business relationships in the broader sense described by the UN Guiding Principles.

¹³⁶ UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 11. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct also clarifies that "Enterprises retain responsibility to address adverse impacts that they cause or contribute to, even when operating in contexts where systemic issues are prevalent." OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018, p. 75, <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf>

¹³⁷ UN Guiding Principles, Principle 22.

¹³⁸ UN Guiding Principles, Principle 13.

¹³⁹ UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 13.

¹⁴⁰ See Box 1 for more details about the Qatar 2022 institutional set up.

To meet its responsibility to respect human rights, FIFA should have a human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how it addresses its impacts on human rights.¹⁴¹

If FIFA identifies that it is causing or contributing to an adverse human rights impact, it must “take the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest extent possible”¹⁴² and remediate or cooperate in remediation through legitimate processes.¹⁴³

The UN Guiding Principles make clear that a business enterprise’s responsibility to respect human rights “exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations and does not diminish those obligations.”¹⁴⁴

The same principle applies between business enterprises, each retaining its own independent responsibility to respect human rights, which is particularly important in the context of this World Cup.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, the Supreme Committee is not the only entity that is responsible for abuses committed in relation to its construction projects. FIFA also bears responsibility for these. This follows its decision to award the World Cup to a country where the risks of severe human rights abuses were high and did so without imposing adequate safeguards.

Similarly, the fact that the Supreme Committee has remediated some of the abuses and offered workers under its purview better labour protections does not exempt FIFA from its own human rights responsibilities, including its obligation to remediate unaddressed harm.

Finally, the UN Guiding Principles clarify that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights “exists over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.”¹⁴⁶ This principle is particularly relevant for businesses operating in Qatar – and other Gulf countries – as the country’s labour laws not only fall short of international labour and human rights standards but actually contradict these standards in many respects.¹⁴⁷

In these situations, the UN Guiding Principles indicate that business enterprises “are expected to respect the principles of internationally recognized human rights to the greatest extent possible in the circumstances, and to be able to demonstrate their efforts in this regard.”¹⁴⁸

FIFA’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES

The UN Guiding Principles have been progressively embedded in FIFA’s own policies and strategies, including key commitments to ensure access to remedy, that apply to a wide range of workers related to the World Cup. In July 2015, FIFA’s Executive Committee (today, the Council) decided to publicly adhere to the UN Guiding Principles.¹⁴⁹ In December of that year, FIFA announced that it would ask Professor John

¹⁴¹ UN Guiding Principles, Principle 15.

¹⁴² UN Guiding Principles, Principle 19 and Commentary.

¹⁴³ UN Guiding Principles, Principle 22, UN Guiding Principles.

¹⁴⁴ UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 11. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct also clarifies that “Enterprises retain responsibility to address adverse impacts that they cause or contribute to, even when operating in contexts where systemic issues are prevalent.” OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018, p. 75, <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, p. 17.

¹⁴⁶ UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 11.

¹⁴⁷ For example, migrant workers in Qatar are denied their right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and to form or join trade unions. In fact, when the government ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR in 2018, it entered important reservations that made clear that it did not intend to change this situation. See Amnesty International, *Qatar finally joins two key human rights treaties – but what does it really mean for migrant workers?*, 13 June 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/qatar-finally-joins-two-key-human-rights-treaties-but-what-does-it-really-mean-for-migrant-workers/>. Through its differential treatment of workers, on the basis of national origin, without any objective justification, Qatar also discriminates against migrant workers in violation of its obligations under the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

¹⁴⁸ UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 23.

¹⁴⁹ FIFA, *FIFA Executive Committee sets presidential election for 26 February 2016 and fully supports roadmap for reform*, 20 July 2015, no longer available on fifa.com but accessible on <https://www.infobae.com/aroundtherings/federations/2021/07/12/fifa-executive-committee-sets-presidential-election-for-26-february-2016-and-fully-supports-roadmap-for-reform/>.

Ruggie, author of the UN Guiding Principles, to provide it with recommendations for “further embedding” the UN Guiding Principles into FIFA’s policies and practices.¹⁵⁰ Further steps followed, including:

- In February 2016, the FIFA Congress adopted a new Article 3 of the FIFA Statutes, which committed FIFA to respect all internationally recognized human rights and to promote the respect of these rights in the context of FIFA’s activities.¹⁵¹
- In August 2016, Professor Ruggie published his advice to FIFA laying out 25 broad recommendations for FIFA’s operationalization of its new human rights commitments.¹⁵²
- In October 2016, FIFA issued a new organizational strategy expressing its commitment to work closely with FIFA World Cup Local Organization Committees and local governments to ensure fair working conditions on FIFA World Cup construction sites.¹⁵³
- In March 2017, FIFA announced the creation of an independent Human Rights Advisory Board to provide FIFA with advice on implementing its human rights responsibilities.¹⁵⁴ The Board was eventually disbanded in March 2020.¹⁵⁵
- In May 2017, FIFA’s Council confirmed the inclusion of detailed human rights requirements based on the UN Guiding Principles in the bidding and selection process for the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup.¹⁵⁶
- In May 2017, FIFA adopted its first Human Rights Policy, outlining the organization’s responsibilities and commitments in line with the UN Guiding Principles.¹⁵⁷
- In January 2020, FIFA published its Sustainability Policy and the Sustainability Strategy for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.¹⁵⁸
- In April 2020, FIFA, Q22 and the Supreme Committee launched the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code,¹⁵⁹ which sets out the minimum mandatory requirements for tournament organizers’ suppliers.¹⁶⁰
- In January 2022, FIFA announced the establishment of a “human rights grievance and remedy mechanism” for “participants, attendees, human rights defenders, media representatives and

¹⁵⁰ FIFA, *FIFA to further develop its human rights approach with international expert John Ruggie*, 14 December 2015, <https://www.business-humanrights.org/de/neuste-meldungen/fifa-to-further-develop-its-human-rights-approach-with-international-expert-john-ruggie/>.

¹⁵¹ FIFA, *FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights, May 2017*, p. 4, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/ah5ghjuqbc6nzdbtpxhy.pdf>

¹⁵² John Ruggie, *For the Game. For the World – FIFA and Human Rights*, 2016, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cril/files/Ruggie_humanrightsFIFA_reportApril2016.pdf

¹⁵³ FIFA, *FIFA, 2.0: The Vision for the Future*, 13 October 2016, p. 63, <https://resources.FIFA.com/image/upload/FIFA-2-0-the-vision-for-the-future.pdf?cloudid=drnd5smfl6dhxgiyqmx>

¹⁵⁴ FIFA, *Independent Advisory Board of Human Rights Experts to meet on 13 March*, 10 March 2017, <https://www.fifa.com/media-releases/independent-advisory-board-of-human-rights-experts-to-meet-on-13-march-2875485>

¹⁵⁵ FIFA, *FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board provides closing report*, 23 March 2021, <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/committees/news/fifa-human-rights-advisory-board-provides-closing-report>. All details about the Board’s work as well as its earlier four reports can be found at: <https://old.business-humanrights.org/en/fifa-human-rights-advisory-board>.

In its response to Amnesty International, FIFA said that a “working group on human rights and social responsibility” was formed in 2021 but that the formal sub-committee is currently being constituted. See FIFA’s response to Amnesty International, p. 5. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

¹⁵⁶ FIFA, *Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - First Report with the Advisory Board’s Recommendations and an Update by FIFA*, September 2017, p. 39, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/ab2ywftc8qle92nghiiee.pdf>

¹⁵⁷ FIFA, *FIFA’s Human Rights Policy – May 2017 edition*, <https://img.FIFA.com/image/upload/kr05dqyhr1uhqy2lh6r.pdf>

¹⁵⁸ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Policy, and FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy, <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-world-cup-qatar-2022tm-sustainability-strategy.pdf?cloudid=u25obd7303tdxupsjysn>. In its January 2020 Human Rights Report, FIFA claimed that the Sustainability Policy and Strategy were both finalized towards the end of 2018 and implementation began then, even though publication was delayed until January 2020. *Update from FIFA on the Recommendations of the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board covering the period of September 2018 to November 2019* (previously cited), p. 11.

¹⁵⁹ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code, Version 1, April 2020, (a newer version dated December 2020 was issued with no significant modifications).

¹⁶⁰ These include suppliers of construction services, security, cleaning, waste management, transport and hospitality. FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code, p. 4.

community members who feel that their rights are adversely impacted by FIFA World Cup 2022-related activities.”¹⁶¹

FIFA’s Human Rights Policy, while not discussing Qatar specifically, contains the key principles and commitments, in line with the UN Guiding Principles, for grounding FIFA’s responsibility to act on identified risks to, and impacts on, migrant workers in Qatar. In its policy, FIFA commits to respecting human rights in line with these principles as well as “all internationally recognised human rights”, striving “to go beyond its responsibility to respect human rights, as enshrined in the UNGPs, by taking measures to promote the protection of human rights and positively contribute to their enjoyment”.¹⁶²

Further, the policy makes explicit reference to FIFA’s commitment to remedy abuses by:

*“providing for or cooperating in remediation where it has caused or contributed to adverse human rights impacts and will seek to promote or cooperate in access to remediation where it is otherwise linked to adverse impacts through its relationships with third parties, including by exploring all options available to it.”*¹⁶³

It also identifies labour rights abuses as one of its “salient risks”, and specifically recognizes that it is linked to workers through its engagement with other entities and through supply chains as part of, for instance, the construction of stadiums and infrastructure, the provision of accommodation and food and beverages or the production of licensed goods.¹⁶⁴

FIFA’s Human Rights Advisory Board, has advised FIFA to proactively communicate on its human rights efforts in order to build external confidence and trust, and to respond to urgent human rights issues as they arise and “work on the systems that will help it identify, evaluate and address human rights risks in the future to prevent a repeat of past mistakes”.¹⁶⁵

The Board also recognized FIFA’s ultimate responsibility for migrant labour abuses in Qatar that includes remedy, noting FIFA’s need to “deal with the consequences of decisions taken before the organization recognized its human rights responsibilities”.¹⁶⁶ It called on FIFA to “work on the past, present and future all at once”, adding that this meant striving to prevent abuses going forward while repairing all harm caused to date.¹⁶⁷

The Sustainability Policy and Strategy are important in understanding FIFA’s leadership role in relation to the tournament. In its **Sustainability Strategy**, published in January 2020, FIFA finally outlined its human rights responsibilities specifically in the context of the 2022 World Cup.¹⁶⁸ The Sustainability Strategy became in practice FIFA’s human rights due diligence policy and strategy for Qatar’s World Cup.¹⁶⁹ It aims to maximize sustainability during “preparation, staging, and post-tournament activities”, and manage sustainability risks that include risks of abuse of migrant workers’ labour rights.¹⁷⁰

According to FIFA this was developed on the basis of a “detailed human rights salience analysis” in line with the UN Guiding Principles as well as the advice of the late Professor John Ruggie, principal author of the UN Guiding Principles. Critically, the strategy recognizes some limited responsibility regarding access to remedy

¹⁶¹ “Human Rights Grievance and Remedy Mechanism” in *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Progress Report* (previously cited).

¹⁶² FIFA Human Rights Policy, para 4 and 41-2.

¹⁶³ FIFA Human Rights Policy, Commitments 3 and 6, pp. 5-7.

¹⁶⁴ FIFA Human Rights Policy, *May 2017 edition*, para. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board’s Recommendations and FIFA’s Responses, September 2018, pp. 26- 28, <https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-second-human-rights-advisory-board-report.pdf?cloudid=hw134aljrosbxevkwh>

¹⁶⁶ Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board’s Recommendations and FIFA’s Responses, September 2018, p. 26

¹⁶⁷ Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board’s Recommendations and FIFA’s Responses, September 2018, p. 28.

