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Monitoring and Investigating
Equipment used in Human Rights Abuses

A companion to **UKWELI:**
Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa

Amnesty International

"Having seen the cost in human suffering of innocent men, women and children, in conflict in Africa and around the world, I believe that it is time the global community establish an international framework on arms control. This will help limit the number of arms sold and used in wars and conflict and assist in mopping up the arms that are already in the community. We all need to support Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam in their Control Arms Campaign and help make the world safe from conflicts and armed violence."
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, October 2004.

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Amnesty International 2005

[colophon]

"The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems – and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as 'weapons of mass destruction'. Yet there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread."

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in: *We the Peoples: the role of the UN in the 21st Century*. Millennium Report to the United Nations General Assembly, 2000, page 52.

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The text of this *Ukweli* companion can also be downloaded from Amnesty's website

www.amnesty.nl/, click 'Landeninfo', click 'Special Programme on Africa'.
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Preface

This handbook on monitoring and investigating Military, Security and Police (MSP) equipment used in human rights abuses is a companion to the Ukweli Handbook on Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa.[1] The MSP handbook aims at inspiring human rights activists across the continent to include monitoring and investigating MSP equipment in their regular human rights monitoring and documenting activities.

You don't need to be an arms expert to undertake meaningful work in this area. Usually, for human rights organisations monitoring and investigating MSP equipment will not be an objective in itself but be related to monitoring and investigating violations or abuses[2] of human rights. However, paying specific attention to equipment used in such violations could help to build a stronger case against the perpetrators and could also contribute to stopping illegal transfers.

Your monitoring and investigating activities related to MSP transfers should preferably not be done in isolation but be part of a network. On the one hand trying to uncover illegal deals can be very complex, time consuming and risky. On the other hand, any piece of information can help to complement information found by others elsewhere and together create evidence of an illegal transfer. If you engage in this kind of investigation you should therefore establish good connections with regional or international organisations (see Part 4, section2 Useful contacts).

This handbook is primarily meant to instruct on monitoring and investigating. Yet, Part 4 includes some suggestions for taking action. It will largely depend on the local security situation whether or not publicising your findings would be wise, even though monitoring as such is a legal activity. Campaigning, like lobbying your government or parliament, may be even more complicated. If you decide to do it you might want to do it with a broad coalition of civil society organisations rather than doing it on your own.

The Special Programme on Africa is planning to publish a separate MSP campaigning manual in addition to this handbook.

It should be noted that monitoring and investigating MSP equipment in a well-established and functioning State is different from situations in which the government authority is weak or has collapsed altogether. In the first case there is a clear distinction between legal use and misuse of MSP equipment. It will be obvious that in circumstances of a weak or failing state, such distinctions are problematic since the state monopoly of violence is contested. In those conditions, the suggestions and instructions in this handbook can only partially be applied.

Assess the risks first before going out on a field trip. This is imperative for all situations where human rights have been violated, not just where a conflict is being fought out between armed groups.

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[1] The *Ukweli Handbook on Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa* is accompanied by six companions on monitoring and investigating Political Killings; Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, and Prison Conditions; Death in Custody; Sexual Violence Excessive Use of Force; Human Rights Abuses in Armed Conflict. The series is published by Amnesty International and CODESRIA (Senegal) in 2000 and 2001.

[2] Throughout this text the term 'violation' is used in the same way that Amnesty International and the UN use the term. It refers specifically to a clear breach of international human rights law which is formally binding on governments. The term 'abuse' is a more general term, which includes reference to the breaching international humanitarian law by any party in a conflict.

Since the year 2000, not less than four regional initiatives on arms control have come into being in Africa.[3] This is a new development, of invaluable importance, which needs to be encouraged by all means. Human rights groups have a role to play to enhance and strengthen these new instruments to make them work. Investigating and reporting misuse and illegal transfers of MSP equipment as breaches of those instruments is one way to pressurise governments to control the use and flows of arms.

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[3] The Bamako Declaration, the ECOWAS moratorium, the SADC Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Declaration. See for details Part 3, section 2.

Introduction

1. What is monitoring and investigating military, security and police (MSP) equipment?
Military, security and police (MSP) equipment are the goods and services - including weapons, technology, personnel or training - that enable military, security and police forces and armed opposition groups to function. This includes conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons, ammunition, riot control equipment, police vehicles, surveillance equipment as well as training that MSP forces receive. Monitoring and investigating MSP equipment aims to find specific and detailed information about equipment used in cases of human rights abuse, those who used the equipment, and those who supplied or manufactured it. This can add vital details to human rights reports, help bring those responsible to justice, stop further transfers of MSP equipment and prevent further abuse of human rights

2. How is MSP equipment used to violate human rights?
Every day, MSP forces use equipment or the training they have received in many legitimate ways to carry out their jobs. However, MSP equipment is often misused and leads to human rights abuses, for example torture or excessive use of force, as these hypothetical examples show:

Use in demonstrations, crowd control or riots – Last week a peaceful demonstration by students against an increase in university fees was broken up by police using batons, tear gas and water cannon vehicles. Even when students were running away some were struck by tear gas canisters fired by the police. When students sheltered inside a shop, police fired tear gas inside to force them outside and then beat them.

Use in prisons – Prisoners in the Central Jail are held in large cells, attached to the wall by leg irons for long periods of time. Prison guards now carry electric shock batons, which they use to keep control. A number of cases of torture have been reported.

Use at borders – From April of this year all travellers entering at border crossing points have been photographed and fingerprinted. The information obtained, together with their identity number, is fed instantly into the newly installed 'national identity system'. This computer system gathers data from all government ministries and contains details of political and union affiliation. Cases of individuals being 'disappeared' at border points are now common.

Use in conflict – In September government helicopters flew overhead and fired rockets and bombs at the village. Afterwards the guerrilla forces arrived with their commanders in brand new four-wheel drive vehicles with machine guns mounted on the roofs. They gathered the young men of the village together and shot them all.

Use of training – Earlier this year a new military police force was created to deal with unrest or demonstrations. They received training from a private company in dealing with demonstrations, strikes and other public events as well as interrogation techniques. The unit has been involved in recent cases where demonstrations were violently broken up using maximum force and firearms. Large numbers of people have been arrested and reports of torture have become common.

3. Why is it important to monitor and investigate the use of MSP equipment and MSP transfers?
There are three main objectives to monitor, investigate and document military, security or police (MSP) equipment:

a) to obtain background information on the types of MSP equipment that are used by the various security forces in your country.

b) to obtain information on the use of MSP equipment in committing human rights violations or abuses in order to find ways to prevent future violations and abuses, or to provide evidence when bringing those responsible to justice.

c) to obtain information about imports and exports (transfers) of MSP equipment to human rights violators in order to prevent further transfers. In the context of armed conflict, information about MSP equipment can contribute to assessing how arms flows circulate and whether embargoes are violated.

The use of equipment by police or military forces to exert force (or lethal force) is allowed in certain circumstances. However, because it can be so easily misused, the use of force is strictly regulated by national, regional and international laws and regulations, which most governments have signed up to. If a human rights abuse is carried out using MSP equipment, those responsible should be held accountable under such laws.

In conditions where the state authority is being contested, resulting in a state of lawlessness, youth militia or vigilante groups may jump into the authority vacuum and seize control over parts of the population. Such conditions have increasingly led to widespread misuse of MSP equipment. In armed conflict, all parties could misuse MSP equipment to commit abuses of human rights.

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Governments are obliged to hold their forces to account and to bring to justice those who violate laws. However, if they fail to do so, human rights defenders must do the job. Holding MSP forces to account is a normal activity that citizens' groups, journalists, human rights organisations or the United Nations all carry out, every day, around the world.
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The other handbooks in the *Ukweli* series all have an MSP element, whether they deal with violations against women, deaths in custody or excessive use of force. Monitoring the use of MSP equipment is a complementary activity to all other human rights monitoring. MSP monitoring adds a deeper dimension to reports of human rights violations which enables more effective and widespread campaigning to take place.

The following example of a report of an incident shows how an MSP element can add crucial information:

> *Version 1.* **Security forces in Johannesburg clashed with demonstrators yesterday following the fatal shooting of a child by police last Saturday. A number of demonstrators were injured.**
>
> *Version 2.* **Security forces in Johannesburg clashed with demonstrators yesterday following the fatal shooting of a child by the police's Special Response Unit (SRU) last Saturday. The demonstration was called to protest against the shooting, the third such shooting in just over two months. The march to the SRU headquarters was declared illegal by the SRU, who used batons, tear gas and water cannon vehicles to drive the demonstrators away. Demonstrators who sheltered in a nearby office building were attacked by police who fired teargas into the building to force them out – only to beat them as they escaped the choking fumes. 47 people were injured, many with broken bones. A number of demonstrators and office workers collapsed due to the effects of the tear gas fumes and are still in hospital.**

> **Human rights activists collected some of the used tear gas canisters, which were marked with 'Chemical Suppliers Ltd. Made in the USA'. Police denied they had used excessive force. The human rights commission has called for a full investigation.**

Both versions of the story are correct, but version 2 includes important extra information identifying the perpetrators of the human rights violations. It names the specific MSP force responsible and this would enable campaigners to ask detailed questions of their government and the police unit about what happened and why excessive use of force was used.

Campaigners could also question the company named about whether the transfer was legal or had broken an embargo or any export laws. If it was a legal transfer they could highlight the human rights violations carried out and demand that the company cease all transfers. If the transfer was in breach of laws or embargoes this information could be used for action to be taken against the company and government responsible for supplying the MSP equipment and to stop further transfers.

4. How does MSP monitoring and investigating contribute to reducing violations and abuses of human rights?
MSP monitoring can:
- add important information to human rights abuse evidence;
- highlight patterns of human rights violations by certain MSP forces, or by certain types of equipment;
- help to identify the MSP forces responsible for violations of human rights;
- give prior warning of possible human rights abuses[4];
- provide physical evidence to identify the routes and supplier countries or companies of the MSP equipment used in abuses of human rights;
- provide information about the origin of arms or evidence of a weapon embargo being violated in armed conflict situations;
- generate publicity that may deter companies from supplying MSP equipment to human rights violators;
- create the possibility of legal redress for the victims of human rights abuses by targeting irresponsible supplier companies or governments;
- expose loopholes in national or regional laws and regulations governing imports or exports of MSP equipment;
- contribute to monitoring the compliance of governments, companies or MSP forces with national, regional or international laws, obligations or control initiatives;
- make MSP forces (and the companies supplying them) aware that they cannot act with impunity;
- supply vital information to international campaigns, or campaigns in the country of origin of the MSP equipment.