¹⁶⁸ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Policy, <https://fifa-backend.pressfire.net/media/newsletter/sustainability-policy-Jan-2020.pdf>. In its response to Amnesty International, FIFA refers to a sustainability management system and implementation plan which may provide more clarity and detail on the extent and content of FIFA’s commitments. However, these documents do not appear to be publicly available. See FIFA’s reply to Amnesty International, p. 6. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

¹⁶⁹ Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board’s Recommendations and FIFA’s Responses, September 2018, p. 40.

¹⁷⁰ Sustainability Strategy, pp. 12, 25.

for a broader group of workers linked to the tournament, but not under the purview of the Supreme Committee.¹⁷¹

In the strategy, FIFA committed to:

- *Ensure* decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment for workers engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for World Cup 2022 sites
- *Enable* access to effective remedy for workers engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for, FIFA World Cup 2022 sites
- *Promote* decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment, including effective access to remedy, for workers engaged through other construction projects and supply chain relationships directly linked to the FIFA World Cup 2022.¹⁷²

Workers engaged in...	FIFA World Cup 2022™ site construction	FIFA World Cup 2022™ site service provision	Other FIFA World Cup 2022™ linked supply chains	Other FIFA World Cup 2022™ linked construction projects
Objective	H1 & H2	H1 & H2	H3	H3
Description	Workers building stadiums and training sites, including contractors' and subcontractors' workers	Workers <i>in Qatar</i> providing facilities management, hospitality, security, cleaning, catering, transport and other services for stadiums, training sites, and other official sites such as hotels	Other workers in the supply chains of the tournament organisers as well as their sponsors and licensees, such as those manufacturing products or producing building materials for the tournament	Workers building and providing services for infrastructure such as transportation systems, roads, ports, utilities and hotels
Commitment of tournament organisers	<i>Ensure</i> decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment		<i>Promote</i> decent working and living conditions and fair recruitment	

Table 1: Scope of Objectives H1-H3 of FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy.

The first two objectives cover all Supreme Committee workers, i.e. workers building football-specific facilities such as stadiums and training sites and services required to guard, maintain and manage these facilities. These workers will continue to be protected under the Workers' Welfare Standards.¹⁷³ It also covers workers building other official World Cup sites such as some hotels (e.g. "headquarters" hotels) and the International Broadcast Centre, and the provision of services for these sites such as maintenance, security, cleaning, catering, transport and other services.

According to the strategy, it might also include other venues over which the tournament organizers have full operational control.¹⁷⁴ This represents an expansion of workers towards whom protection is promised since workers building, or providing services for, official World Cup facilities that are not stadiums or training sites had so far been ignored.

The third objective covers workers building and providing services for infrastructure works necessary for the successful delivery of an event of the scale and magnitude of the FIFA World Cup that are not categorized as World Cup sites. This would include the expansion and upgrade of the transport system, road, ports and the building of additional visitor accommodation.¹⁷⁵ This category should also include, in theory, the full range of services required for hosting the estimated 1.2 million visitors expected to travel to Qatar to watch the

¹⁷¹ Sustainability Strategy, pp. 27, 29, 83.

¹⁷² Sustainability Strategy, p. 26.

¹⁷³ These workers are now referred to as those engaged in "SC capital projects and manpower services contracts". The latter include "cleaning, fit-out, maintenance, pantry and security". Sustainability Strategy, p. 27, 29, 83.

¹⁷⁴ These workers are described in the Sustainability Strategy as those "engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for, FIFA World Cup 2022 sites", see FIFA's Sustainability Strategy, pp. 26 and 96.

¹⁷⁵ Sustainability Strategy, p. 32.

tournament,¹⁷⁶ including cleaners and security guards working in hotels, staff at restaurants and bars, taxi drivers and many others.

However, although it is positive to see some recognition of expanded responsibility, FIFA does not appear to be offering workers involved in larger infrastructure works and services any concrete measure of protection beyond general non-binding activities.¹⁷⁷ The use of “promote”, instead of “ensure” and “enable” to describe its commitment towards these workers shows the poor level of commitment and absence of any meaningful measure of protection to these workers. This means that these workers will most likely continue to suffer labour rights abuses in the run-up to and during the World Cup.¹⁷⁸ For example, a survey of 19 hotels conducted by The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre in 2021 revealed a general lack of action among respondent hotels to prevent and exclude abuses of their migrant workforce. Many hotels did not even respond to the survey.¹⁷⁹

Ultimately however, the Sustainability Strategy, published only in 2020, has come far too late to address human rights abuses in the context of the 2022 World Cup. It does not absolve FIFA from its responsibilities to remedy past and current human rights abuses that it could and should have sought to prevent.

The **Sustainable Sourcing Code**,¹⁸⁰ launched by FIFA, Q22 and the Supreme Committee in April 2020 sets out the minimum mandatory requirements for tournament organizers’ suppliers.¹⁸¹ It lays down the broad elements for a process of selection, monitoring and evaluation of suppliers according to sustainability requirements that include labour rights protections.¹⁸² While it is difficult at present to assess the level of protection that will be offered to workers in FIFA’s and Q22’s supply chains and whether this will be equal to that provided to Supreme Committee workers, the Sustainable Sourcing Code appears promising. On the other hand, the Sustainability Sourcing Code does not mention any protection measures or commitments in relation to “workers engaged through other construction projects” and it is not clear what, if any, concrete protection measures have been implemented or are being planned in relation to them.¹⁸³

In January 2022, FIFA finally announced the establishment of a “**human rights grievance and remedy mechanism**” for “participants, attendees, human rights defenders, media representatives and community members who feel that their rights are adversely impacted by FIFA World Cup 2022-related activities.”¹⁸⁴ While welcome, such mechanism should have been established years ago when major building work in Qatar was taking place so that all grievances resulting from this work would have been addressed in a timely manner.

¹⁷⁶ Doha News, Qatar to attract over 1.2 million visitors for FIFA World Cup 2022, 24 October 2021, <https://www.dohanews.co/qatar-to-attract-over-1-2-million-visitors-for-fifa-world-cup-2022/>

¹⁷⁷ Such as “engaging with entities” responsible for them, “seeking to create incentives and exchange knowledge and best practices” and continuing to support broader legal reform. See FIFA’s Sustainability Strategy, p. 25, 32 and 34.

¹⁷⁸ For example, the Sustainability Strategy refers to the Karama initiative as one of the platforms through which improvements to these workers’ living and working conditions can be pursued, but this initiative is seeking improvements for all construction workers in the country. See Sustainability Strategy, p 34.

¹⁷⁹ Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, *Checked Out: Migrant worker abuse in Qatar’s World Cup luxury hotels*, 14 July 2021, <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/briefings/checked-out-migrant-worker-abuse-in-qatars-world-cup-luxury-hotels/>

¹⁸⁰ FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code, Version 1, April 2020, <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/fxrprncoiiqghmqdku8.pdf> (a newer version dated December 2020 was issued with no significant modifications).

¹⁸¹ These include suppliers of construction services, security, cleaning, waste management, transport and hospitality. FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code, p. 4.

¹⁸² The Sustainable Sourcing Code includes a commitment to apply the Supreme Committee’s Workers’ Welfare Standards to Qatar-based migrant workers employed by suppliers of “all goods and services requiring direct or contracted labour in Qatar”. FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code, p. 8.

¹⁸³ Information disclosed so far is vague, generic or insufficient. Neither the Sustainable Sourcing Code nor the first two sustainability progress reports provide much detail regarding specific requirements for migrant workers’ rights for prospective suppliers or how compliance will be monitored and enforced. The first sustainability progress report announced that work on sustainable procurement control and enforcement mechanisms would start in 2020 (even though the report is dated October 2020). The second report simply states that Supreme Committee procurement enforcement procedures for Supreme Committee contractors will be “expanded to FIFA and Q22 services contracts related to tournament operations”. See, respectively, *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 First Sustainability Progress Report*, p. 60; and “Sustainable Procurement Enforcement” in *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Progress Report*. See also BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 30.

¹⁸⁴ “Human Rights Grievance and Remedy Mechanism” in *FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Progress Report*.

AWARDING THE WORLD CUP WITHOUT CONDITIONS

As football's global governing body, FIFA not only chooses the World Cup host, but also sets the terms and conditions under which the event can be hosted. FIFA did not require any human or labour rights guarantees as part of its bidding and selection process for the 2022 World Cup.¹⁸⁵ Despite clearly foreseeable risks of serious human rights abuses in Qatar (see Background and Chapter 1), FIFA did not require any labour rights protections or safeguards or even demand any commitments from Qatar to reform its notoriously exploitative labour system as a condition of hosting the 2022 World Cup.¹⁸⁶

FIFA has never published the "Bid Book" (Qatar's bidding document) or the Hosting Agreement between FIFA and Qatar, though the Bid Evaluation Report has been made publicly available. This shows that at no point were human rights concerns, expectations or commitments mentioned or discussed as part of FIFA's requirements for hosting the 2022 World Cup.¹⁸⁷ There is an evaluation of the bid's approach to "social and human development", highlighting "local programmes developing football facilities and opportunities for women, people with special needs and expatriates, as well as a health campaign to raise awareness of nutrition and the adverse impacts of a sedentary lifestyle."¹⁸⁸ The evaluation does not include the word "worker" or "labour" once, nor the phrase "human rights". In one section the health risks of Qatar's extreme heat is considered for "players, spectators, officials and the FIFA family", but not for workers.¹⁸⁹

The widespread and severe abuses of migrant labour that followed FIFA's decision to award the World Cup to Qatar without conditions could have been avoided if FIFA had acted responsibly to prevent them and used the powerful means it had, namely the bidding and selection process, to do so.¹⁹⁰

In granting the World Cup to Qatar without imposing any conditions on labour rights protections, FIFA contributed to the foreseeable human rights abuses experienced by workers on a wide range of projects and activities related to the World Cup, including but going beyond those under the purview of the Supreme Committee. As stated earlier, the UN Guiding Principles – endorsed by FIFA and embedded in its own policies – make clear that business enterprises that cause or contribute to human rights abuses must remediate them or collaborate in their remediation through legitimate processes. Consequently, FIFA must now remediate or collaborate in the remediation of all labour rights abuses connected to the staging and hosting of the 2022 World Cup, including past abuses that have so far not received adequate reparation. This responsibility is regardless of, and in addition to FIFA's ongoing responsibility to prevent further harm.

This position was echoed by the Human Rights Advisory Board, which noted FIFA's need to "deal with the consequences of decisions taken before the organization recognized its human rights responsibilities".¹⁹¹ It added,

¹⁸⁵ Because of its decision to award the 2022 World Cup to Qatar without requiring labour rights protections, the global union confederation BWI filed a complaint against FIFA with the Swiss National Contact Point responsible for implementing the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD's) *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*. The BWI alleged that FIFA's choice of Qatar as host despite the documented human rights violations against migrant workers in the country breached the Guidelines. The National Contact Point admitted the complaint, which led to some negotiated solutions. BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁸⁶ John Ruggie, *For the Game. For the World: FIFA and Human Rights*, p. 21. Detailed human rights requirements based on the UN Guiding Principles were included for the first time in a bidding and host-selection process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. See *Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board – First Report with the Advisory Board's Recommendations and an Update by FIFA*, p.39.

¹⁸⁷ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p.5, 22.

¹⁸⁸ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p.10.

¹⁸⁹ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p.24.

¹⁹⁰ The hosting agreement is a powerful tool that FIFA uses to impose adjustments to a country's existing laws and judicial infrastructure. The potential penalty of losing the World Cup motivates countries to abide by FIFA standards, however stringent. See Constitution Net, *How FIFA is changing Brazil's Constitution for the World Cup*, 19 June 2014, <https://constitutionnet.org/news/how-fifa-changing-brazils-constitution-world-cup>. Also, Anna Haslinsky, *The Almighty FIFA and Brazil's Great Concessions*, 28 July 2014, https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/law/academics/sportslaw/commentary/mslj_blog/journal_archives/2014/0728.htm, and the *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report*.

¹⁹¹ *Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board's Recommendations and FIFA's Responses*, p. 26.

“FIFA has to deal with the legacy of decisions taken and contracts signed before the organisation recognized its human rights responsibilities... and it has to work on the systems that will help it identify, evaluate and address human rights risks in the future to prevent a repeat of past mistakes”.¹⁹²



Migrant workers gather on "Bank Street," in downtown Doha on June 17, 2011, where many workers wire remittance money to their families in their home countries.. © Sam Tarling/Corbis via Getty Images

THE EXTENT OF FIFA'S RESPONSIBILITY

FIFA's responsibility goes far beyond those projects such the stadiums or other official FIFA World Cup sites that are directly linked to the tournament.

At the time of the bid, Qatar was immersed in a building campaign to turn Doha from a capital city into a regional and global hub, and hosting the World Cup was a key element of that project. While some of Qatar's major infrastructure projects that took place after winning the bid, such as building the new Doha International Airport and upgrading the transport system, may have happened regardless of the World Cup, this work became critical for, and directly linked to, the tournament.¹⁹³ Indeed, major infrastructure and other projects all formed part of Qatar's bidding package.¹⁹⁴ In reality, Qatar's bid "was based on both projected and event-specific infrastructure".¹⁹⁵

For instance, part of Qatar's "hosting concept" included major infrastructure work such as developing the new international airport to become the "main gateway" to Qatar for staging the FIFA World Cup. The work also included significantly expanding visitor accommodation capacity, expanding or upgrading the general transport infrastructure, such as the passenger metro "projected to be 70% operational in 2020 and serve all tournament stadiums", rail, road and motorway systems and enhancing the IT&T.¹⁹⁶ Even in its press release of May 2010 announcing the submission of its "Bid Book", Qatar highlighted its plans for a new international

¹⁹² *Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board's Recommendations and FIFA's Responses*, p. 28.

¹⁹³ FIFA's rules and guidance for the 2022 World Cup, Qatar's "Bid Book" and the Hosting Agreement between FIFA and Qatar are not publicly available. For this reason, it is not possible to see what exactly was required and promised for the 2022 World Cup. However, much of it can be gathered from the *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*.

¹⁹⁴ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁵ Sportcal, *Qatar 2022 Submits Final Bid Book in Zurich*, 14 May 2010, <https://www.sportcal.com/News/PressReleases/72635>

¹⁹⁶ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p. 8, 9, 15-23, 25.

airport, Qatar Metro Network System and an additional 110,000 hotel rooms and serviced apartments as critical components of its hosting proposal.¹⁹⁷

The infrastructure work was specifically assessed by the FIFA Evaluation Group – the team of experts responsible for examining all bids for the 2022 World Cup – and was considered essential for the successful delivery of the 2022 World Cup. So much so that the FIFA Evaluation Group noted that, in relation to Qatar’s planned upgrade and expansion of the transport system, “any delays in the completion of the transport projects could impact FIFA’s tournament operations”.¹⁹⁸ As for the projected additional accommodation, the Evaluation Group pointed out: “the expected number of guests and the influx of visitors depends to a large extent on the timely construction of the new properties”.¹⁹⁹

In any case, the reality is that the country’s mammoth infrastructure work that followed Qatar’s successful bid became inextricably linked to the 2022 World Cup and FIFA. The work was imperative for the successful delivery of the tournament. Had this work not been planned, it would have been demanded. As expressly noted by FIFA, “the FIFA World Cup 2022 has an effect on the requirements and deadlines for those projects.”²⁰⁰ Being directly linked to the tournament, FIFA had a responsibility to ensure that this work was conducted and delivered with full respect for human rights.²⁰¹ As such, FIFA’s responsibility extends to cover the full range of workers deployed on “World Cup-related projects” without whom this tournament would not be possible.

SUBSEQUENT FAILURES TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE ABUSES

Despite some progress in recent years, for almost the entire decade that followed FIFA’s decision to award the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, the only concrete measure of protection of migrant workers’ rights was the enactment of the Supreme Committee’s Workers’ Welfare Standards. As previously highlighted, FIFA did not even recognise its responsibilities towards workers until 2016.

The Workers’ Welfare Standards have indeed improved protections for workers, but even as acknowledged by the Supreme Committee’s own reports and self-audits, these standards have never been fully and universally implemented. This tallies with multiple reports by trade unions and NGOs, which over the years provided a sobering account of the spread and severity of these abuses, many of which went undetected or unaddressed for years, even in the context of Supreme Committee projects.²⁰² In any case, improved protections do not erase the many past abuses suffered by Supreme Committee workers, and any outstanding harm should still be remediated fully.

Additionally, Supreme Committee workers only account for a fraction of migrant workers in Qatar – around 2% at the height of construction work.²⁰³ They are even a small proportion of workers employed on projects and services essential for the delivery of the World Cup, with numbers dwarfed by those working on infrastructure projects including the airport expansion, metro or road construction. There have been few if any meaningful efforts to prevent or mitigate abuse of migrant workers building World Cup infrastructure not falling under the purview of the Supreme Committee or providing other World Cup-related services.

FIFA has been insufficiently proactive in identifying, preventing and mitigating abuses. For most of the period since the awarding of the World Cup, FIFA’s actions were either non-existent or limited and reactive. Most of FIFA’s initial actions were limited to raising concerns with the Supreme Committee and following up on

¹⁹⁷ Sportcal, *Qatar 2022 Submits Final Bid Book in Zurich*, 14 May 2010.

¹⁹⁸ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p. 5, 22.

¹⁹⁹ *2022 FIFA World Cup Bid Evaluation Report: Qatar*, p. 18.

²⁰⁰ Sustainability Strategy, p. 32.

²⁰¹ That this work was directly linked to the World Cup and therefore fell under FIFA’s responsibility to respect human rights was clearly articulated by FIFA’s Human Rights Advisory Board and recognized as such by FIFA’s own Sustainability Strategy.

²⁰² Amnesty International, *Qatar: End corporate exploitation of migrant construction workers*, 18 November 2013, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/11/qatar-end-corporate-exploitation-migrant-construction-workers/>; ITUC, *Qatar: Profit and loss counting the cost of modern day slavery in Qatar: What price is freedom?*, 18 December 2015, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/qatar_en_web.pdf; Amnesty International, *The Ugly Side of the Beautiful Game - Exploitation of Migrant Workers on a Qatar 2022 World Cup Site*; Amnesty International, *Qatar: Migrant workers unpaid for months of work on FIFA World Cup stadium*, 11 June 2020, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/qatar-migrant-workers-unpaid-for-months-fifa-world-cup-stadium/>; Human Rights Watch, “How Can We Work Without Wages?” – *Salary Abuses Facing Migrant Workers Ahead of Qatar’s FIFA World Cup 2022*, 24 August 2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/24/how-can-we-work-without-wages/salary-abuses-facing-migrant-workers-ahead-qatars#_ftn85

²⁰³ Supreme Committee, *Workers’ Welfare*, <https://www.workerswelfare.qa/en/our-workers>

measures taken by this body or other actors, such as the ILO, BWI or Qatari authorities.²⁰⁴ FIFA appeared to believe that its due diligence responsibilities were met through the Supreme Committee implementing the Workers' Welfare Standards, in effect outsourcing its own responsibilities.²⁰⁵ Indeed, the case of the al-Bayt Stadium workers described below is just one of many examples that show FIFA's over-reliance on the Supreme Committee to conduct its due diligence.²⁰⁶ Over the course of the last decade, Amnesty International has repeatedly called on FIFA to take a more proactive role in identifying and addressing abuses.²⁰⁷

BOX 2: ABUSES AT AL-BAYT STADIUM

In June 2020, Amnesty International revealed that around 100 employees of Qatar Meta Coats, a design and construction company subcontracted for work on Al Bayt Stadium, had not been paid for up to seven months and were owed between US\$2,200 and over US\$16,500 in salaries and allowances. The lengthy delays led to great hardship, and some workers explained how powerless they felt despite Qatar's promised reforms. The company had also failed to renew employees' residence permits, leaving them at risk of detention and deportation. Many of its employees had paid up to US\$2,000 to recruitment agents back home that the company was not willing to reimburse.

Soon after Amnesty International raised the case with FIFA, the Supreme Committee and Qatari authorities, employees began to receive part of what they were owed. However, the exploitation had happened in plain sight of the Supreme Committee and the Qatari authorities, who said they had first learned of the problem in July and September 2019 respectively, nearly a year before Amnesty International's investigation. In contrast, FIFA's lack of proactive engagement meant that they were not even aware of the abuses until informed by Amnesty International in May 2020.

So, while the Workers' Welfare Standards appear to have enabled the Supreme Committee to detect the problem at Qatar Meta Coats quickly, they were unable to secure timely or full payment for the affected workers.²⁰⁸ FIFA, on the other hand, were not even aware, and informed Amnesty that it was not "routinely notified" of all cases requiring remediation, instead trusting its partners and their systems to protect workers' rights on World Cup sites.

Monitoring the activities of a business partner and satisfying itself that this partner is meeting its commitment to respect human rights is an important part of a company's due diligence responsibilities. However, this alone is not sufficient to meet a company's own responsibility to respect human rights, particularly in the context of Qatar and the World Cup where FIFA itself significantly contributed to bringing about a situation of widespread abuse and exploitation.

FIFA's insufficient due diligence efforts to prevent or mitigate labour rights abuses were noted by its Human Rights Advisory Board, which consistently advised FIFA to take a more proactive role in dealing with abuses. The Board suggested many measures, including:

- publicly communicating FIFA's stance on human rights abuses;
- engaging directly with contractors;

²⁰⁴ See, for example, reference to its engagement with the Supreme Committee "to better understand the SC's approach to the involvement of workers on construction sites", *Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board's Recommendations and FIFA's Responses*, p. 55. This approach is also reflected in some of FIFA's letters of response to allegations by Amnesty International (such as FIFA's letter of 17 March 2016 concerning the Khalifa International Stadium and the letter of 9 June 2020 concerning Qatar Meta Coats workers).

²⁰⁵ For example, see *FIFA, 2.0: The Vision for the Future*, p. 64; and FIFA, *FIFA Activity Update on Human Rights (previously cited)*, referring mostly to actions by the Supreme Committee; *Update from FIFA on the Recommendations of the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board covering the period of September 2018 to November 2019* (previously cited), p. 43; and *Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board's Recommendations and FIFA's Responses* (previously cited), pp. 55, 70. Similarly, in a letter to Amnesty International in March 2016 responding to the organization's concerns about labour conditions in the refurbishment of the Khalifa International Stadium, FIFA limited its response to providing an extensive account of the Supreme Committee's standards and actions relating to the case.

²⁰⁶ Amnesty International, *"I have worked hard – I deserve to be paid": Exploitation on Qatar World Cup stadium*, 10 June 2020.

²⁰⁷ See, for example, Amnesty International, *Five years of human rights failure shames FIFA and Qatar*, 1 December 2015.

²⁰⁸ Amnesty International, *"I have worked hard – I deserve to be paid" ; Exploitation on Qatar World Cup stadium*, 10 June 2020.

- taking part in joint inspections; and
- monitoring conditions through its on-the-ground team.²⁰⁹

Even the Board's final two reports of 2019 and 2020 were still pushing FIFA to move to a more proactive role, one that "adds value" to the Supreme Committee's efforts and meets "its own responsibility, in collaboration with, but distinct from, the [Supreme Committee's]".²¹⁰

FIFA did finally assume its leading role in 2020, committing to take some action to respect labour rights in the 2020 Sustainability Strategy, but such commitment came much too late, following a decade of labour abuses and leaving long-standing harm unaddressed. As explained above, even the Sustainability Strategy fails to ensure labour rights protection to the full range of workers linked to the World Cup.