5. What risks are involved in monitoring and investigating MSP equipment?
As a human rights defender you may already know about some of the risks of human rights work.[5] Investigating the military, security or police area can add to those risks. Many governments (including Western governments) have a policy of not releasing any information about MSP equipment or MSP forces. They use the excuse of 'National Security' against

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[4] For example, in 2001 the Zimbabwe government bought Austrian military vehicles, Israeli water cannons and other riot control equipment and training for security forces in the run-up to national elections. This gave an indication of the government's possible repressive intentions towards the opposition parties.

[5] Refer to the *Ukweli Handbook on Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa*, p. 58 – 60 for details about the risks involved in monitoring and documenting.

those wishing to find out information. Undertaking MSP work can also bring the human rights activist into contact with individuals or companies engaged in the supply of such equipment – the arms brokers.

Monitoring and investigating MSP equipment and transfers is entirely legal and legitimate. It is consistent with governments' obligations under international laws and treaties that they have signed up to. Nevertheless, it can be dangerous, given that the MSP trade involves huge amounts of money, and, as we shall see in Part 3 many MSP transfers are either taking place on the margins of legality or are illegal.

Part 2, section 7 gives details of how to assess and minimise the risks of monitoring and documenting MSP equipment - please read that section carefully.

6. About this handbook

This MSP companion is directly relevant to the other *Ukweli* companions and should be used with close reference to them. The other guides are referred to in the text and should be consulted for more information. You may find yourself using this handbook together with one of the others when investigating particular types of human rights violations:

- When investigating an extra judicial execution, try to find cartridge cases from the weapon used.
- For a disappearance case, find out if and what type of vehicle was used.
- When monitoring prison conditions, find out if prisoners are held in leg irons and if the leg irons have markings that could link them back to a supplier or country of origin.
- In cases of torture find out what type of equipment was used.

Referring to the other *Ukweli* handbooks is vital because you will need to decide whether or not the use of MSP equipment has resulted in a human rights violation or abuse, and if so, what type of violation it is. Even when you think no violation has occurred, investigating MSP equipment is still important because it may give information about the routes used and companies or people involved in the MSP trade. This is especially important when trying to discover if the trade in MSP equipment has violated any laws or embargoes.

A checklist of questions may contain:

• **Was MSP equipment used, what type was used?** • **Who used it?** • **Was it misused? Did a human rights violation occur?**	
YES – decide what type of violation occurred e.g. excessive us of force, torture, etc. and investigate what equipment was used and where it came from.	**NO – gather information to find out how the MSP equipment was obtained.** **Were any laws or embargoes broken in order to obtain the MSP equipment (either in your country, the country of origin or a third country)?**

This handbook should enable you to:
- Gather general information:
  o Understand what military, security and police equipment is;
  o Understand where MSP equipment is used and how it can be misused;
  o Find out what MSP forces operate in your country;
  o Find out what equipment is used by the MSP forces in your country;

- o Monitor the international or regional agreements and laws your government has signed up to;
  - o Monitor armed conflicts.
- Gather case related information:
  - o Monitor the use of MSP equipment for example at demonstrations, riots or in prisons;
  - o Recognise different types of MSP equipment;
  - o Gather detailed and accurate evidence where human rights violations have occurred;
  - o Find information from a range of sources including witnesses and gathering physical evidence;
  - o Identify specific equipment used by MSP forces in human rights abuse cases.
- Organise output and campaigning (depending on the local and security conditions):
  - o Share the information gathered with other national and international organisations to ensure that it is published without risks for yourself or your organisation;
  - o Use the information in reports on human rights violations;
  - o Raise awareness of the MSP issues within your organisation and with the public;
  - o Use the information gathered in campaigning work to bring those responsible to account;
  - o Use MSP investigation findings to hold governments to account under the international, regional and national agreements and laws they have signed up to.

This MSP handbook is laid out as follows:

Part 1
gives definitions related to MSP equipment. It explains what MSP transfers are and gives detailed definitions of the terminology used.

Part 2
 explains how to monitor MSP equipment, collect background information and where this information can be found. It explains how to monitor and investigate specific uses or abuses of MSP equipment, and how to analyse the information that is discovered. It describes some of the main types of equipment, so that you can begin to recognise their identifying features. This part of the guide ends with a discussion of the risks of monitoring and investigating MSP equipment and suggests ways to minimise them.

Part 3
explains how MSP equipment is supplied legally and illegally. By finding the supply routes, you may be able to identify loopholes in the laws that should control the supply of arms. You can then demonstrate that the law has been broken by such a transfer and campaign for change. If there is no law preventing such transfers, you can campaign for one to be implemented.
The second section of Part 3 details the initiatives that are being taken to address the proliferation of weaponry. This will enable you to check what treaties and agreements their governments have signed up to, and use information gained through monitoring to check their government's compliance with them.

Part 4
gives ideas for action, how to use the information, how to campaign, and how to link your work into campaigns locally, nationally and internationally. It also provides a list of useful contacts for other organisations active in the MSP field.

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Do not be put off by the size or level of detail in this handbook - you do not need to have previous experience or knowledge to make use of it.

Monitoring the equipment used in human rights violations or abuse ranges from starting simply to ending at sophisticated levels. Your activity will normally fall somewhere between the extremes:

- Simply observing and noting the vehicles used by the police at a demonstration (even down to the number of wheels or manufacturers' marks and badges);
- Gathering information about the manufacture of MSP equipment in your country;
- Gathering physical evidence from sites of human rights violations;
- Supplying evidence to an international human rights group or UN panel investigating arms trafficking.

If you find information regarding MSP forces, or equipment, or associated human rights violations or abuses, but you cannot or do not wish to take action, pass it on to someone who can. This could be a journalist, a Member of Parliament, other human rights NGOs, international NGOs or even the United Nations.
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Part I

Definitions

1. What is military, security and police (MSP) equipment?

Military, security and police equipment are the goods and services including weapons, technology, personnel or training, as well as direct logistical or financial support, that enable military, security and police forces to function. It includes small and heavy arms and their ammunition, riot control equipment, vehicles, surveillance equipment, communications equipment and also any training those forces receive from their own governments, outside agencies, overseas governments, police forces or private companies. MSP equipment can be locally made or assembled, made overseas, imported or exported.

MSP equipment is used by governments and their agents, by non-state actors, armed opposition groups, insurgents, militias and by criminals. Try to remember all these possible actors in order to take a balanced view of the use and potential misuse of MSP equipment in your country.

Military and police forces should be structured and act as separate organisations. However, increasingly, in many countries, there is little distinction between the two. The graduation from Military - Paramilitary - Security - Police is now blurred.

Often many different types of MSP forces and units are created by governments, which can appear confusing to monitors. This makes the chain of command and the process of holding MSP forces accountable much more difficult. For example: In the 1980s, in what was then Zaire (nowadays Democratic Republic of Congo), a range of special services and units existed, created intentionally to cause confusion and to spread fear in order to control the population. All the services were directly accountable to President Mobutu alone as to avoid any form of mutual accountability and transparency. Each service had its own places of detention and was notoriously reputed for violating human rights.

Many police forces contain 'special operation' units that use military style tactics, training and equipment. Reversely, military forces are often called upon to carry out traditional police functions such as riot or crowd control. This can have serious consequences as the military are often not trained in the specialist function of dealing with demonstrators or confrontations with the public, and this may lead them to use inappropriate and excessive force.

Certain types of equipment may only ever be used exclusively by military forces. Yet, increasingly police and security forces are using 'military' equipment such as submachine guns, assault rifles or armoured personnel carriers. Just because a piece of equipment is seen as 'military' does not mean that you are dealing with a military unit. (Military equipment is increasingly being used for 'policing' against civilians, for example the use of military helicopters in Zimbabwe for riot control and to fire tear gas.)

The import and export (transfer) of MSP equipment can be run by government ministries or agencies, or by commercial organisations. Transfers can also be organised by covert government agencies, or by criminal organisations (the latter is also known as the black market).

Equipment, training and personnel transfers to MSP forces can be beneficial to society. They can provide under-resourced and inadequately trained personnel with the tools to ensure

they can act as guardians to the community, deterring crime (police) and protecting the country from violent aggression (army).

However, in a number of African states, the under-financing, under-resourcing and inadequate training of MSP forces has led directly to corruption (bribery), intimidation, links with organised crime, and human rights violations. What is needed is MSP training and resources which are soundly based on a human rights concept of policing and human security. Such transfers of course must be stringently controlled throughout the process of licencing, transfer and use.

2. What are small arms and light weapons?

Small arms (also called weapons, arms, firearms, handguns and long guns) are generally lightweight and easily carried (even by a child) and include:
revolvers, pistols, rifles, carbines, assault rifles, sniper rifles, shotguns, submachine guns, light machine guns, hand-thrown or weapon-launched grenades, landmines and ammunition.

Light weapons are generally larger and more complicated. They can be described as a system, consisting of the weapon and its associated sighting or guiding equipment. They may need two people or more to carry them and their ammunition. Light weapons include:
anti-materiel rifles, heavy machine guns, grenade launchers (hand held, fixed under the barrel of a rifle or vehicle mounted), portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank or anti-aircraft missile systems, mortars of less than 100mm caliber, and ammunition for all of these.

In this handbook no distinction is made between military, police, commercial or hunting/sporting weapons - all can be (and have been) used by MSP forces to commit violations. Small arms and light weapons can also be craft-made in small workshops; these tend to be crude in their finish, but still function efficiently. Ammunition is much more difficult to make in a craft workshop and is almost always imported.

For example: In Ghana some weapons are locally manufactured. Some 'factories' look like garages and they actually are using scrap of cars to manufacture weapons. These weapons look like AK 47s, and although they bear often imprints, they are not registered. The making of these weapons has a cultural element so that efforts by the Ghana government encouraging people to use their skills for other products have largely failed. As long as there is a demand for weapons, it will be difficult for the government to stop its manufacture.

3. What is equipment that can be used for torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading (CID) treatment?[6]

It is possible to use almost anything to torture someone. Torture can be carried out using a cigarette, legitimate security equipment (e.g. a police baton, electric shock baton or stun gun) or by equipment that is specially designed to inflict pain (e.g. thumb cuffs). This handbook concentrates on commercially-available equipment that is used for physical restraint and control or that has been specifically designed for the infliction of pain, and that has been consistently reported to have been used in acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

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[6] For more detailed information about Torture and CID you should refer to the *Ukweli companion on Monitoring and Investigating Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, and Prison Conditions*.