FIFA'S RESPONSE TO AMNESTY'S FINDINGS

In its letter to Amnesty International, responding to the main findings of this report, FIFA reiterated its commitment to implement its due diligence process to protect workers involved in the preparation of the 2022 World Cup, based on its human rights policies. It also detailed the human rights considerations it took since awarding the World Cup to Qatar in 2010, mainly through the Supreme Committee's initiatives and its Workers' Welfare Standards.²¹¹

With regard to its responsibility to conduct its own due diligence, FIFA sought to justify its dependence on its Qatari partner by the "widely recognised effectiveness" of the Supreme Committee programme. FIFA also said that from 2019 it increased and shifted its due diligence effort from construction workers to the preparation of the tournament through the creation of the Workers' Welfare Unit at Q22.²¹² This response reinforces the reality that before 2019, little was being done for non-Supreme Committee workers working on the wide range of projects required for the preparation and delivery of the tournament. Even now, FIFA only appears to be offering general non-binding commitments to "promote" decent conditions and effective.

On its remediation efforts, FIFA reiterated that its efforts have been focused only on the projects under the Supreme Committee's purview.²¹³ While indeed, it is important for FIFA to recognise its responsibility to remedy abuses suffered by those workers, this does not negate the need to remedy abuses suffered by other workers on World Cup-related projects. Even within this narrow approach, some abuses committed before 2014 – when the Worker Welfare Standards were established – are not covered. FIFA's new grievance mechanism, also highlighted in its letter and in chapter 4 of this report, also came many years too late.²¹⁴

FIFA also stated again that this World Cup served as "a catalyst for landmark labour rights reforms" and praised its role in contributing to the promotion of human rights in the country and improving labour standards and practices through its Sustainability Strategy.²¹⁵ While the 2020 Sustainability Strategy is progress, it was obvious that human rights were not a consideration for FIFA when it awarded this World Cup to Qatar or in the first few years following its decision. Similarly, it took Qatar eight years after being chosen as a host country to finally commit to a reform programme. This was more in response to the intense international scrutiny of its treatment of migrant workers in the country rather than FIFA's direct leverage.

Finally, FIFA confirms that it has "taken note of and are assessing the proposition" to set up a remediation programme to ensure remedy for all unaddressed harm related to World Cup projects. FIFA also said it is "looking at ways to ensure closure of all grievances associated with FIFA World Cup projects, including pre-event cases".²¹⁶ Amnesty International welcomes these commitments, calls on FIFA to ensure these are not

²⁰⁹ See, *Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - First Report with the Advisory Board's Recommendations and an Update by FIFA*, p. 20, 22, 23, 29; and *Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board's Recommendations and FIFA's Responses* Amnesty International, Qatar: "They think that we're machines", p. 9, 49.

²¹⁰ FIFA, *Third Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board – Including the Board's Recommendations from Oct 2018 - April 2019*, May 2019, p. 9, https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/files/FIFA_Human_Rights_Advisory_Board_Third-report_June_2019.pdf; and *Fourth Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board – Including the Board's Recommendations From May-December 2019*, January 2020, p. 8-9, https://old.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/FIFA%20HRAB%20Fourth%20Report_Feb2020_Final_0.pdf

²¹¹ See FIFA's response to Amnesty International, p. 1. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

²¹² See FIFA's response to Amnesty International, p. 2. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

²¹³ See FIFA's response to Amnesty International, p. 3. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

²¹⁴ See FIFA's response to Amnesty International, p. 3. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

²¹⁵ See FIFA's response to Amnesty International, p. 2. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

²¹⁶ See FIFA's response to Amnesty International, p. 3. sent on 6 May 2022 published in Annex I.

limited to projects under the purview of the Supreme Committee, and urges FIFA to make public its plans in this regard.

CONCLUSION

FIFA's responsibility to respect human rights was clearly reflected and elaborated on in its revised Statutes of 2016 as well as its Human Rights Policy, the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Policy and Strategy, the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainable Sourcing Code and recommendations from its Human Rights Advisory Board.

In awarding the World Cup to Qatar without requiring any measures or conditions to prevent foreseeable labour rights abuses and subsequently failing to implement adequate and timely measures to prevent or mitigate risks of labour rights abuses in activities related to the World Cup, FIFA contributed to the wide range of abuses that occurred in this context. In line with the UN Guiding Principles, FIFA must now remediate or cooperate in remediating these abuses, including historic abuses that remain unaddressed.

As highlighted in this chapter, FIFA's responsibility to provide for or cooperate in remediation covers not only workers on Supreme Committee projects, but also the full range of workers required for the preparation and delivery of the tournament. This work includes not only building football-specific facilities such as stadiums and training sites, FIFA-accredited hotels and the broadcast centre, but also the services required to maintain, manage, clean and guard these facilities. It also comprises building of necessary wider transport, accommodation and other infrastructure as well as the full range of services required for hosting the more than a million visitors expected to travel to Qatar to watch the tournament (from hospitality to transport, to the provision of security and cleaning for hotels and other types of accommodation and venues).

It is difficult to accurately estimate exactly how many workers have been involved in World Cup-related projects, but the number will run into the hundreds of thousands. In addition to the 30,000 workers who have worked roughly every year directly on projects under the purview of the Supreme Committee, hundreds of thousands would have worked over the past decade on the construction of infrastructure projects essential for the hosting and staging of the tournament such as the expansion of the Hamad Airport,²¹⁷ Qatar Rail Project,²¹⁸ Lusail city²¹⁹ and Ashghal Expressway Programme,²²⁰ to name a few.

The numbers of individual workers involved in these and other projects over the last 12 years - such as the construction of accommodation to provide an additional 110,000 hotel rooms - will also be higher than this, as people move in and out of Qatar. Additionally, tens of thousands of security guards, cleaners, hotel staffs, taxi drivers, staffs in restaurants, bars and many others working in the hospitality and service sector will be essential to the running of the tournament and to take care of visitors

²¹⁷ Future Airport, *Hamad International Airport - Built for comfort, style and efficiency*,

<https://www.futureairport.com/contractors/routes-development/hamad-international-airport/>

²¹⁸ Railway Technology, *Qatar Rail awards Doha Metro contracts worth \$8.2bn*, 6 June 2013,

<https://www.railway-technology.com/uncategorised/newsqatar-rail-awards-doha-metro-contracts/>

²¹⁹ The Guardian, *Qatar World Cup 'slaves': the official response*, 25 September 2015,

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/25/qatar-world-cup-official-response>

²²⁰ KBR, *Doha Expressway Team Delivers Two Major Milestones*, 18 January 2017, <https://www.kbr.com/en-gb/insights-news/stories/doha-expressway-team-delivers-two-major-milestones>

7. A PROPOSED REMEDIATION PROGRAMME

Fully implementing and enforcing the pledges and commitments of both Qatar and FIFA would undoubtedly go a long way in improving the working and living conditions of migrant workers in Qatar. However, whilst welcome, they will not be enough to erase the past and continuing harm that followed FIFA's 2010 decision to award the World Cup to Qatar without any conditions on ensuring workers' rights are protected. Qatar and FIFA must now work to remediate all abuses, including past ones.

In 2018, Qatar took some steps to remediate abuse of workers, especially of those who suffered wage theft, by improving their access to justice and compensation. However, while these mechanisms have improved access to remedy for some workers they are yet to prove their reliability to provide adequate and timely compensation for all affected workers. Additionally, they only cover issues of unpaid wages and accept claims within a year of an abuse, leaving unaddressed other labour abuses such as dangerous working conditions, recruitment fees and forced labour.

Similarly, FIFA has taken some steps by committing to ensure "access to effective remedy" to Supreme Committee workers and workers engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for, FIFA World Cup sites.²²¹ However, the needs for reparation go well beyond this group of workers and include all workers that have been, are, or will be, engaged in World Cup-related construction and other services who suffered harm in the context or as a consequence of this work.²²²

Redressing the large number of past, outstanding grievances suffered by all these workers as well as future ones in the run-up to and during the World Cup will require a targeted, coordinated and effective remediation programme. Ideally, all workers or their family members should have received adequate remedy by the time the World Cup begins, but this is extremely unlikely. For this reason, the remediation programme must last for as long as grievances remain outstanding, even if this is long after the tournament ends.²²³

Bearing in mind that any remediation programme should be discussed and agreed through a consultative and participatory process that includes workers and reflects their views and expectations, Amnesty International suggests below some key principles for any such programme.²²⁴

²²¹ See FIFA's Sustainability Strategy.

²²² Article 2.3 of the ICCPR; United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.

²²³ This programme is suggested as a way of providing reparation to victims of labour rights abuses and not as a means of securing punishment. However, accountability and appropriate punishment of perpetrators of labour rights abuses must also be guaranteed, including by strengthening existing enforcement mechanisms.

²²⁴ For the centrality of rights holders in remediation schemes, see UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises*, A/72/162, 18 July 2017, paras 18-25. See also UN Guiding Principles, Principle 31(h); OHCHR, *Improving accountability and access to*

It should be emphasized that, while the below proposals relate to abuses related to the preparation and delivery of the 2022 World Cup, Qatar still has the obligation to ensure remedy for all violations and abuses on its territory, whether connected to the tournament or not.

BOX 3: EFFECTIVE REMEDY UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Under international human rights law, remedies for human rights violations must be accessible, affordable, adequate and timely.²²⁵ They must also strictly adhere to due process standards,²²⁶ minimize power imbalances,²²⁷ and be culturally appropriate and gender-sensitive.²²⁸

These and other principles of international human rights law on the right to remedy should guide the assessment of existing remedial avenues for migrant workers in Qatar and the changes and adjustments needed to ensure they are able to deliver remedy in line with international standards. They should also inform the establishment of any new avenues.

To guarantee accessibility, for example, FIFA and the Qatari government will need to proactively reach out to all worker groups, including those who have left the country as well as women and others in a particularly vulnerable situation.²²⁹ They must provide them with all relevant information about existing remedial mechanisms relevant to them, how to access them and what to expect from them.²³⁰

Barriers to access should be removed.²³¹ For migrant workers, this will entail having access to independent expert advice and legal representation²³² and the ability to use the mechanisms without incurring costs and without fear of retaliation or victimization.²³³ It will also require exempting from or

remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018, para. 11.3; OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through non-State-based grievance mechanisms, A/HRC/44/32, 19 May 2020, para. 4.1(c), 12.2(a).

²²⁵ UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, para. 2 (c); CESCR, General Comment No 9 (1998) on the domestic application of the ICESCR, para. 9. See also recommendations to states on measures to ensure accessibility, affordability, equitability and rights-compatibility in state-based non-judicial mechanisms in OHCHR, *Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018.*

²²⁶ UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, para. 23.

²²⁷ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162 (18 July 2017), para. 86(d).* Also UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 31(d).

²²⁸ OHCHR, *Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through non-State-based grievance mechanisms, A/HRC/44/32, 19 May 2020, para. 12.1.* Women may be affected disproportionately, particularly in the hospitality sector. Remedial mechanisms must be capable of identifying the nature and effect of abuse on women and redress it appropriately. UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162 (18 July 2017), paras 28, 30.*

²²⁹ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162 (18 July 2017), para. 25.* OHCHR, *Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through non-State-based grievance mechanisms, A/HRC/44/32, 19 May 2020, para. 8.1(b); OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018, paras 2.3, 7.1.*

²³⁰ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162, 18 July 2017, para. 24.* See also, UN Guiding Principles, Principle 31(e) and UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, para. 11(c).