Although it is unusual for manufacturers to advertise their products for use in torture, enough evidence has been reported for manufacturers to know that a problem exists with certain types of equipment. Yet they continue to sell it.

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The term 'torture equipment' should never be used when approaching companies you suspect are supplying such equipment – it may lead them to take legal action.
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4. What is security equipment?

The term 'security equipment' covers equipment that security forces use to carry out a wide range of functions including ways to physically control people, for example during demonstrations. Riot control equipment includes batons, irritant chemicals such as tear gas; vehicles such as water cannon and armoured personnel carriers.
The term also covers surveillance equipment such as cameras and telephone tapping equipment and communications equipment such as radios. These may appear relatively benign compared to other types of MSP equipment, but in the hands of a repressive regime they can provide the 'eyes and ears' of a security force that is violating human rights. In the hands of unscrupulous governments they can become 'repression equipment' that enables a state to control, monitor, detain or kill its opponents.

For example:
- The Maldives[7] government controls all Internet accesses through a state company. They monitor emails sent and received, censor on-line bulletins produced by opponents of the regime, and block all access to the opposition party's website and those of human rights organisations. One political dissident was jailed for 15 years in 2001 for sending emails to Amnesty International.

- When the Nigerian national ID card scheme was finally introduced in February 2003 it was highly controversial. Some politicians opposed the scheme, fearing it would be used to cross-check other population records including the voters roll, and that people would be targeted because of their voting record.

- National identity cards played an important role in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 when the ethnic identity cards (originally introduced by the Belgian colonial power) proved an important tool to Hutu gangs at roadblocks to decide who should be killed.

5. What are MSP forces, training, and mercenaries and private companies?

MSP forces
There are many different types, structures, compositions and names of MSP forces in Africa. These may include:
- Military: army, navy and air force;
- Other government security forces, special operations forces, presidential guards;
- Police, prison personnel, border and customs officials;
- Paramilitary and other irregular forces: militia units.

Apart from MSP forces there are other forces and individuals who use and may misuse MSP equipment:
- Guerrilla forces, armed opposition groups;

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[7] The Maldives is a group of Isles in the Pacific Ocean. Although not African, the example is illustrative for more countries, including in Africa.

- Militia linked to political parties;
- Private security forces and mercenaries;
- Criminals and criminal gangs;
- Armed vigilantes.

This list is not exhaustive, nor are these definitions rigid. Similar types of units may have different names in different countries. MSP forces may also be involved in the manufacture, trade or transfer (import/export) of MSP equipment.

Training
All MSP forces need to train to practice their skills and tactics. Training given to security forces in new techniques, for example riot control or interrogation methods, can have a fundamental effect on the way they behave and their adherence (or not) to international human rights standards.

Many western governments, for example the USA and UK, run military and police training programmes that take place either in the provider or the recipient country. MSP forces run joint training exercises, sometimes with many different countries' MSP forces taking part. For example, in 2004 the UK and Ghana ran a joint exercise at the Achiase Jungle Warfare School in Ghana which also included advisers from Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria.

Increasingly, the training of MSP forces is carried out by private companies. These may be based in the country concerned or overseas. Monitoring the training given by outside agencies to MSP forces can reveal important information about new or changed methods used by them. Such training could subsequently explain abuses or violations carried out by the newly-trained MSP unit.

Mercenaries and private companies
Private companies are involved in all aspects of MSP supply to governments. For example:
In 1998, the Equatorial Guinea government asked US private military company MPRI[8] to evaluate its defence systems and the need for a coast guard to protect its oil reserves. MPRI needed a licence from the US State Department which rejected the request, citing the record of torture and abuse of political dissidents. After much MPRI lobbying, in 2000, the State Department issued a licence to MPRI. MPRI refuses to reveal the terms of its contract with Equatorial Guinea and whether any human rights dimension is included.
Some private companies even run certain aspects of the security structure of a country such as the customs, border guards or prison service. For example: A group of South African and foreign companies run a number of prisons in South Africa. Experience in other countries with privately run prisons has shown that private prisons often use a wider variety of equipment than state prisons do, in order to reduce the number of staff needed to control a large prison and thus to keep costs down.

In Africa a number of companies and individuals have taken part in conflicts, by assembling fighting forces, providing weapons and equipment or command and control of the fighting forces. Such companies are described as private military companies. Usually such companies are paid, at least in part, in products such as diamonds or oil, for example in Sierra Leone and Angola. South Africa now has a law that makes such activity illegal.

There are also individuals who fight for money in a foreign conflict as mercenaries. For example: bombardments on Bouaké in Northern Côte d'Ivoire in November 2004 were carried out by Belorussian mercenaries.

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[8] Military Professional Resources Incorporated: www.mpri.com/site/about.html.

Part 2

Monitoring and documenting MSP equipment

1. What is monitoring?[9]

- Monitoring and documenting is the long-term observation and analysis of the human rights situation in a country or region. In this case it includes MSP forces, all other types of armed units, groups or gangs, and their equipment that are implicated in abuses of human rights. Monitoring in this handbook also includes transfers of MSP equipment.

- Monitoring and documenting MSP equipment and transfers consists of collecting, systematically and consistently, information that may be related to MSP equipment and transfers as related to human rights abuses, from a variety of sources.

- This information, collected over a period of time, should allow you to put specific cases under investigation into a political and legal context, as well as to identify patterns in the use of MSP equipment. It should also allow you to develop an in-depth knowledge of the military, security and police forces and the equipment they use so that you recognise misuse when it occurs.

- Fact-finding/investigating consists of investigating a specific incident or allegation of human rights abuses, collecting or finding a set of facts, including MSP evidence, that proves or disproves that the incident occurred and how it occurred and verifying allegations or rumours.

2. How to monitor the activity of MSP forces and the use of MSP equipment?

Step 1.
Collect background information on MSP forces and the equipment they use. What organisations, government agencies or companies in the country and outside of the country are involved in MSP equipment supply?

Step 2.
Investigate incidents where MSP equipment is used, and investigate individual cases of allegations of human rights violations, in terms of
a) the violation itself and
b) how the equipment was obtained, i.e. transfers.

Step 3.
Analyse the information collected and identify possibilities for its use in campaigning.

MSP monitoring consists of gathering small pieces of information and assembling a bigger picture. Many partial pieces of information will be important and it is vital to use a method that enables you to keep all the information organised. You may need to build alliances between your organisation and others, perhaps international human rights organisations, to make the best use of your information.

MSP monitoring could start at any number of points including:

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[9] The terminology used is consistent with the terminology in *Ukweli*. Please refer to the *Handbook on Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa*, Part One: 'General Principles and Activities'.

- A human rights violation;
- Police use of excessive force;
- Police receiving or using new equipment;
- Seeing equipment used on a demonstration;
- Deciding to examine national laws or commitments made by your government and seeing if these are fulfilled.

In a sense MSP monitoring is circular because no matter where you start there will be questions of use, misuse, supply or legal issues to consider.

3. Step 1: Collecting background information

a. Collect information on MSPforces and other armed groups

Get to know the different types of forces in your country, the way they operate and how they are organised. Find the names of the units and who they are answerable to, i.e. the process of control and accountability.

Collect information on the organisation of the MSP forces:

- The different branches and names, and their identifying markings, uniforms or distinct methods they use (see box), the vehicles they drive. What laws govern and limit their activities?

- Are some MSP forces usually or always involved in repressive activities, for example at demonstrations?

- Where are their bases and any related detention centres or prisons?

- It is important to monitor the recruitment and selection of MSP force personnel, as well as the names of individuals in command of particular units. This can provide valuable information about individuals responsible, or those commanding them, when human rights violations occur. This information can then be used to hold such individuals to account, such as in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide.

- It is good practice to keep a chronology of events where MSP forces have been involved for later reference.

Collect information on the organisation of armed groups:

- Apart from government forces, there may be non-state actors such as opposition forces, guerillas, militias, gangs, vigilantes etc. Get to know their identifying characteristics such as scarifications or amulets and other gris-gris; youth militias can sometimes be recognised from the boots, belts or caps they wear.

Methods:

The Zimbabwean Youth Militia are known to have been taught to make barbed wire sjamboks (whips) and to asphyxiate their victims in water, or to beat them on the feet.

Vehicles:

Some security forces drive only unregistered vehicles, others drive vehicles with foreign licence plates.

Clothes:

Security force personnel sometimes wear opposition party T-shirts or false uniforms to make identification difficult. Such information is vital if individual MSP units are to be linked to incidents of abuse or violations.

b. Collect information on what MSP equipment the various forces use
- What equipment are the *security* forces allowed to use? Are there national rules or do the separate forces decide their own needs?

- What weapons are carried by *specific* forces? Often they carry different weapons; police may carry just pistols, other units may carry rifles and other weapons, some may carry weapons other than firearms, for example electroshock batons.

- Useful information can be gathered by simply watching MSP forces.

c. Collect information on MSP equipment supply – the *trade* in MSP equipment
What is the procedure used to purchase equipment for the different MSP forces? How is the trade in MSP equipment conducted? Identify the different agencies involved. For example:

- **Government** – Ministry of Defence, Defence Procurement Agencies, etc. Does the military run a supply agency or a weapons production factory?

- **MSP forces** – can the army or police buy equipment directly? Do they make or repair their own? For example: The Nakasongola ammunition factory in Uganda makes ammunition for the armed forces but also repairs guns for the army.

- **Private companies** – they may be involved, either within your country or from overseas.
  - The names of companies and individuals are important (current and previous).
  - Do companies advertise products for sale? Many companies supply products to both MSP forces and commercially, perhaps to the public for safety and security. Begin building your detailed knowledge of the companies, their staff or directors. Do they have links to other companies and countries? Do they import/export? They may be agents or suppliers of other companies' products.
  - Are products made and supplied locally or do they have to be imported?

- **Financial Institutions** –The financing of the MSP trade is an important research area. Which banks offer financial services to companies involved in the MSP trade? Do they have links to international banks – this may provide a route to put pressure on them to stop financial assistance and can provide very useful information to international campaigns. For example: A report on helicopters supplied to Ghana in 2004 included details of the financing arrangements and the US $55 million loan agreed with Barclays Bank to finance the deal via a UK company.

d. Identify the international, regional and national laws and agreements your government is committed to upholding
- Are there national laws regulating which forces are allowed what MSP equipment? For example, in some countries only certain forces are allowed certain weapons. In some countries civilians are allowed to own weapons, in others there are more restrictions.

- What codes of conduct, rules, regulations or guidelines govern the activities of the security forces and the use of force and firearms? Are there penalties for MSP personnel who break them? Are the penalties enforced?

- Familiarise yourself with the relevant points of international human rights law and international humanitarian law as they apply to the use of MSP equipment.[10]

- Has your government enacted in its national laws such international treaties and guidelines as the Child Soldiers Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty, the UN Standard Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials?

- Are there national rules or laws stipulating which companies or individuals are allowed to trade in MSP equipment? There may be a register of dealers in firearms or other security equipment.

- Has your country signed up to regional or international agreements restricting the transfer of weapons, for example the ECOWAS Moratorium?

The import and export of MSP equipment is usually strictly controlled (both because of security considerations and because it is worth a lot of money). By gathering the baseline of laws and regulations, you can measure the information you obtain about the use and trade in MSP equipment against these regulations or laws.

e. Information sources
The sensitivity of this work means it can be difficult to find information, but even so, a very wide range of information sources exist.

Often one individual or organisation has only a piece of the whole picture. MSP monitoring needs people and organisations to share information and put the whole picture together. You will need to build alliances with a range of individuals and organisations to succeed. This could include other human rights NGOs, international organisations, governments departments, journalists, individual police officers, factory workers etc.

Before starting your monitoring and documenting activities, you need to develop a plan. What are you looking for and what are your questions? What aspects of the MSP area do you want to investigate? You will not be able to investigate everything – so focus on a particular aspect to start with: perhaps there is a history of violations at public demonstrations, or your government has signed up to an international agreement and you wish to monitor its compliance.

Identify the different areas of information you need. Do your questions concern local, national or international issues? You may need to look at local, national or international sources of information. If the security conditions in your country do not permit the development of a filing and storage system to gather, store and retrieve the information needed, you should identify a partner organisation that can safely set up a database.

Your framework of investigating ideas and questions will depend on what you have already found out, and the point at which you are starting. For example, if you start with a human rights violation, you might then try to identify the MSP equipment used. This might then lead to a company involved in supplying the equipment, and to a transfer that took place. You might then look at the laws that should cover such activities. At each point questions and monitoring need to take place and these will lead to further actions and possibly campaigning.

Possible sources of information include:

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[10] Please refer to the *Ukweli companion on Monitoring and investigating human rights abuses in armed conflict*.

i) Official sources

- Some governments produce reports on their MSP trade or arms exports. For example, South Africa[11].
- Some provide information on contracts to supply their MSP forces – for example Armscor, the South African government procurement company, publishes an 'acquisition bulletin' in which it reveals to whom it supplies equipment, including the company name and a description of the equipment[12].
- Government ministers or parliamentary committees, and members of parliament, may sometimes report on or investigate MSP forces or MSP trade. Members of parliament can ask questions about MSP issues. For example: A statement by the Ghanaian defence minister in 2003 gave details of Russian helicopters supplied via a UK brokering company.
- Some governments make regular reports on their police and prison services, others may do so under pressure following an incident.
- Governments may produce official reports on non-state actors, militias etc.
- Registers of dealers in firearms, importers/exporters or licenced security companies.

ii) Media sources: newspapers, radio, television, Internet

- There are some excellent newspapers across Africa, which report on MSP issues. For example: the *East African* (Kenya) or the *Zimbabwe Independent*.[13]
- TV tends to be state controlled but radio can be a radical and independent media.
- Try to identify the journalists most interested in the area and approach them for further information – they can help you and you can help them, so build up a long-term relationship with them.
- Look through previous issues to build up information over a time period, or to identify patterns of use, incidents of misuse or stories about specific equipment.
- Many international media organisations, and those available over the Internet, carry reports on MSP issues. For example: BBC, Agence France Presse (AFP), Reuters.

iii) Company information

- In some countries a register of companies is publicly available; e.g. Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia.
- Companies' financial or annual reports can be a useful source of information.
- Look out for adverts or business directories for more detailed information about what they supply.
- Companies often exhibit at trade fairs, some of which may be specialist security or military events. Access may be restricted to MSP forces or company personnel. However journalists and press can get in, and sometimes companies have a public day. Obtaining an exhibition catalogue can supply useful information on who is exhibiting and where they come from, as well as which foreign visitors are attending. Obtaining company brochures is even more useful. For example, South Africa holds an Africa Aerospace and Defence exhibition every two years and the Securex security show every year.

iv) MSP force magazines

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[11] www.mil.za/SecretaryforDefence/Frame/Frame.htm
[12] www.armcor.gov.za
[13] Many more African newspapers can be found at www.kidon.com/media-link/africa.shtml.

- Police force or army newspapers will often contain valuable information about the forces, their equipment and names of commanders. E.g. the Nigerian Army magazine *New SOJA* or the South African *SA Soldier* magazine.

v) Specialist journals
- There is a wide range of publications aimed at the military and defence market – for example *African Security Review* (Institute of Security Studies, South Africa), African Armed Forces Journal (South Africa). They will not be widely available but may be accessible at libraries based at universities – especially those that have have departments of defence studies.

Some international journals are available on the web. Please refer to the list in Part 4, section 2)

vi) Electronic sources: web sites or email
- This is potentially a very useful way of gathering information or contacting other organisations that may be able to help.
- It is also a good way to familiarise yourself with certain MSP equipment as companies around the world advertise on the web and there are many pictures and descriptions available.

vii) Direct approaches to MSP forces, governments and companies
- Posing direct questions is a very simple but immensely powerful way of gathering information, security risks permitting. For example: An MSP researcher in Nigeria obtained very useful information from the arms manufacturer Dicon by writing a series of polite but detailed questions about their activities.
- Try to establish an ongoing dialogue with a company or government department.
- Write in a non-confrontational way and try to meet the officials concerned.
- NGOs are often used by governments as a source of information. Remember that you have a service to offer as well as trying to get information from them.
- Police forces may record the details, types and code numbers of found or seized weapons and may be willing to share these with you.

viii) Employees of MSP forces or companies
- If you can find one prepared to talk, a source from inside an organisation will provide excellent information that cannot be obtained anywhere else. Retired or sacked employees or those bearing a grudge can be good sources. Once an employee has left, they may be more willing to give information to NGOs.

ix) Local people close to a factory or military establishment
- Local people may often have useful knowledge of MSP forces, company activity and equipment. They may see deliveries into or shipments out of a factory. They may have grievances about the establishment which may prompt them to provide you with useful information.

x) Other non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
- Locally or internationally, these may have access to sources of information that you do not, or can write on your behalf to companies or governments. Many produce detailed reports and international NGOs may hold much information that is unavailable in your own country.

xi) Academics, universities etc.
- Many universities have some sort of defence studies or peace studies department where research on MSP-related issues may be taking place. Academics can often get

better access to company and MSP force information because they are seen as more neutral. Building links to these academic researchers may open more doors to you.

xii) Ports and airports
- Shipments of MSP equipment into a country or region will go through sea ports, airports or border crossings.

- Monitoring the movement of aircraft and ships can provide vital information. This should be done discreetly, perhaps by making links with legitimate users or workers at the facility.

- Make a note of the cargo aircraft markings and numbers or names of ships (one of the safest ways of doing this is if you are sitting on another plane waiting to leave). Perhaps certain deliveries only ever arrive at night and are picked up by unmarked or military trucks. For example: A number of suspicious incidents related to the unloading of cargo from three separate Panamanian-, Belizean-, and Norwegian-registered ships at Buchanan, Liberia in 2001. Their activities in Liberia were characterised by heightened security, unloading at night, and the intimidation of curious locals that raised suspicion of sanctions busting.

- All airports have details of flights and what their load was. Although they are hard to get hold of, these 'cargo manifests' and flight patterns offer an excellent source of information. For example: MSP monitors discovered discrepancies between flight arrivals at Robertsfield airport in Liberia and flight plans filed at take-off in Europe. This led to the discovery of arms delivery flights, which the government could not deny.

xiii) Informal information
- There is always an informal network of information, gossip or rumour surrounding events, companies or facilities. While this does not provide hard evidence, it may be useful to pick up hints of where to look or ask for information. There may be people who have a grudge or grievance. Be creative in thinking about who might have information.
  For example: A broker delivering weapons to the Movement for a Democratic Liberia (MODEL) in Liberia did not pay his hotel bill. The hotel manager was willing to show the bill to MSP monitors, and from the bill it became clear that the Côte d'Ivoire government was paying the broker's expenses. In a separate case, the disgruntled ex-girlfriend of an arms broker was willing to talk to human rights monitors and provided useful information with which to trace the broker.

xiv) Found or looted information
- During times of riot, unrest or serious conflict, buildings, offices, warehouses or factories are looted. This can provide a useful source of information that monitors should be aware of. For example: In Liberia, offices in the port of Buchanan were looted. Later on, looted documents appeared on the local market being used to wrap vegetables. These appeared to be delivery documents for arms shipments showing details of what arms were delivered and who supplied them. In Sierra Leone, the house of Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF Forces, was looted and more arms delivery documentation found.

xv) Disarmament efforts and confiscated weapons
- Weapons collection or destruction programmes, which take place as part of disarmament efforts, both after conflict and in peacetime, may provide very useful sources of information. Often large numbers of weapons and ammunition are handed in. These can provide code numbers and weapon types that give indications of what

routes were used to supply the weapons. You will need to make contact with the organisations that are conducting the programs, such as the UN or the police.

For example: When fighters turned up at demobilisation camps in Sierra Leone and handed in their weapons, the authorities recorded the serial numbers. The weapons were traced to a Serbian manufacturer who had shipped them using false 'end user' certificates.

In some cases NGOs have worked with the police and military to obtain the code numbers and markings from confiscated weapons which were used in murders and other crimes. They have been able to identify the country of origin of some of these weapons and in some cases the manufacturer. With this information they have challenged governments and companies to explain how the weapons ended up in the hands of criminals

4. Step 2: Monitoring and investigating the use of MSP equipment

a. Where is MSP equipment used? Where do you need to monitor?
It is useful to monitor any use of MSP equipment – not just use which is specifically linked to human rights abuses – because you can build up background information on MSP forces and other armed groups.

Different types of equipment are used in different places, and some equipment is more likely to lead to human rights abuses. One reason for security forces to use equipment is so that it enables the MSP forces to impose order using fewer personnel.