²³¹ As listed in the UN Guiding Principles, these barriers can include “lack of awareness of the mechanism, language, literacy, costs, physical location and fears of reprisal”. UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 31. UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162 (18 July 2017), paras 28, 30.*

²³² UN Guiding Principles, Principle 31(d). UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162 (18 July 2017), para. 23.*

²³³ UN General Assembly, *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162, 18 July 2017, paras 32, 35-36.* Also, OHCHR, *Improving accountability*

suspending any existing statutes of limitation or fixed time periods in which to submit complaints – conditions that migrant workers are often unable to meet because of the plethora of obstacles and difficulties they face in pursuing remedy.²³⁴

Another way of ensuring accessibility, as well as equality of arms, is by revising rules on evidence. Migrant workers often lack supporting evidence of the harm they allege they have experienced and the means of obtaining such evidence. The evidence either does not exist in documentary form or is difficult or impossible to corroborate, and/or is in the hands of employers or government entities.²³⁵ Workers who have left Qatar or family members of deceased workers who have never been in Qatar are likely to be particularly affected by a lack of sufficient evidence.

The “information asymmetry” typically present in employer-worker relationships has been widely recognized as an obstacle to justice in both labour law and business and human rights standards more broadly. To ease this asymmetry, both fields contemplate shifts in the burden of proof towards employers or lighter evidentiary burdens in favour of workers.²³⁶ The abysmal power imbalance between employers and migrant workers in Qatar and the well-documented scale and severity of labour rights abuses affecting migrant workers fully justify such rules. Under the remediation programme, all remedial mechanisms (both existing and new) must start from the presumption that migrant workers’ claims are legitimate and can only be rejected if manifestly spurious or unfounded. Furthermore, reparations should be available even where evidence is minimal if the employer cannot indisputably rebut it.²³⁷

The measures of reparation offered to migrant workers must also be capable of redressing the full range of harms suffered, some of which may not be immediately obvious. Workers who have been deprived of their full wage for months will require not only full payment of the money that is owed to them, but also the full cost of any loans they may have been forced to take out and the harm their dependents may have experienced as a result of the delay. Workers whose physical or mental health has been affected or who have experienced physical injury might require long-term medical care and rehabilitation, the cost of which should also be fully covered.²³⁸

and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018, para. 7.12. The ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, explicitly states in para. 66 that “any worker who, acting individually or jointly with other workers, considers that he or she has grounds for a grievance should have the right to submit such grievance without suffering any prejudice whatsoever as a result”. See also UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 31(b).

²³⁴ OHCHR, *Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms*, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018, para. 7.8 (recommending that limitation periods take account of the nature and severity of the harm and the particular limitations and needs of the rights-holders).

²³⁵ For example, migrant workers are not provided with physical pay slips. As a consequence, they have little idea about, and proof of, the breakdown of their pay (such as basic wage, food allowances, transport costs, bonuses, backpay, deductions, overtime hours and payment). Most companies do not use timesheets either or, if they use them, they deny workers access to them. This leaves migrant workers with little proof of how and when they were denied pay or benefits. Human Rights Watch, *How Can We Work Without Wages? - Salary Abuses Facing Migrant Workers Ahead of Qatar’s FIFA World Cup 2022*, 24 August 2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/24/how-can-we-work-without-wages/salary-abuses-facing-migrant-workers-ahead-qatars#_ftn85

²³⁶ ILO, *Promoting employment and decent work in a changing landscape*, International Labour Conference 109th Session, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_736873.pdf. CESCR, General Comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities: “Shifting the burden of proof may be justified where the facts and events relevant for resolving a claim lie wholly or in part within the exclusive knowledge of the corporate defendant”, para. 45. See also OHCHR, *Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse: explanatory notes for guidance*, A/HRC/32/19/Add.1, 12 May 2016, paras 15-16, 49-50.

²³⁷ The Supreme Committee is already implementing this principle in the area of recruitment fees. BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 14.

²³⁸ As the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights said, “The adequacy of remedies should also be judged by keeping in mind not only the current needs of the victims, but also their future long-term needs.” UN General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/72/162, 18 July 2017, para. 33.

ELIGIBILITY

Any remediation programme focused on harms caused in relation to the Qatar 2022 World Cup should be able to address historical grievances from 2010 onwards. This would mean that all migrant workers who suffered labour abuses and exploitation but have so far been denied access to effective remedy would be eligible under the remedial scheme. Workers who failed to secure an adequate remedy through either the newly established mechanisms such as the Labour Committees and the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund, or the Supreme Committee's grievance mechanisms, would also have access to the scheme.²³⁹ This would include workers who suffered abuses before such mechanisms were established, or who suffered forms of abuse not covered by these schemes.

Those eligible would include the full range of workers employed on projects essential to the preparation and delivery of the World Cup, beyond those under the purview of the Supreme Committee. This should include, but not be limited to, those building and providing services for the stadiums, transport infrastructure, accommodation and other facilities and services required for the tournament.

ACCESSIBILITY

Any remedial process should ensure easy access for victims or their families to come forward to seek full reparation. This is particularly relevant in the context of the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, where abuses were committed over extended periods and many victims may have already left the country.

Any mechanism should also ensure easy access to information; adequate assistance, including language and legal support; clear eligibility criteria; lenient requirements for producing evidence; minimal administrative hurdles and quick and easy processes.

This would mean that, where applicable, workers or their families who have open, unresolved or inadequately addressed claims should be able to seek full reparation, even if they are no longer in Qatar. This is particularly important in countries like Qatar where it is impossible for migrant workers to seek remedy once back in their home countries or if they have had to migrate again. For instance, in 2019, Amnesty International documented the cases of thousands of migrant workers from three different companies who had to drop their complaints for unpaid wages after they were unable to follow up on their claims remotely.²⁴⁰ For those no longer in Qatar, be it workers or their families, claims should be supported by and coordinated between their respective embassies in Doha and Qatari embassies in their home countries.²⁴¹ Qatari embassies should widely and proactively publicize the opportunity to seek reparation, and provide support for accessing reparation through simplified procedures.

FIT-FOR-PURPOSE REMEDIAL AVENUES

Complaint and reparation mechanisms set up since 2018, including the Labour Committees, Workers' Support and Insurance Fund, and the Supreme Committee's Universal Reimbursement Scheme, could form the basis of new reparation schemes. However, it is likely that new compensatory routes will be required.

As a first step, existing mechanisms should be reviewed, their effectiveness assessed and, in consultation with workers, strengthened to ensure they can deliver effective remedy in line with international human rights law (see Box 3 above). Where existing mechanisms are proving incapable of delivering full reparation or delivering it promptly, and/or for channelling and resolving past abuses that have so far not been adequately remediated, new mechanisms should be set up. This might be particularly appropriate, for instance, to address outstanding claims by the families of workers whose deaths have not been recognized as being linked to their working conditions and therefore not entitled to compensation.

Given the large number of workers affected by the same type of abuse and their desperate need for prompt reparation, collective redress processes should be considered. These can efficiently assess fact patterns common to all their cases and allow workers to come together to share resources and knowledge. This could

²³⁹ See, for example, BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 9, 13, 28, which describes outstanding cases of unpaid or delayed salaries that, due to backlog, employer resistance, company bankruptcy and other issues, “fall through the cracks”.

²⁴⁰ Amnesty International, *All Work, No Pay: The Struggle of Qatar's Migrant Workers for Justice* (Index MDE 22/0793/2019), 19 September 2019.

²⁴¹ BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 29.

greatly speed up delivery of remedy for individual workers.²⁴² To make sure remedial mechanisms work in the interest of affected workers and deliver satisfactory outcomes for them, the programme must include ways of ensuring adequate worker representation and assistance before claiming reparations and throughout the remedial processes.

PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

As noted in the UN Guiding Principles, poorly designed, implemented or resourced redress mechanisms will only compound existing grievances.²⁴³ In light of this, an overarching governance structure and independent supervisory body capable of overseeing the functioning and outcome of all existing or new remedial mechanisms should be put in place.

Both the programme and its governance structure should be designed, set up and implemented in consultation with, and with the active participation of, key stakeholders, including workers, global trade unions, ILO representatives, civil society organizations and individual labour and human rights experts.

Critically, workers pursuing claims through any of the existing or new remedial processes should be able to raise concerns, without fear of retaliation, about the functioning of these processes before the supervisory body or other mechanism envisaged under the programme.

SPEED AND COLLABORATION

Speed is of the essence not only because of the proximity of the World Cup but also more importantly because of the urgent need of many thousands of workers to see justice for their grievances. The task may not be as daunting as it first appears.

In addition to building on existing remedial mechanisms, there are already many collaborative platforms that can be tapped into to initiate the process, such as those between FIFA, Q22 and the Supreme Committee as “tournament organizers”; between the Supreme Committee, Q22 and the Qatari National Human Rights Committee;²⁴⁴ between the Qatari government and the ILO;²⁴⁵ and between the Supreme Committee and the BWI.²⁴⁶

Key to its success will be the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders and independent and accountable governance and oversight structures. The Sustainability Strategy can be expanded to include a brand-new strand of work exclusively focused on the tournament organizers’ efforts to ensure effective remedy through the remediation programme.

FIFA, Q22 and the Supreme Committee committed in the Sustainability Strategy to considering the expansion of the Supreme Committee’s grievance mechanisms or the development of parallel mechanisms for workers engaged in the provision of services for World Cup sites.²⁴⁷ This shows that the tournament organizers are already committed to enhancing the provision of remedy, albeit in a limited way.

²⁴² Collective claims can alleviate burdens and barriers that individual claimants often face if they pursue a claim on their own. See, for example, UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 26; OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018, para. 7.4; OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through non-State-based grievance mechanisms, A/HRC/44/32, 19 May 2020, para. 8.5.

²⁴³ UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 31.

²⁴⁴ On 3 February 2021, the Supreme Committee and Q22 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Qatari National Human Rights Committee to ensure that human rights continue to be considered in the delivery of the World Cup. This collaboration, according to FIFA, will include “remediation of human rights impacts”. FIFA, “SC and Q22 sign MoU with NHRC to further enhance the positive human rights legacy of the FIFA World Cup 2022”, 3 February 2021, <https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/sc-and-q22-sign-mou-with-nhrc-to-further-enhance-the-positive-human-rights-legacy>

²⁴⁵ In its 2020 Progress Report, the ILO committed to work with the Ministry of Labour on “policies/protocols to handle multi-worker complaints, retaliation, and on how to ensure rapid enforcement of agreements/adjudications through the Workers’ Support Fund.” ILO, *Progress report on the technical cooperation programme agreed between the Government of Qatar and the ILO*, 9 October 2020, p. 8.

²⁴⁶ BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 9, 13.

²⁴⁷ Sustainability Strategy, p. 31.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Qatar and FIFA must publish the remediation programme in full and must always remain transparent and accountable to both human rights victims and the wider public.

They must also communicate proactively and regularly on their efforts to remediate and on progress achieved in the remediation programme. For FIFA, this could be done by adding a new, stand-alone chapter to its regular sustainability reporting, focused exclusively on remediation, with this reporting continuing after the end of the World Cup and until all World Cup-related grievances have been resolved.

Communications about the programme should include up-to-date, clear and comprehensive detail about its performance, including data about the various remedial mechanisms in place, number and types of complaints received, outcomes (the extent to which they have delivered substantive reparation, including feedback from the affected workers themselves on whether they feel they have obtained adequate reparation) and the time taken to achieve them.

Data can be anonymized or aggregated where necessary to guarantee the safety of individual workers, but must be sufficiently clear and detailed to allow for a thorough understanding of the efforts of Qatar and FIFA to remediate the full spectrum of past, present and future abuses and their outcomes.²⁴⁸ Additionally, FIFA should also disclose its financial contribution to the remediation programme.