- **On the street** – demonstrations, strikes, marches and arrests are all likely to involve use of MSP equipment and are a potential source of violations.
- **After arrest or during transport to a police station, at police or detention centre** – usually restraints are used (handcuffs etc) and beatings or physical violence are no exception.
- **Interrogation at police or detention centre** – this is the most likely place for torture to occur - use of legcuffs, restraints or electroshock equipment are common.
- **Prisons** – widespread use of MSP equipment to control prisoners and impose order.
- **Borders** – land, sea or air borders are controlled with an increasing use of MSP equipment such as surveillance or identity systems.
- **Crime** – criminals and gangs use a wide variety of MSP equipment. Linking with the police on domestic crime issues can be a very useful activity.
- **The site of combat** – In armed conflict, all sorts of MSP equipment are prone to lead to abuses of human rights. You can find useful information on airports, on the battlescene when the fighting is over, around the barracks and camps of fighting units, in and around refugee camps, etc.

b. Preparing for the investigation: what do you need to do beforehand?
Finding evidence of MSP equipment may happen accidentally when you are investigating an incident of human rights abuse. When this happens, the found evidence will help you to assess that the violation took place, how it took place and who was involved.

You may also decide to systematically investigate use or misuse of MSP equipment. In this case you need to carefully prepare your investigation. Remember at all times to firstly assess the security risks involved in going out on a field trip. The *Ukweli* handbook provides with a comprehensive list of preparations.[14] The following shortlist of suggestions should be read against that background.

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[14] *Ukweli, Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa.* See 'Fact-finding', p. 11-14.

- Organise what knowledge you have already and identify what you need to find out and what specific physical evidence you require.
- Going to the scene – identify the places you need to visit:
  - The scene of the incident, the street, prison etc. List what you already know about these locations.
  - Any other places, e.g. hospital to interview victims or injured parties about what equipment was used and to link injuries to specific weapons used.
  - What do you need to record the incident - camera, tape recorder, notebook, maps?
  - Prepare for exit strategies. If violence occurs have an escape route. If your physical safety or security is challenged or if you are arrested what are your options? Who knows where you are?
  - Will you go alone or in a group? Often going together with others strengthens what you are able to do and is safer. Try to get a balance of experience and gender in the group. Dress appropriately and in a neutral way that enables you to blend in and be perceived as impartial.

Similarly, when interviewing witnesses and victims you should refer to the handbook *Ukweli, Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa*, where you find a comprehensive overview of suggestions for interviews (p. 61-70).

c. Standards of evidence[15]
The information you gather must be accurate and rigorous. You must keep an independent approach that will stand up to scrutiny. Use reliable and verifiable sources that can be rechecked later if possible. Ensure that the methods you use are appropriate and ethical.

Original documents are vital for purposes of proof to journalists or a court. It is good practice to get two independent and verifiable sources or witnesses to corroborate your information.

However, this is not always possible and you must make a decision about the veracity / level of reliability of the information. Can you trust the source and use the information? Beware of fraudulent claims or people who try to give you what you want.

Be aware that governments and companies will often deny any wrongdoing as a matter of course.
- Be persistent and tenacious.
- Repeat questions if negative answers or denials are made.
- Gather more information and again ask more questions. Eventually someone will talk.

[box]
The evidentiary standards of monitoring and investigating MSP equipment are necessarily very high, otherwise companies may take legal action against you, which may cost you and/or your organisation a fortune.
[end of the box]

5. Step 3: Analysing the information

Analysing the information you have obtained is a process of detailed questioning and testing your ideas and assumptions about what occurred, and then deciding how you can use the information you have got. The other *Ukweli* handbooks contain valuable information on how

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[15] See *Ukweli, Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa*. See Part Two, 'Principles of Research on Human Rights Violations', in particular the section about Accuracy, p. 32-34.

to analyse information in general as well as to make an analysis of different types of human rights violations.

Depending on the specific case you are investigating, you may make a relevant selection of the following questions to guide your assessment:

a. Evidence that a violation occurred or a transfer took place

- Did a violation of human rights occur? If so, what type? To decide this you will need to refer to the other *Ukweli* handbooks.
- If no violation occurred, is there evidence of a transfer (import/export)?
- Were guidelines on the use of MSP equipment broken?
- Did any MSP force personnel break a law? If yes, what type of law: local, national, or international?

b. Identification of equipment used[16]

- Was MSP equipment present and what was its role in the incident or violation?
- Is the MSP equipment identifiable?
- Is the MSP equipment linked to a specific company and does this lead to a possible transfer that took place, or new information about a company or trader?

c. Completeness of information

- Do you have a complete picture of the incident? Do you need more information?
- Are there gaps in your knowledge or possible new routes of investigation?
- Is this simply a local issue, or are there national, regional or international issues?
- If the security situation in your country would permit to set up a database, how does the new information fit with other information stored in that filing system? [17]
- Can you use the information? Do you need help from other sources and if so what sources?
- If you can't use the information, can anyone else use it; for example: journalists, lawyers, medical personnel, other NGOs or international organisations?

d. Responsibility of MSP forces

- Do you know which specific MSP force is implicated?
- What is the evidence for their involvement?
- Who is responsible and who is accountable?

e. Reliability of sources

- How reliable is the information? Is it verifiable? Do you need more sources and confirmation?
- Do the testimonies of the victims or witnesses appear credible and reliable?[18]

f. Consistency with patterns

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[16] Please refer for identification of MSP equipment to Part 2, section 6.
[17] For more details of how to set up databases and the long-term use of information in human rights monitoring, see *Ukweli, Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa*, p. 22-24.
[18] Please refer also to *Ukweli , Monitoring and Documenting Human Rights Violations in Africa*, p. 32-34 and 61-70.

- Does the incident fit a pattern of behaviour by MSP forces or is this a new type or method of use of MSP equipment?
- Does the pattern of behaviour suggest that MSP forces have been trained to use MSP equipment in a certain way, or that they are ignoring certain laws or guidelines that they should be obeying?

g. Consistency with government obligations

This is where you measure the information you have found against the laws and regulations that your government ought to have, and that it ought to respect (see Part 2, section 3).
- Does the information indicate that MSP forces or companies are abiding by national laws?
- Does the information indicate that the MSP forces are abiding by the international commitments your government has signed up to, for example, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Child Soldiers Protocol, etc.
- Does the information indicate that arms companies and brokers are abiding by the international commitments your government has signed up to, such as the ECOWAS Small Arms Moratorium or other regional agreements?
- If existing laws or commitments are being ignored or flouted, can this form the basis for campaigning?
- Are there loopholes in existing laws which are allowing transfers of equipment to take place? If so, can this form the basis for campaigning?
- If however there is no law or regulation covering what has occurred, can you use the information you have gathered to campaign for a law that would prevent it taking place?

h. Urgency

- Does the information need to be used immediately (possibly to stop further violations or further transfers) or can the information wait?
- If it does not need to be used immediately, can the information be put on file or released at a later date that best fits your campaign timetable?

6. How to identify MSP equipment

Why is identification important?
Identifying the equipment used by security forces can:
- make reports of violations of human rights more accurate. MSP evidence can reveal that a violation or abuse of human rights has taken place and identification can contribute to bringing the perpetrators of human rights abuse to justice.
- provide vital information to doctors treating injured victims, of tear gas for example
- new types of equipment used by security forces can be spotted. If they are new they may be recently imported and so may be easier to trace; they may also be part of a larger package of assistance, including training, which can also be investigated.
- lead to the identification of supply routes.
- lead to action being taken against governments or companies to stop further supplies.

Identifying a weapon or piece of equipment and linking it back to a specific manufacturer is possible if the right information is obtained. The emphasis is on accuracy and detail. Often information gathered in the field or reported in newspapers is incomplete and lacks the crucial details needed to make a full identification.

Identification can turn a story that is not reported at all into a story that makes a huge impact, possibly affecting government policy and leading to those responsible for supplying the equipment being held to account.

Levels of details

Many different marking systems are used on small arms and light weapons. Most have at least either a company name or symbol of the manufacturer and the year of manufacture. Some may have more detailed markings and have a serial number. All of these markings are needed to make a positive identification of a weapon.[19]

There are various levels of identification ranging from:

- A general description such as 'rifle';
- Naming an equipment type e.g. AK-47 rifle;
- Obtaining enough detail of markings and code numbers to link the article back to a manufacturer e.g. AK-47 rifle, markings 'Norinco, Made in China 97-3456-AN-52764'.

Most types of equipment can be identified by noting:
- Shape;
- Dimensions;
- Markings;
- Colours;
- Code numbers, although these may be shaved off before an illegal transfer takes place.

The best information comes from close-up examination of objects, with the possibility of measuring, making drawings or taking detailed photographs. If you are taking a photograph of a fairly small object, put something whose size is identifiable (a shoe, pen or mobile phone), next to it to give an idea of dimensions.

Warning: remember that handling some types of MSP equipment can be dangerous! Please refer to Part 2, section 7 on assessing risks before you do any identification work.

Small arms and light weapons are robust and can remain operational for many years; so too can vehicles and larger weapons. It is important to note whether the equipment looks 'old' or 'new'. Old weapons are frequently traded and can travel around different conflict zones for many years. New weapons or recently transferred weapons may be easier to trace. Ammunition does not last as long and in a conflict huge amounts are needed. It is likely to be newer than the guns themselves, and more easily traced.

For example: In the conflicts in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire in 2001-2003, the weapons used were old, but the ammunition was new and constantly supplied by arms traffickers. Identification of some of the ammunition markings provided vital evidence to expose the routes used to supply the ammunition, and identify those responsible.

When you find equipment, you should look for the following identifying details:
- A manufacturer's name, trademark or symbol.
- Markings or symbols on vehicles.
- Markings on the base of the cartridge case.

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[19] One very useful reference book allowing identification is *Jane's Infantry Weapons*, published every year, parts of which are available on-line: http://jiw.janes.com.

- The bullet itself; it can provide vital evidence for a forensic expert linking the bullet to the weapon that fired it.
- Discarded ammunition boxes; these may contain serial numbers and manufacturer's details.
- In rare instances when offices are overrun and looted during conflict, the associated paperwork regarding arms supplies, and particularly the brokers and shippers, comes to light.

Technical descriptions
The following technical descriptions should help you to become familiar with the information that is needed to identify a piece of equipment. This will help you to write accurate descriptions in human rights reports.

A. Types of security equipment

a. Crowd or riot control equipment:
- **Batons/clubs** – carried by police or security force personnel. Can be straight, side handled, extendable. Materials: wood, bamboo, rubber, metal, plastic. Widely abused to inflict pain, punishment beatings or in torture cases.
- **Sjamboks** – used in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Traditionally made out of animal hide, long and sued like a whip. Can inflict deep lacerations and have led to deaths.
- **Machetes or pangas** – often used in violent conflicts. In Rwanda they had the markings of a UK company.
- **Protective equipment** – shields, body armour and helmets. This enables the security force to withstand attack, but often leads them to be more aggressive towards individuals or a crowd.
- **Chemical irritants** – often called tear gas or tear smoke. Designed to keep a crowd at a distance, to disperse it or to deter an aggressor. However, these weapons are often used for punishment or torture. They cause tears, eyes to shut, coughing, choking and vomiting. The chemical irritant is usually visible as clouds of white smoke or powder, but can be delivered from a water cannon and may not be obvious or visible until victims start coughing or choking. It is obvious when chemical irritants are used because the security force will have gas masks on. If used in a confined space they can cause death.
  Chemical irritants can be delivered from hand held sprays (like aerosol spray cans), backpack sprayers, hand thrown or weapon launched grenades, or from a vehicle. The common types of chemical are 'tear gas', which is also called 'CS gas', or 'pepper spray' also called 'OC spray'.

  (Note – The use of almost any chemical by security forces is possible. Reports in the past have suggested that such things as bleach, cleaning agents or acid have been used. However these are usually very small scale or one off uses. The chemical irritants described above are industrially produced and used on a large scale.)

- **Riot ammunition** – designed to disperse individuals or crowds using pain. Often called less-lethal ammunition. Can contain plastic, rubber or wooden bullets or a number of pellets. Newer types contain cloth bags or 'socks' filled with lead shot. Can also contain chemical irritants, or sound/light stun grenades producing a blinding flash and deafening noise.
  They come in a range of sizes: Shotgun (12 gauge), 37/38mm or 40mm are fired from a riot gun or grenade launcher. This type of ammunition has caused many deaths worldwide, especially when fired at vulnerable parts of the body such as the head, neck or chest.

- **Launching devices** – riot ammunition can be hand thrown, rifle launched, launched from a grenade launcher or a grenade launcher on a rifle, vehicle launched, dropped out of a helicopter.
- **Weapons** – shotguns, rifles and grenade launchers are all typically used for riot control.
- **Uniforms** – a vital identification tool for human rights monitors. The first question asked about a violation is often what uniform the perpetrators were wearing. Even if it is not possible to be 100% certain about the identification, note all colours, badges, styles of cap or hat etc.

[box]
Identifying units is often complicated. For example, militias don't wear uniforms and the use of special clothing can be misleading as well. For example: in Zimbabwe Mugabe supporters were known to sometimes use MDC T-shirts (Movement for Democratic Change).
[end box]

b. Vehicles – many different types of vehicles are used by MSP forces, from simple transport vehicles to more specialised types.
- **Riot control vehicles** – are usually lightly armoured and used to protect the police at demonstrations or to control the crowd. They can transport security personnel to the scene, or demonstrators away from it. Often fitted with firing ports and grenade launchers for tear gas or smoke. Can have cameras, lights, loudspeakers or water cannon fitted.
- **Water cannon** – a more specialised vehicle. Usually a large truck with one or two water cannons (sprayers) on the roof of the cab. It can fire bursts or streams of water and can mix chemical irritants in the water. The water streams can knock people to the ground.
- **Armoured personnel carriers** – larger, more heavily armoured vehicles, which can have wheels or tracks. These often have weapons such as machine guns mounted on top.
- **Helicopters** and to a lesser extent **aircraft** – they play an important role in MSP forces. Increasingly helicopters are implicated in human rights violations, from being involved in bombarding Bouaké and Korhogo in Northern Côte d'Ivoire, to shooting at civilians in Sudan. Aircraft have been linked to human rights abuses, for example in Togo where they were used to dispose of victims at sea.

c. Surveillance and communications equipment – encompasses a range of equipment to monitor a population or to target specific individuals and gather information on their movements and contacts. Surveillance can be carried out by security force personnel, but increasingly relies on more sophisticated equipment. Victims may be aware they are being followed or watched, or may be presented with lists of telephone calls made, or photographs of themselves at certain places.
- **National identification systems** – include passports and identity cards (which may contain 'biometric' information such as photographs or fingerprints). Voter registration cards have also been used to identify voters' allegiances. Electronic information can be gathered via linked computer databases to build a national information system. See the Nigeria example on page [13 check in final version].
- **Telephone monitoring and phone tapping** – security forces can listen in and record private conversations. New telephone exchanges and mobile phone systems all have this capability built in. Victims may be presented with a list of their phone calls, or be told that the security forces know whom they are in contact with.
- **Web and email monitoring** – governments may monitor the World Wide Web for key words, or restrict access to certain sites such as pro-democracy sites or human rights

sites. Users may be warned on screen that such activity is taking place, or certain sites may be unavailable to them. Governments often claim access is restricted to stop crime or access to immoral sites. See the Maldives example on page [13check in final version].

- **Communications equipment** – such as secure radio systems. Such systems can greatly increase the effectiveness and operations of MSP forces, enabling central control or government control to be more effective.
  The following example illustrates the potential of such systems: In Zimbabwe, police attending a demonstration were peaceful and inactive, merely observing the crowd. Human rights observers heard an order came through on their radios and suddenly the police began attacking and beating the peaceful crowd.
- **Closed circuit television (CCTV) systems** – cameras attached to buildings or posts in the streets are used to monitor key areas. They may also be attached to vehicles.

B. Types of small arms and light weapons (SALW)[20]

Warning: always assume weapons are loaded, i.e. that there may be ammunition in them (see Part 2, section 7 for risks).

Most weapons will have some sort of markings, lettering or numbers on them somewhere; these details are vital for accurate identification.

- **Revolvers** – small handguns that have a revolving chamber holding the ammunition.
- **Pistols** – small handguns which have ammunition in a clip, stored inside the grip or handle of the weapon. Much more compact and narrow than revolvers. Can be single shot, semi-automatic (i.e. several shots in rapid succession), or fully automatic.
- **Rifles, carbines, assault rifles, semi-automatic rifles, automatic rifles** – the standard weapon of the soldier. Accurate with longer barrels. Can fire single shots, bursts of shots or continuously for a short time. They can have a fixed butt (the part which rests on the shoulder) which makes them longer, or the butt may collapse or fold to give a shorter weapon. Some have straight ammunition magazines, others curved (this is an important aid to identify them). Can have a variety of attachments on the top including sights, aiming devices, lights etc.
- **Sniper rifles** – look like normal rifles but have longer barrels and sometimes a bipod (two short collapsible legs) at the front giving stability. Very accurate weapons enabling shooting over a long distance, perhaps up to a mile (1.6 kilometres).
- **Shotguns** – a shorter weapon with wider barrels in order to fire special ammunition. Widely used in riot control, used for close or short range firing. Can fire bullets or 'shot': many small pellets of metal or plastic. Increasingly used to fire 'less lethal' ammunition such as chemical irritants or rubber/plastic bullets. They usually have one barrel for police or military use (hunting shotguns usually have two barrels side by side).
- **Submachine guns and light machine guns** – can fire at a very high rate, but generally not as accurate or controllable as rifles. Submachine guns can be very compact, often used by police guarding important buildings or people. Light machine guns look like rifles but have thicker barrels, a bipod at the front for stability and perhaps a perforated barrel guard for dissipating heat.
- **Heavy machine guns** – are bigger with thicker barrels so that they can be fired continuously. Often they are mounted on a vehicle and need two people to carry.

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[20] Images of weapons, ammunition and munitions can be found on the Internet. When using Google, select 'images' before starting a search activity.

- **Grenade launchers** – these can be hand-held, mounted under the barrel of a rifle, or mounted on a vehicle. They have wider barrels than machine guns, up to 40mm (1.5 inches).
- **Mortars** – basically a tube mounted on a plate which fires mortar ammunition (small bombs) over a great distance. Widely used by military forces.
- **Shoulder-launched rockets or missiles** – the most common type is the RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade. These lightweight tube launchers fire a wide variety of small grenades and missiles over a long distance.

C. Types of ammunition and munitions

Warning: always assume that ammunition is 'live' and could explode. Unless you have experience and skill do not handle it (see Part 2, section 7 for risks).

Huge quantities of ammunition are used in conflicts. It is usually present in large amounts at the site of a human rights violation either as fired remnants (such as casings) or live, unfired ammunition. Ammunition is often marked and these markings can provide important evidence to the human rights monitor. Ammunition is fired from a gun, munitions are such things as hand grenades or land mines.
- **Small arms ammunition** – comes in a huge variety of styles and sizes (calibres). Consists of the cartridge case containing the primer and explosive and the bullet. The cartridge case should be marked on the base with a manufacturers mark (the 'headstamp') and other marks indicating date of manufacture. Total length of ammunition, length of case, width of bullet and width of case are important measurements. For example, ammunition cases retrieved from Kisangani, Democratic Republic of Congo, in 2002 were traced by their headstamp markings to Russian and Chinese factories.
- **Hand thrown or weapon launched grenades** – a wide variety are available. They can be smoke, stun, chemical, or explosive - showering metal shrapnel over a wide area.
- **Landmines** – explode when stepped or driven on, or can be rigged to tripwires.
- **Mortars** – short, fat bombs with small tail fins, fired from a mortar tube placed on the ground. They can be explosive, smoke, incendiary (causing fires) or chemical; common types are 60, 81 and 82mm (but there are also a few of 50, 51, and 52mm).