NON-REPETITION

As part of their remedy efforts, Qatar and FIFA must also contribute to guaranteeing non-repetition of past abuses of migrant workers, a key measure of reparation under international human rights law.²⁴⁹ Legal reform and other “legacy” work to secure lasting improvements in the living and working conditions of migrant workers in Qatar should be seen in this light. Alongside legal reform, migrant workers’ empowerment is also key to ensure non-repetition.

FIFA should therefore also support and contribute financially towards initiatives designed to assist and support migrant workers, such as the Migrant Workers’ Centre recommended by the BWI.²⁵⁰ In the absence of trade union recognition and representation, this is envisaged as a “safe place” for migrants to learn about their rights and to seek legal assistance and advice. As the BWI has put it, “FIFA should expand the nature and recipients of the FIFA Legacy Fund to include the migrant workers through the Centre.”²⁵¹

Beyond this tournament, FIFA must ensure that the awarding of all future tournaments and events follow a rigorous assessment of risks to human rights, and require clear action plans to prevent and mitigate potential abuses identified. Such risks may include abuse of workers’ rights, forced evictions, discrimination, restrictions on freedom of speech and financial corruption. This would mean building on and strengthening the bidding requirements introduced in 2017, which are in line with the UN Guiding Principles, but which have to date been only partially implemented as shown by attempts to expand the 2022 World Cup to other countries, and the awarding of the FIFA Club World Cup to UAE and China without adequate due diligence.²⁵²

²⁴⁸ Accounting for how a company is addressing its human rights risks and impacts is part and parcel of an adequate human rights due diligence process under the UN Guiding Principles. See, in particular, Principle 21. See also OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through State-based non-judicial mechanisms, A/HRC/38/20, 14 May 2018, paras 8.2 and 10.3. Also OHCHR, Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through non-State-based grievance mechanisms, A/HRC/44/32, 19 May 2020, para. 11.2 (recommending regular and detailed public reporting on the functioning and performance of remedial mechanisms).

²⁴⁹ UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, para. 23.

²⁵⁰ BWI, *The World Cup and Qatar: An Open Letter*, 30 March 2022, <https://www.bwint.org/cms/the-world-cup-and-qatar-an-open-letter-2604>

²⁵¹ BWI, *Dribble or Goal? Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar – Tracking the Score for Decent Work Legacy in Qatar*, p. 30.

²⁵² The Guardian, *Fifa under fire after announcing China will host 24-team Club World Cup*, 24 October 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/oct/24/fifa-china-host-24-team-club-world-cup-2021-human-rights>; and Sports Rights Alliance, *Sport & Rights Alliance Raises Concerns over FIFA’s Surprise Selection of UAE to Host 2021 Club World Cup*, 22 October 2021, <https://sportandrightsalliance.org/sport-rights-alliance-raises-concerns-over-fifas-surprise-selection-of-uae-to-host-2021-club-world-cup/>

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION

Financial contribution is a key part in any remediation programme. While Qatar and FIFA will need to collaborate closely to design and implement this programme, their responsibility to contribute financially to the remediation programme is independent from each other's. Qatar, FIFA, the Supreme Committee and other actors including companies all bear a responsibility to contribute financially to a remediation programme.

To start with, financial contributions towards the programme should ensure all remedial mechanisms are sufficiently resourced and capable of delivering full and swift reparation, particularly when this requires disbursements of money to provide monetary compensation, reimbursements and other forms of financial relief. This could entail, for example, "topping up" existing funds, such as the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund, setting up brand-new compensation funds (for example, for injured workers and families of deceased workers) and stepping in to provide remedy directly when remedial mechanisms in place are failing to deliver promptly and effectively.

This was noted by the Board which encouraged FIFA to take a more proactive role in the remediation of abuses by ensuring remediation was effectively provided through established channels and ultimately remediating itself.²⁵³

A future participatory process including independent evaluations would be needed to determine the final amount required for a comprehensive remediation programme. But given the scale of historical abuses it is likely that remediation for hundreds of thousands of workers involved in projects related to the World Cup, as well as investment in projects to promote non-repetition of abuses, could cost hundreds of millions of US dollars. This amount would be needed to reimburse recruitment fees alone, in addition to compensation required for lost wages, injuries or deaths.

However, neither Qatar nor FIFA would struggle to pay such levels of compensation. Qatar is by many measures one of the world's richest countries per capita,²⁵⁴ and manages a sovereign wealth fund worth over US\$450 billion.²⁵⁵ By some estimates, Qatar will spend over US\$200 billion on the infrastructure to be used for the tournament, including between US\$6.5 billion and US\$10 billion on the stadiums alone.²⁵⁶ Similarly, FIFA is one of the world's richest sports bodies, and is forecast to make over US\$6 billion in revenues from the World Cup, largely from broadcasting and licensing rights. In its own annual report, the football body describes its finances as being "in robust health", boasting over US\$1.6 billion of reserves even after having invested over US\$1 billion to support football associations recover from the Covid-19 pandemic.²⁵⁷ FIFA is also set to distribute approximately US\$440 million in prize money to football associations who qualified for the World Cup, with each team guaranteed at least US\$10 million even if eliminated in the group stage, and the winners receiving US\$45 million.²⁵⁸ Further, through its Legacy Funds set up following the last three World Cups in South Africa²⁵⁹, Brazil,²⁶⁰ and Russia,²⁶¹ FIFA contributed to a total amount of around US\$260 million to support among other things education, humanitarian projects and football related initiatives.

As such, given the scale of abuses requiring remedy, Amnesty International calls on FIFA to earmark an amount at least equivalent to the tournament's prize money (US\$440 million) to contribute to a workers' compensation fund, and to invest in initiatives to strengthen workers' rights and ensure non-repetition of abuses in both Qatar and countries of origin.

²⁵³ See, e.g. Second Report by the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board - Including the Board's Recommendations and FIFA's Responses, September 2018, p 49.

²⁵⁴ World Bank data, Qatar, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/QA>

²⁵⁵ Bloomberg, *Qatar's \$450 Billion Wealth Fund Shifts From Trophies to Tech*, 25 March 2022,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-25/qatar-s-450-billion-wealth-fund-shifts-from-trophies-to-tech>

²⁵⁶ Sky News, *Cost of the World Cup: the Toll and Cost of Qatar 2022*, <https://news.sky.com/story/qatar-2022-what-has-been-built-for-the-2022-world-cup-what-it-has-cost-in-lives-and-how-much-was-spent-on-construction-12496471>

²⁵⁷ FIFA, *Annual Report 2021 Football Unites*, p 169,

<https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/7b8f2f002eb69403/original/FIFA-Annual-Report-21.pdf>

²⁵⁸ FIFA, *FIFA President welcomes participants to Team Seminar*, 1 April 2022,

<https://www.fifa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/news/fifa-president-welcomes-participants-to-team-seminar>

²⁵⁹ Sportsmedia, *South Africa receives \$100 million World Cup legacy fund*, 14 December 2010,

https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/south_african_soccer_receives_100_million_world_cup_legacy_fund/

²⁶⁰ FIFA, *Legacy Fund makes further strides in Brazil*, 23 September 2020, <https://www.fifa.com/news/legacy-fund-makes-further-strides-in-brazil>

²⁶¹ The Independent, *FIFA To Hand Russia \$60m For World Cup Legacy Fund*, 27 February 2019, <https://independent.ng/fifa-to-hand-russia-60m-for-world-cup-legacy-fund/>

A POSSIBLE MODEL? THE RANA PLAZA, TAZREEN AND ALI ENTERPRISES COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS

The harms suffered by the victims of the 2013 collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory building in Bangladesh and the 2012 fires in the Tazreen Fashions and Ali Enterprises factories (in Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively) differ significantly in their cause, nature and context from the range of labour rights abuses suffered over the years by migrant workers in Qatar. However, the large compensation schemes set up to remediate these industrial disasters followed some robust procedural principles that can inspire remediation efforts in Qatar.²⁶²

The Rana Plaza Arrangement was negotiated and set up by stakeholders from the Bangladesh government, national employers' associations, global and national trade unions, and global and local NGOs. These signatories subsequently formed the Rana Plaza Arrangement's governing body, the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee. This body's main responsibility was to develop, implement and monitor a systematic process for delivering compensation and medical care to Rana Plaza's victims, consistent with international standards.²⁶³

The Tazreen Claims Administration Trust set up to compensate the victims of the Tazreen Fashions fire was also established based on principles negotiated between C&A (a major retail firm that sourced from Tazreen Fashions), the C&A Foundation, IndustriALL Global Union and the Clean Clothes Campaign, with the support of the ILO.

Two committees were created to oversee the compensatory process that included global representatives from industry and civil society, the Bangladesh Ministry of Labour and Employment, national trade unions, the employer's association, fire survivors, and local civil society groups working directly with survivors.²⁶⁴

The Ali Enterprises compensation arrangement also convened a multi-stakeholder advisory group, which included IndustriALL, Clean Clothes Campaign, KiK (a German textiles company and Ali Enterprises' main client), the German government (as observer) and the ILO (as neutral chair). It also convened a local oversight committee comprising the Pakistani government, the national employers' association, national trade unions, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, and the survivors' association.²⁶⁵

The victims of all these disasters had to fight long and hard to access compensation, which is in itself a serious breach of their right to remedy. However, their struggle led to the implementation of compensatory arrangements that were unique and unprecedented, particularly because of their strong governance and procedural features.²⁶⁶

A 2018 assessment of these compensatory arrangements found that multi-stakeholder negotiation and governance that includes trade unions, labour rights groups and survivor representatives were key elements for successful "post facto" compensation arrangements.²⁶⁷ So was the direct participation of workers and/or representatives of survivor groups in their governance schemes.²⁶⁸

²⁶² According to the Rana Plaza Arrangement, the Fund reached its target in June 2015. The majority of the \$30 million collected was contributed by international clothing brands, with significant contributions from the Bangladesh Prime Ministers Fund and anonymous donors as well as small individual donations. These contributions were used exclusively to cover payments to Rana Plaza victims and their families, to provide medical services to those injured, and cover operating costs. For more information see, the Rana Plaza Arrangement, <https://ranaplaza-arrangement.org/>

²⁶³ Rebecca Prentice, *Workers' Right to Compensation after Garment Factory Disasters: Making Rights a Reality*, February 2018, p. 13, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/74288/1/Compensation%20Report%20Prentice%20FINAL%202018.pdf>

²⁶⁴ Rebecca Prentice, *Workers' Right to Compensation after Garment Factory Disasters: Making Rights a Reality*, February 2018, p. 16.

²⁶⁵ Rebecca Prentice, *Workers' Right to Compensation after Garment Factory Disasters: Making Rights a Reality*, February 2018, p. 19.

²⁶⁶ The Rana Plaza Arrangement, <https://ranaplaza-arrangement.org/intro>; Clean Clothes Campaign, "Justice for the Ali Enterprises victims", <https://cleanclothes.org/campaigns/past/ali-enterprises>

²⁶⁷ Rebecca Prentice, *Workers' Right to Compensation after Garment Factory Disasters: Making Rights a Reality* February 2018, p. 21, 27.

²⁶⁸ Rebecca Prentice, *Workers' Right to Compensation after Garment Factory Disasters: Making Rights a Reality* February, p. 3, 27.

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Preparations for the 2022 World Cup continue to rely on the labour of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers, many of whom have suffered so that the world can enjoy its most watched international sporting event. FIFA failed to take sufficient action to prevent this suffering when it could have done so, and in fact enabled it by choosing to award the World Cup to a country where widespread labour abuses were clearly foreseeable, without imposing any conditions to protect workers' rights. However, FIFA has also learnt many lessons since it made the award in 2010 and has taken some unprecedented steps, such as producing the first ever sustainability strategy for a World Cup based on a systematic assessment of human rights risks.