D. Types of equipment that can be used for torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

The 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) defines torture as "an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as:
(i)   obtaining from that person or a third person information or a confession;
(ii)   punishing that person for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed;
(iii)   intimidating or coercing that person or a third person;
(iv)   for any reason based on discrimination of any kind;
and inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of the authorities."
Similarly, armed groups are responsible for any acts of torture committed by their forces, as they are bound by the Geneva Conventions that prohibit all parties to the conflicts from perpetrating torture.[21]

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[21] Please refer to the *Ukweli companion on Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, and Prison Conditions.*

Almost any object can be used to torture someone. The following list contains some equipment that is specially designed to inflict pain, and other equipment that can have a legitimate use by law enforcement officials if it is used correctly, but which is often misused.

a. Restraints: equipment used to restrict the movement of an individual.
  - **Handcuffs** – a universal piece of police equipment used to restrain a subject by being placed around the wrists. Legitimate use, but can also be misused to deliberately inflict pain. They can be produced locally (poor quality) but usually obtained commercially. They may have manufacturers' names or marks on the cuff, or the shape of them may be unique. They can be fixed and rigid with a hinge between the cuffs, or the cuffs may be linked by a short piece of chain.
  - **Legcuffs** (also known as shackles, fetters or hobbles) – they do have a legitimate use, such as to prevent a prisoner escaping while being transported, but should not be used for extended periods of time. However, they are frequently misused. Made of metal and placed around the ankles to restrict movement. Two cuffs linked with a longer chain. May be very heavy. Often left on for long periods of time causing long term damage to the ankles and severe pain. Often used to hang prisoners upside-down or from bars.
  - **Thumbcuffs** – can be serrated. Designed to immobilise the subject's arms because so much pain is caused to the thumbs if the arms are moved. Thumbs are usually cuffed behind the back, or with one arm over a shoulder. They have no legitimate use.
  - **Restraint boards and chairs** – items that are commercially available with a number of restraining points (wrists, arms, shoulders, head, chest, waist, legs, knees, ankles) which completely immobilise the subject. Used legitimately in hospitals to immobilise dangerous or suicidal patients, but have also been used for torture or cruel punishment.

b. Electro shock equipment
Often described as the modern tool of the torturer this equipment delivers an electric shock to the subject in order to control them through pain compliance (i.e. making them obey instructions by applying pain). Generally they have a number of electrodes (two or four) which deliver the charge. Powered by commercially available batteries they are often sold as personal defence products or anti-theft products. Very commonly used by MSP forces worldwide, they are small, easy to use and leave little or no marks.

Please note that the first four could have a legitimate use in self-defence and possibly policing, but are easily misused to inflict pain.
  - **Stun guns** – small, fit in the hand, used close up.
  - **Shock batons** – usually tubular, some are strong enough to be used as normal batons. They can be telescopic or extendable.
  - **Shock prongs** – very long tube with electrodes at the end, used in prisons to hold back individuals, or hold them against a wall.
  - **Stun shields** – flat or curved shields with metal electrodes attached to give electric shocks. Used in crowd control as a normal shield would be, or in prisons to subdue prisoners or to enter a prisoner's cell.
  - **Stun belts** – fitted around a prisoner's waist with electrodes in the region of the kidney. They are remotely activated via a small hand held control. Cause extreme pain and can cause involuntary urination or defecation as well as psychological torture for the subject who does not know if or when they will be shocked. These have no legitimate use in law enforcement.
  - **Tasers** – long distance shocking pistol-type device which, when fired, ejects two darts attached to wires which connect back to the device. When these hit the subject they attach to the clothes or puncture the skin, and an electric shock is delivered.

With a range up to 20 feet, they can repeatedly stun the victim from a distance. Tasers are increasingly being used by police forces worldwide. If used strictly as an alternative to live bullets they may have a legitimate function but human rights organisations remain concerned at the potential for misuse, and the number of deaths associated with them.

c. Chemical irritants
They have also been used to torture subjects or for punishment, either by direct application to restrained prisoners, causing acute pain, or by the threat of use.

E. Training, security companies and mercenaries

a. Training by foreign forces
The training of MSP forces can take place in country or overseas, and can be carried out by the MSP forces themselves, foreign MSP forces, or increasingly by private companies. Many governments in Europe and America run training programmes.

Training can (and should) be positive: it can cover human rights law or ensuring correct treatment of prisoners. However, it can also cover weapons usage and tactics that encourage human rights violations by encouraging a 'shoot first, ask questions later' type approach. It is often unclear whether military training encompasses a human rights aspect, and if so, to what extent.

b. Security companies
Many private companies now offer training to MSP forces on a tailor-made basis. Some boast of having their own facilities including firing ranges, urban combat training and close quarter combat training. For example: a UK company, Elite Defence International Ltd, claimed to have a special facility near Johannesburg, licenced by the South African Police Service. It offers training in small arms, automatic weapons, ammunition and explosives of all kinds. By being based in South Africa, they avoid any scrutiny in their home country, but can offer their services to clients worldwide.

c. Mercenaries
By their nature mercenaries are extremely secretive and may hide behind legitimate security companies. There is a grey area between what constitutes 'security assistance' and when the level of involvement becomes that of a mercenary, i.e. somebody paid to take an active part in combat operations. Mercenaries are expensive to hire and widely implicated in conflicts where payment can be made out of the proceeds of natural resource extraction e.g. diamonds or oil. They have been used in recurrent conflicts over the past few decades in Africa, including in Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Angola, DR Congo and Uganda.

Look out for obviously foreign looking personnel around the MSP forces, or those speaking other languages, or those in civilian dress.

7. Risks and risk assessment of MSP work

Human rights monitors need to be careful not to create any unnecessary risk for themselves, other members of their organisation or persons from whom they are gathering information.

Understanding the different levels of risk will enable you to be more effective. Take things slowly and have a cautious, low risk approach.

What risks might you face?
Risks could include those to you personally or to your organisation, such as:

- Physical risks and threats;
- Injury when monitoring an event e.g. at a riot or in armed conflict situations;
- Danger of injury when examining found MSP equipment at sites of violations or conflict;
- Disappearance, detention, imprisonment or kidnap;
- Interference and disruption of your organisation by MSP forces;
- Discrediting of your organisation by government or MSP forces just for what you're saying;
- Risk of possessing MSP information, e.g. photos, which may be a crime in certain countries;
- Inaccurate information may mean losing your reputation and ability to campaign;
- Legal challenges from companies or individuals: libel suits can be extremely costly and damaging for your reputation.

Risk assessment
- Plan all of your actions carefully and for each stage, assess the risks that may arise.
- Become knowledgeable about any laws relating to your activities.
- List all the possible security concerns associated with any actions, for example monitoring demonstrations or approaching companies that supply MSP equipment.
- Develop contingency plans; for example: if a demonstration turns violent, can you escape/evacuate?
- Develop alternative monitoring strategies; for example: if taking photographs is too risky is there a journalist who can do it?

If you decide to go to the scene of an incident involving MSP equipment, or to any other place where you may find information (prisons, border posts, companies, armouries, airports, sites of combat) you must assess all the risks involved for you, your colleagues, and the people you will talk to.

Security risks of various activities

Low risk
- Office-based activities and background monitoring
- Monitoring newspapers and other media for stories about MSP issues
- Analysing legislation and the laws which govern:
  - MSP forces and their use of MSP equipment;
  - imports/exports/ suppliers of equipment;
  - manufacturers of MSP equipment;
  - ownership by the public of weapons.
- Make an assessment of the treaties your government has signed up to.

Medium risk
- Seeking out, befriending and building long term relationships with MPs, journalists, unions, workers in key industries or in MSP forces to find information or to act on your information.
- Building networks of human rights activists and researchers including international organisations.
- Publicising your work can be medium or high risk, depending on the situation.
- Gathering information on the MSP forces that operate in your country.

High risk
- Investigating individuals and companies manufacturing, importing, exporting or

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> - trading in MSP equipment.
> - Gathering physical MSP evidence at sites of use or abuse or combat.
> - Actively monitoring MSP forces, having monitors at demonstrations or other potential sites of MSP equipment use.
> - Linking human rights abuses to MSP forces, equipment used and supply routes.
> - Making public calls for safeguards against violations, tougher laws, end to impunity for violators.
> - Naming those responsible for violations.
> - Publicising your findings.
> - Setting up a database can be of high risk in some countries.

How to reduce risk?

- Plan your monitoring and investigating activities carefully. Review your investigating policies and procedures regularly.

- Build long term links with other NGOs locally and internationally for advice and support in possible times of crisis.

- Share the risks: don't go alone to monitor an event, tell others where you are going and what you are planning to do, have an escape plan and emergency contacts.

- Develop a range of contacts that can provide support in an emergency e.g. journalists, embassies, international NGOs.

- Try to link your investigating activities to domestic issues such as gun crime or gun control. This may make the issues easier to communicate and more acceptable to the public, police and security forces.

- Be rigorously balanced and equitable, not sensational. Use statements such as "We believe that ..." and "It was reported that ..." rather than accusatory statements.

- Always double-check sources and try to have two independently verifiable sources.

- Find out what international agreements your government has signed up to, so that you have a response to questions about the legitimacy of your work.

- Carry out monitoring in a public and open way. Use public information sources where possible. However, there may be times when monitors need to be anonymous / incognito, for example in situations where they would become the targets of violence themselves.

- Store gathered MSP evidence away from your office and home. It may be safer to get it out to organisations in safer places by post, courier or by personal means.

- If appropriate, seek official authorisation to visit places where violations of human rights occurred or where MSP equipment is made, stored, used. This can build useful contacts within MSP forces and with individuals who could provide further information about MSP issues.

- Do not be a hero – monitoring in a war zone is not worth the risk.

- Try to avoid secretive or undercover activities, for example making clandestine visits to facilities or factories. But do guard and protect your sources and information.

- Ask high profile politicians, celebrities, journalists etc. to endorse your monitoring / campaigning.

- Use the parliament to pose public questions about risky issues. Make friends with a Member of Parliament.

- Share information with others so that you are not the only group holding sensitive information or items. Release information to journalists and make it public early on, even if further investigation is needed. The more people that know about something, the less the risk to you.

- Use journalists. They are an invaluable resource for your MSP work, and because of their training and experience they can often go into situations where human rights monitors would not be able to.

- Do not be hasty to implicate individuals, security forces or companies in cases of abuse.

Always assume that any activity can carry a risk, even simply being a member of a human rights group. However, there are many low risk MSP monitoring activities that can produce useful and powerful results that lead to a reduction in human rights violations being carried out.

> **WARNING: Certain types of MSP equipment can be dangerous. If you find items of MSP equipment, always assume that weapons are loaded and that ammunition and ordnance is 'live' and could cause injury. Do not take unnecessary risks trying to handle arms and ammunition. Unless you know what you are doing, leave the items alone and simply observe from a distance and if possible take photographs or write detailed descriptions or make drawings of the equipment found.**

Part 3

Africa and the arms trade

This Part 3 describes the most important routes and methods by which arms and security equipment are transferred. Many of them are linked: the chain of events that leads to the bullet casing or tear gas canister you find on the ground is a complex one that may involve individuals, companies and groups in several countries. This information is provided here to demonstrate that any piece of information you can gather, however small it seems, may be of use in piecing together the chain of supply and bringing those responsible to justice.