FIFA still has time to prevent at least some further abuses in the final run-up to the World Cup and during its delivery. However, it will not be in a position to prevent them all, and it definitely cannot erase the suffering of the past. In line with the UN Guiding Principles and its own commitment to remediate abuses to which it has contributed, FIFA must now ensure that any abuses related to the tournament that it has not prevented are fully remediated. Where existing mechanisms are incapable of delivering full reparation, new mechanisms should be set up with both Qatar and FIFA promptly stepping in to provide remedy.

The 2022 World Cup will be far from exemplary in terms of preventing harm, but it can still represent a turning point in FIFA's quest to respect human rights if all workers who have suffered abuses in the preparation, staging and delivery of its flagship event receive adequate reparation.

In the next six months leading up to the 2022 World Cup, Qatar must stringently enforce its labour laws and press ahead with its reform plans to protect migrant workers' rights and prevent them from falling victim to further abuses. Simultaneously, it must work to remediate all harm already caused that remains unaddressed or poorly addressed whether related to World Cup projects or not. This includes working with FIFA, Q22, the Supreme Committee and other relevant domestic and international actors to ensure remedy for abuses suffered by migrant workers engaged in World Cup-related projects and services who have so far been unable to obtain full and adequate reparation.

Alongside efforts to prevent further abuses of migrant workers engaged in World Cup-related projects and services, Qatar and FIFA must now:

- Ensure that all migrant workers who suffered harm because of their involvement in World Cup-related work have access to full and adequate reparation in line with international human rights law and standards. Such reparation should extend to the migrant workers' families where applicable.
- Urgently initiate structured discussions with all relevant stakeholders – including, in particular, workers, global trade unions, ILO representatives, civil society organizations and individual labour and human rights experts – with a view to designing and implementing a targeted and effective remediation programme for abused migrant workers engaged in World Cup-related projects and services. The programme would also cover past abuses that have so far not been adequately remediated and extend beyond abuses in the context of Supreme Committee projects.

As part of this programme, Qatar and FIFA should:

- Review and strengthen existing remedial mechanisms in consultation with workers to ensure they can deliver effective remedy in line with international human rights law.

- Consider the establishment of new mechanisms, including collective redress processes, where existing mechanisms are proving incapable of delivering prompt and full reparation and/or for channelling a large number of similar grievances that have so far not received adequate reparation.
 - Ensure workers have access to adequate legal representation and assistance before commencing and throughout the duration of remedial processes.
 - Discuss and set up, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, an overarching governance structure and an independent supervisory body to oversee the functioning and outcome of all remedial mechanisms.
 - Discuss and set up, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, a mechanism for workers pursuing claims through any of the existing or new remedial mechanisms to safely raise concerns about the functioning of these mechanisms without fear of retaliation.
 - Design a way for workers (or family members of deceased workers) who have open, unresolved or inadequately addressed claims to be able to come forward to seek and receive full reparation even if they are not in Qatar.
- Plan for the remediation programme to last for as long as grievances remain outstanding, even if this is long after the tournament has ended.
 - Contribute financially towards the programme to ensure all remedial mechanisms are sufficiently resourced and capable of delivering full and swift reparation; set up new funds where needed (for example, for injured workers and families of deceased workers); and step in and provide remedy directly where remedial mechanisms are failing to deliver promptly and effectively.
 - As part of this FIFA should set aside an amount at least equivalent to the prize money provided to FAs participating in the 2022 World Cup, in order to contribute to a potential compensation fund and further initiatives to strengthen protection of workers' rights in Qatar and countries of origin. This should include supporting the Migrant Workers' Centre recommended by BWI.
 - Publish the remediation programme in full, including FIFA's financial contribution to it.
 - Expand the Sustainability Strategy to include a brand new strand of work exclusively focused on the tournament organizers' efforts to ensure effective remedy through the remediation programme.
 - Communicate proactively and regularly on its efforts to remediate, including by publishing up-to-date, clear and comprehensive detail about the remediation programmes' performance. This should include data (anonymized or aggregated where needed to protect individual workers) about the various remedial mechanisms in place; the number and types of complaints received; the outcomes (including feedback from workers on whether they feel they have obtained adequate reparation); and the time taken to achieve them. This reporting should continue until all World Cup-related grievances have been resolved.
 - Contribute to guaranteeing non-repetition of abuses of migrant workers' rights by pressing for the urgent and full implementation of legal reforms and supporting, including financially, the establishment of permanent measures to assist and support migrant workers going forward, such as the Migrant Workers' Centre recommended by the BWI.
 - Beyond this tournament, FIFA should conduct rigorous assessments of risks to human rights for any country wishing to host FIFA's events, and develops clear action plans to prevent and mitigate potential abuses identified. – Where identified risks cannot or will not be prevented, FIFA should not award the tournament. These risks may include abuse of workers' rights, forced evictions, discrimination, restricted freedom of speech and financial corruption.
 - Establish an independent grievance mechanism specifically designed to receive and resolve complaints of abuse by workers directly or indirectly hired by FIFA/Q22 or in FIFA/Q22's supply or sub-contracting chains, including against FIFA/Q22 themselves. This mechanism should strictly adhere to the effectiveness criteria laid out in Principle 31 of the UN Guiding Principles and be developed and overseen in collaboration with workers and/or workers' representatives.

ANNEX I

FIFA'S RESPONSE TO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 6 MAY 2022



Stephen Cockburn
Deputy Director, Head of Economic and
Social Justice
Amnesty International

Zurich, 6 May 2022

FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ and labour rights

Dear Stephen,

Thank you for your letters dated 30 March and 29 April 2022 with respect to labour rights and the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™.

Let me start by reiterating FIFA's steadfast commitment to implementing effective due diligence processes in relation to the protection of workers involved in the preparation and hosting of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 in line with FIFA's Human Rights Policy and responsibility under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. In doing so, we follow the commitments and initiatives outlined in the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy (see [here](#)). Our efforts in that respect are also described in various public reports by FIFA, the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 LLC (Q22) and the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy (SC), most of which are referenced in your letters. Furthermore, an overview on the progress in relation to the different initiatives can be found on the Sustainability Strategy Progress Report microsite (see [here](#)), which is updated on a regular basis.

In this letter, we would like to share some overall considerations in response to your communications. We will then provide answers to your more specific questions from your letter of 30 March in the annexe to this letter.

a) On the overall labour rights due diligence process related to FIFA World Cup projects

Human rights-related matters have been taken into consideration in FIFA World Cup 2022 planning from the very beginning, with the bid committee aiming to use the competition as an instrument to shape wider social change in Qatar. After Qatar was selected to host the FIFA World Cup 2022, and with the start of FIFA World Cup infrastructure construction, the SC established and later gradually expanded its workers' welfare programme to ensure the protection of workers on FIFA World Cup sites. Besides the daily work of a team of labour experts at the SC, the programme has also included close engagement with external stakeholders, joint inspections with Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI) since 2017, as well as the independent monitoring of the programme by the ethical trade consultancy, Impactt Ltd.

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In light of the widely recognised effectiveness of the SC's programme and the independent oversight by unions, Impactt Ltd. and other external monitoring bodies, FIFA's role in relation to the construction of FIFA World Cup infrastructure has been to engage with the SC on an ongoing basis, support the SC in its efforts, and raise concerns about issues identified by unions, external monitoring bodies, civil society organisations and others. Dedicated staff members at FIFA and Q22 have led this work since 2013, including with staff based in Doha since 2017. FIFA is grateful to have in the SC, and in particular its leadership and the Workers' Welfare Department, a trusted partner that has shown remarkable commitment to the protection of workers involved in FIFA World Cup projects.

Starting in 2019, the focus of overall tournament preparations gradually shifted from construction to event preparations. This meant that a growing number of workers became involved in areas of the tournament's organisation, led and managed by FIFA and Q22. As a consequence, FIFA also increased its direct operational involvement in related labour rights due diligence through the creation of a Workers' Welfare Unit at Q22, which operates in an integrated manner with the pre-existing SC Workers' Welfare Department. This means that resource funding for that team, as well as the integration of labour rights due diligence – from the tender stage to contracting, from monitoring to enforcement processes – involves nearly all functional areas at FIFA and Q22 involved in tournament delivery.

For further information on labour rights due diligence in relation to service workers, please refer to our letter dated 22 February 2022.

b) On efforts to promote a wider labour rights legacy

In 2008, Qatar adopted the Qatar National Vision 2030, one of the purposes of which is to drive positive social change, including with respect to the protection of workers. The FIFA World Cup has been used by many in Qatar and internationally to promote this cause. FIFA has supported this effort, as reflected in the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy, which is built around the four pillars of the Qatar National Vision 2030. In that respect, it includes a series of commitments and initiatives by the tournament organisers aimed at contributing to wider labour rights reforms to benefit all workers in Qatar, not just those involved in FIFA World Cup projects.

As has been widely recognised, the FIFA World Cup has served as a catalyst for landmark labour rights reforms in Qatar. These include, for example, the dismantlement of the *kafala* system, the introduction of a non-discriminatory minimum wage, and enhanced protections from heat-related and other health hazards. Qatar has also introduced steps to promote ethical recruitment through the establishment of Qatar Visa Centers in several sending countries, and has enhanced access to remediation for workers through the workers' support and insurance fund. In the process, there has been a remarkable increase in exchange and cooperation between Qatari entities and international actors, as exemplified by the opening of an International Labour Organisation (ILO) Office in Doha in 2017, and the formalised collaborations between the Ministry of Labour and international unions.

These reforms are the result of a cumulative effort by many national and international actors who have leveraged the spotlight and change incentives created by the FIFA World Cup. Chief amongst these actors are entities within Qatar, including the Ministry of Labour and the SC.



Through the programmes implemented under the umbrella of the Sustainability Strategy, FIFA, Q22 and the SC have contributed to this agenda in various ways. These include:

- engagement by FIFA's leadership at political level, urging the authorities to implement wider labour rights reforms in collaboration with the ILO and other international actors;
- participation in multi-stakeholder forums and sector-wide initiatives, such as the Karama initiative or the hospitality sector initiative led by the Ministry of Labour, the ILO and the Institute for Human Rights and Business;
- the establishment of best practices in FIFA World Cup projects that have served as a basis for countrywide legal reforms, including in relation to worker committees and heat stress mitigation;
- spill-over effects of heightened standards for FIFA World Cup contractors, raising the bar across companies and sectors, thus also benefitting workers who are not directly involved in FIFA World Cup-related work;
- collaboration with the Ministry of Labour on the training and deployment of labour inspectors, using FIFA World Cup projects to help build capacity for ministry staff;
- collaboration with international unions and organisations, in particular BWI and the ILO, and contribution to strengthening the presence of, and engagement with, worker representatives in Qatar.

c) On remediation

Throughout the process, the SC and FIFA were mindful of the need to ensure that workers involved in FIFA World Cup projects can and could raise concerns with their employers or, if preferred, directly with the SC or FIFA. In that respect, the SC, working closely with the BWI, introduced Workers' Welfare Forums to ensure workers have a voice at project and accommodation level. A hotline for workers to raise concerns directly with the SC was also set up by it. Since 2019, these systems have gradually been extended to include service companies involved with the FIFA World Cup through relationships with the SC, FIFA and Q22. This also includes a collaboration with the ILO on worker committees in the hospitality sector.

In addition, FIFA introduced a grievance mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists in 2018. In 2021, it was complemented by a human rights grievance mechanism specifically for the FIFA World Cup Qatar. That mechanism has been developed based on a study on the effectiveness of existing systems conducted by an independent expert entity, and is informed by recommendations emanating from a stakeholder engagement process conducted in 2021. The mechanism is hosted by a specialist provider and allows for anonymous reporting both in writing and through voice messaging.

Furthermore, FIFA is currently in the process of discussing ways to ensure that labour rights-related grievances during the competition period will be handled efficiently. These might include concerns raised through the FIFA and SC grievance mechanisms, as well as issues identified through the audit and inspection programme implemented by the SC and Q22 Workers' Welfare teams. The aim is to ensure the speedy resolution of issues, taking into account the specific tournament circumstances and the fact that the overall FIFA World Cup project will come to a close in the months after the competition. In that respect, we have also taken note of and are assessing the propositions set out in your letter dated 29 April 2022, in which you outline a system involving a wide range of non-FIFA World Cup-specific public infrastructure built since 2010 as part of the



government's overall effort to develop the country, and used on a daily basis by the wider population of Qatar as well as corporations and organisations operating in the country.

In closing, we would like to note that, as is to be expected for any undertaking of this scale and complexity, the due diligence put in place to protect workers involved in FIFA World Cup projects has been a source of continuous learning for FIFA. The work to hold companies to account on labour rights has not been without challenges and will continue to require serious efforts during the coming months. At the same time, we are pleased to have seen significant progress not only for FIFA World Cup workers but also in the country at large and which has led to tangible positive changes for hundreds of thousands of workers in Qatar.

We will continue to implement and further strengthen our labour rights due diligence processes in line with the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022™ Sustainability Strategy and in close collaboration with our counterparts at Q22, the SC and the Ministry of Labour. We value the engagement with Amnesty International in that respect and trust that you will fairly reflect the work of FIFA, Q22 and the SC in your upcoming report.

Please find below further information in response to your questions included in your letter of 30 March 2022, and do not hesitate to get in touch should you have further questions.

Kind regards,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "AG".

Andreas Graf
Head of Human Rights & Anti-Discrimination



Annexe: responses to specific questions from your letter dated 30 March 2022

1. Has FIFA set up or taken any steps to set up a human rights sub-Committee within its internal governance structure?

Yes. The FIFA Governance, Audit and Compliance Committee (GACC) is responsible for overseeing FIFA's human rights work. In 2021 and following on from the decisions passed by the FIFA Congress in May 2021, the FIFA GACC formed a working group on human rights and social responsibility. The new FIFA Governance Regulations, which will be submitted for approval at the next FIFA Council, will formally reflect the decisions taken in 2021 by the GACC.

2. If not, has FIFA taken any steps to put in place any other arrangement to ensure integration of its human rights commitments into decision-making within FIFA's key governing bodies and to ensure accountability for failure to abide by these commitments?

See above.

3. Has FIFA set up or taken any steps to set up a body to provide ongoing and independent evaluation of FIFA's human rights efforts through the entire life cycle of the 2022 World Cup?

FIFA evaluates the effectiveness of its human rights due diligence processes in relation to the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 on an ongoing basis. This happens primarily through issue or project-specific collaborations with external partners and engagement with stakeholders, as well as through internal assessments. In addition, between 2017 and 2020, FIFA worked closely with its independent human rights advisory board. Since 2021, the FIFA Governance, Audit and Compliance Committee oversees FIFA's human rights work.

4. Has FIFA published any new human rights reports detailing its actions and plans for further operationalising its human rights commitments across its entities and activities? If not, why not?

FIFA regularly publishes information on the various steps taken as part of its strategic human rights programme (see [here](#)). Furthermore, we are currently in the process of working on a comprehensive human rights report covering activities for 2022. In addition, we have started the development of a FIFA Human Rights Strategy for 2023-2026, which FIFA intends to publish in the first half of 2023.

With respect to the human rights-related measures taken concerning the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022, updates are published in the Sustainability Strategy Progress Report microsite (see [here](#)). In addition, more detailed reports are published by the SC on its dedicated workers' welfare website (see [here](#)).

5. Is FIFA now planning to provide more regular updates up to, during and post tournament?

FIFA will regularly update the Sustainability Progress Report microsite throughout the coming months. Furthermore, a final report will be drawn up and published after the tournament in line with international sustainability reporting standards.



6. When will FIFA publish its next update?

See above.

7. If this is done by way of updating a live, online document, how will the public know when new information is available and where to find it?

FIFA encourages stakeholders and the wider public to regularly consult the Sustainability Strategy Progress Report microsite to learn about the most recent updates.

8. Can FIFA explain how concretely it manages, evaluates, coordinates and ensures funding for the implementation of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy?

FIFA has implemented a sustainability management system, in line with international best practices and the ISO 20121 Standard, to ensure the implementation of the Sustainability Strategy across the three parties: FIFA, Q22 and SC. This process is led by Q22's sustainability team and is based on the strategy's implementation plan, which defines the responsibilities, resources needed, key milestones, and performance indicators and targets for each of the initiatives in the strategy.

The FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 has been granted ISO 20121 certification, the international standard that sets requirements for embedding management systems to deliver a sustainable event. The ISO certification covers tournament operations across all official venues and measures the efficacy of management systems from the planning stage through to tournament delivery and the tournament's legacy.

Please also see the information on the governance pillar in the Sustainability Strategy Progress report.

9. More specifically, can FIFA explain what financial contribution it is making towards implementation of the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Sustainability Strategy and whether any of this financial contribution is directed towards remediation of abuses of migrant labour?

The combined budgets of the FIFA Social Responsibility & Education Division and the Q22 Sustainability Department for the implementation of the strategy is approximately USD 10 million. Significant additional resources are being invested by the SC and other host country entities towards the delivery of the initiatives in the joint strategy led by them. Furthermore, the implementation of the strategy rests on the collaboration with, and contribution from, a wide range of other functional areas at FIFA, Q22 and the SC, which is not included in the above-mentioned amount.

It should further be noted that, as a consequence of the Workers' Welfare initiatives under the strategy, countless workers have received financial remediation. This includes the payment of outstanding wages, the repayment of recruitment fees through the SC's universal reimbursement scheme and other forms of compensation. Through the recruitment fee reimbursement scheme, for example, both FIFA World Cup and non-FIFA World Cup workers have received payments of a total of USD 22.6 million as at December 2021, with an additional USD 5.7 million committed by contractors.

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10. Can FIFA explain whether it has worked and is still working to ensure respect for the labour rights of “workers engaged through other construction projects”, that is “workers building and providing services for infrastructure such as transportation systems, roads, ports, utilities and hotels”? If so, can FIFA explain how it is doing so?

Please see point b) above and information on the human pillar in the Sustainability Strategy Progress report.

11. Similarly, can FIFA explain whether it is working to ensure respect for the labour rights of migrant workers who will be providing services not to World Cup sites specifically, but to the thousands of World Cup visitors and spectators expected to travel to Qatar to watch the event (e.g. hospitality, catering, security, transport, etc.). If so, can FIFA explain how it is doing so?

Measures in that respect include those outlined in point b) above. Furthermore, the audit and inspection programme by the SC, Q22 and FIFA extends to a large number of hotels beyond those formally involved in tournament delivery.

Further information can also be found in the section on the human pillar in the Sustainability Strategy Progress report.

12. What labour standards will suppliers be required to implement under the Sustainable Sourcing Code and how will compliance be monitored and enforced?

The SC’s Workers’ Welfare Standards are the baseline labour rights standards used for all Qatar-based contractors for the FIFA World Cup. They are monitored and enforced through a comprehensive audit and compliance programme implemented by the SC and Q22 Workers’ Welfare units. For more information, please refer to the above and our previous letter to Amnesty International dated 22 February 2022.

13. What remedy will migrant workers working for tournament organisers’ suppliers and contractors be offered in case of breaches to the Sustainable Sourcing Code?

When companies working in relation to the FIFA World Cup breach their obligations under the Sustainable Sourcing Code or the SC’s Workers’ Welfare Standards, FIFA and the other tournament organisers focus on using their leverage to ensure the wrong is made right by the entity that caused the impact, usually the company employing the respective worker. Where needed, this may include escalating the matter to the Ministry of Labour. The type of remediation will depend on the adverse impact in question and may include the payment of outstanding dues by the employer, the strengthening of company practice to ensure non-repetition and sanctions for the company.

14. In conducting due diligence on contractors building and providing services to World Cup sites as well as expected visitors and spectators, has FIFA identified any outstanding grievances brought by workers that have been poorly and/or insufficiently addressed and what steps is FIFA taking to work with contractors to address and remedy these issues for affected workers?

Since 2014, efforts have been ongoing to ensure that companies comply with the SC’s Workers’ Welfare Standards and to address related grievances. This includes pre-contract checks with a



focus on recruitment practices and worker accommodation standards, including the requirement to implement a corrective action plan. Companies that do not meet the standards or have demonstrated a lack of commitment to addressing issues as part of the tender process or in previous relationships with FIFA, Q22 or the SC are excluded from the process.

Furthermore, in the context of the above-mentioned discussions on procedures to ensure processes that meet tournament needs, and mindful of the fact that the FIFA World Cup project will come to an end in the months after the tournament, we are looking at ways to ensure closure of all grievances associated with FIFA World Cup projects, including pre-event cases.

15. What steps has FIFA taken, if any, to review and improve or rectify shortcomings in existing remediation mechanisms?

In 2019, FIFA commissioned an expert service provider to conduct a study assessing the effectiveness of existing remediation mechanisms. The results of this study have been taken into account in the development of the FIFA World Cup human rights grievance mechanism as well as in the respective follow-up procedures.

With respect to state mechanisms, FIFA has engaged with its Qatari counterparts on the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund and the need to ensure effective and timely outcomes.

16. Can FIFA clarify what specific remediation measures or mechanisms have been or will be put in place for remediation of grievances by:

a- workers engaged in the provision of services for FIFA World Cup 2022 sites;

b- workers engaged in the construction of, and provision of services for, infrastructure "that is not being developed directly for the FIFA World Cup, but will be used during the tournament..."

The primary grievance mechanism in place for workers linked to the FIFA World Cup is the SC's Workers' Welfare hotline. The follow-up to cases will include collaboration with FIFA and Q22 where a case concerns contractors of these entities, as well as with the Ministry of Labour where required.

In addition, workers can also raise concerns directly with FIFA through the FIFA World Cup human rights grievance mechanism (see [here](#)). Such cases are first assessed by an independent entity and the follow-up, including referral to third parties and tracking of progress, is managed by FIFA.

17. In this context, has FIFA established or is FIFA planning to establish an independent grievance mechanism specifically designed to receive and resolve complaints of labour rights abuse by these workers, including against FIFA and/or Q22 themselves?

See above.

18. Is FIFA planning to support, including financially, the establishment of the Migrant Workers' Centre proposed by Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI)?

FIFA continues to support the establishment of an entity that allows workers to seek and receive advice and support from fellow worker representatives through various means. In that respect FIFA is in close contact with BWI, relevant entities in Qatar, as well as other stakeholders.

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PREDICTABLE AND PREVENTABLE

WHY FIFA AND QATAR SHOULD REMEDY ABUSES BEHIND THE 2022 WORLD CUP

When FIFA awarded the 2022 World Cup to Qatar in 2010, the existence of widespread labour rights abuses was well-documented. FIFA knew, or ought to have known, that the monumental construction work and other services required to host the tournament would rest on the shoulders of vulnerable migrant workers at severe risk of exploitation. Yet, despite these warnings, FIFA granted the multi-billion-dollar event to Qatar without imposing on the country any conditions to strengthen labour rights protections. Recognising its responsibilities far too late, and introducing measures benefiting far too few workers, the abuses that followed were both predictable and preventable.

Qatar and FIFA have clear obligations and responsibilities under international human rights law and standards not only to prevent such widespread human rights abuses, but also to provide adequate remedy for victims of abuses. While Qatar's obligation should cover every abuse on its territory, FIFA's responsibility extends beyond workers directly employed on stadiums and training sites, to the hundreds of thousands of workers building and servicing the wider range of projects necessary for the preparation and delivery of the tournament.

With six months to go to the World Cup, Qatar and FIFA should work together to put in place a comprehensive programme to provide remedy for all the workers who suffered abuse to make the FIFA 2022 World Cup possible.