1. How is MSP equipment traded?

A. What are arms transfers?
A transfer is when arms are moved from the possession of one actor to another. It includes transfers across states and internal transfers. Recipients can be state actors, such as military, security or police forces; or non-state actors, such as armed opposition groups or criminals. Arms can be transferred by governments as part of assistance packages, or sold by companies. Actors such as brokers and transportation agents may also be involved somewhere in the chain.

- Transfers can be legal, illegal:

'Legal' transfers occur with either the active or passive involvement of governments or their authorised agents, and in accordance with both national and international law.

'Illegal' transfers are those in clear violation of national and/or international laws such as United Nations arms embargoes. Without official government consent or control, these transfers may involve false or forged paperwork, or corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain.

- The grey market and illicit arms flows:

In between these two, however, is the *'grey market'*. Many weapons start out in the legal trade, but then because of poor controls they end up diverted or sold on into the illegal arms market. For example, a transfer of weapons that eventually reaches a destination covered by a UN arms embargo may have started its journey as part of a legal state-sanctioned deal, but it has been diverted from its stated destination. Grey-market transfers exploit loopholes in arms control laws, or may unintentionally circumvent national controls.

Huge amounts of small arms and light weapons circulate across Africa. These flows are not legal in most cases and are therefore called *illicit*. Much of this weaponry arrived after the end of the Cold War when Eastern European states were dumping their stocks on the African market, legally and illegally. These arms flows now go from conflict to conflict, traded by arms dealers, criminal networks, drugs and diamond smugglers, outside any legal framework.

B. 'Legal' transfers

a. Government to government transfers and assistance
These tend to be for larger weapon systems such as aircraft or naval equipment, but have also included small arms and security equipment. Such weapons transfers may be part of a larger government assistance and training package. Often they are not fully reported to parliaments or the public in either the recipient or exporting states, which makes it more

difficult for civil society to hold governments to account for transfers of arms which are used to commit human rights violations.

France has provided a package of military assistance, training and equipment to Togo. Bullets used in an attack by Togolese government forces on the homes of opposition leaders in 1998 were made by a French company. The UK has supplied Landrover vehicles to Zimbabwe, which have reportedly been used by security forces in violent attacks on opposition party activists.

b. Commercial exports of arms

Governments' concerns for their national security lead them to broad agreement that commercial arms sales should be authorised. Yet a lack of effective legal controls means that diversion of arms from the state-sanctioned sector to the grey market is common. In addition, government authorisations for exports may be influenced more by the economic or geopolitical importance of the deal than by concerns about how the arms may be used.

End-user certificates identify the recipient and the intended use of the arms, and are supposed to prevent secondary trafficking once state-sanctioned weapons reach their intended destination. They are usually required before governments authorise commercial arms exports. But this system has been overwhelmed by commercial greed, political corruption and the sheer numbers of weapons transfers. There is an active black market in these certificates, and many governments or corrupt officials are complicit in their abuse.

In 1999, 68 tons of Ukrainian weapons arrived in Burkina Faso. The Ukrainian government had granted an export licence after receiving an end-user certificate from the Ministry of Defence of Burkina Faso, stating that Burkina Faso would be the final destination of the weapons. But the weapons were shipped on to Liberia and then to the RUF forces in Sierra Leone, despite the arms embargo on Liberia.

c. The activities of arms brokers

Arms brokers are the middlemen who arrange and facilitate arms transfers between suppliers and purchasers. They set up deals and arrange transport and cargo clearance for arms, and can make their profits without necessarily taking possession of the weapons. Some of their activities are legal. But the lack of regulation means that it is hard to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activities, and some brokers exploit loopholes in the law to supply weapons to conflict areas under embargo, where they have a devastating effect on human rights.

Brokers were involved in supplying weapons to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, and more recently to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan.
In October 2002, a report of the United Nations Security Council accused two UK residents, John Bredenkamp and Andrew Smith, of illegally providing services and military equipment to the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) for use in the DR Congo, in breach of EU and British sanctions against Zimbabwe.

d. Production in Africa

There are currently at least nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa that produce small arms: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. South Africa is currently the only country in the region whose indigenous small arms industry is well-developed, although Nigeria and Zimbabwe are attempting to develop theirs. Most production, with the exception of South Africa, takes place in state-owned factories, and there is little information, official or unofficial, about its scale.

Increasingly governments are looking to foreign arms manufacturers to upgrade their facilities. Pakistan Ordnance Factories have been involved in modernising arms production in

Sudan and Chinese companies have been in discussions to develop the Dicon factory in Nigeria. The National Enterprise Corporation of Uganda has a small arms and ammunition factory in Nakasongola that was built with aid from China's Wabao Engineering Corporation.

In other countries craft production of weapons by blacksmiths or engineers is an important source of weapons. Most of the products are crude and of poor quality but production is being taken up by more skilled workers using better equipment, leading to an increase in the numbers of weapons produced as well as the quality. For example, in Ghana it is estimated that over 20,000 weapons are craft produced each year and that 1 in 3 gun crimes were carried out with locally made weapons. See page [12check in final version].

e. Licenced production and technology transfer
Arms companies in one country can permit the production of their weapons in another country, under licence. It enables companies in Africa to gain access to modern weapons and production facilities. Such agreements, on which there are few controls, are increasingly supplementing or even replacing direct export deals. This type of production has a potentially huge impact on the proliferation of small arms across Africa.

The ammunition factory at Eldoret in Kenya was built by the Belgian arms company FN Herstal. It can produce up to 20 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition a year. Such ammunition is used throughout war-torn Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Construction was temporarily halted in 1996 after allegations that ammunition was being shipped to Burundian and Rwandan Hutu rebels.

f. Resale and re-circulation of surplus arms
When military or police forces upgrade their weapons, or when weapons are confiscated from criminals, the surplus weapons can find their way into the hands of abusers of human rights. Surplus weapons must be disposed of responsibly, but some states have not put in sufficient resources or political will to make sure this happens, and officials are just instructed to get rid of them as quickly as possible, without expense and if possible at a profit.

During the 1990s huge quantities of surplus weapons were offloaded from Eastern European countries as they converted to standard NATO weaponry. Slovakia has sold tanks, artillery systems and combat planes to Angola. Surplus ammunition from Albania, collected as part of a demobilisation programme, has been flown to Rwanda, allegedly for use in eastern DR Congo where human rights violations continue to occur.

C. The illegal trade

There are a number of ways that weapons can enter the illegal market:

a. Stolen weapons
They are taken from government stockpiles and shipments due to lax security or through the complicity of corrupt military and security forces. Rebel armed groups often obtain their arms and ammunition through seizures from police and army units or stores. This happened during the 1990s in a number of African conflicts including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. At times of weakness or desperation, commanders sometimes even open their weapons stores to sections of the population, to intensify the challenges faced by armed rivals and to disperse stocks that might otherwise be captured.

In April 2003, IJAW youths attacked Koko town in Delta State, Nigeria and looted 105 rifles and over 2000 rounds of ammunition from the military armoury in the town. In 2003 in Mauritania, 26 cases of explosives were stolen from the state-run iron mining company SNIM in the northern town of Zouerate. The theft raised fears that the explosives would be used against the government.

b. Illegal sales by legal dealers
Many countries control the sales of firearms by licencing dealers. These licenced dealers may sell some of their weapons legally, while diverting others to illegal markets.

c. Diversion
Arms are diverted en route to their supposed legal destination, or once they have reached the 'official' destination they can then be re-transferred onwards to illicit customers. Lax air traffic control, security or export checking procedures allow this to happen.

In 2001 a plane originating in the Czech Republic and carrying 30 tons of rifles and ammunition officially destined for Georgia, was seized during a refuelling stop in Bulgaria after its pilot reportedly requested permission to take off for Eritrea. Crew notes, found inside the Ukrainian plane, suggested that the actual destination was Asmara in Eritrea.

d. Mis-declared cargoes
The quantity of cargo flown and shipped to Africa is huge and the controls on it are weak. The descriptions of such cargo are usually vague and only occasionally are they checked For example: In March 2000, a plane left Bratislava airport in Slovakia bound for Harare, Zimbabwe, allegedly carrying a weapons cargo listed as 'technical equipment and machinery' for use by Zimbabwean forces in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The previous November, the same plane had been used to fly a load of weapons mis-declared as 'technical equipment' from Bulgaria to Harare, where it was transferred to another plane for delivery to Zimbabwean troops fighting in the DR Congo.

e. Illicit production
Most countries in Africa have some production of small arms that is outside of any control by the police or government. In general illegal manufacture is a small proportion of the problem of illicit trafficking, but in certain countries, most notably South Africa, where an illegal homemade firearms industry developed during the struggle against apartheid, it has become a significant problem. In 1997 it was estimated that there were between 20,000 and 30,000 homemade firearms in South Africa.

[box]
Arms for natural resources
The trade in 'conflict goods' such as diamonds, timber, coltan and oil is an increasingly prominent feature of conflicts in Africa. The plunder of these natural resources by governments and armed opposition groups often provides the finances to buy arms and pay soldiers, and the huge personal profits to be made are a primary reason for continuing conflicts. Diamonds have fuelled conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC); oil in Sudan and Angola; timber in Liberia; coltan, gold, and other minerals in the DRC.
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2. African arms control initiatives

A number of arms control initiatives have been developed over the last few years, internationally and within Africa, which could have a powerful and positive impact in halting the proliferation and misuse of weapons throughout the continent.

The regional and sub-regional arms control initiatives show that several African governments are taking the problem seriously, although some of them, despite their best intentions, do not have the human or financial resources to turn their commitments into reality. Other governments are lacking the political will to turn words into deeds.

International and national public pressure is needed to hold governments to account. Popular campaigning, particularly when coupled with effective MSP monitoring, can have a great effect. In order to put your MSP monitoring and investigating activities into a useful context, you need to find out what international or regional agreements your government has signed up to, whether they are legally enforceable or just a political statement of intent, and what your national legislation says.

If you discover an incident of human rights abuse where MSP equipment is used, or a weapon transfer has occurred, you can hold it up against the standards your government has committed itself to.
- If there is already a national law or legally enforceable agreement that is being broken, you can publicly highlight this and demand that it be enforced.
- If there is a law but it is not effective enough to prevent an MSP transfer, you can publicly highlight the fact that there are loopholes being exploited by companies or security forces.
- If your government has signed up to a politically binding agreement or statement of intent, you can draw attention to the fact that it is failing to live up to its commitments.
- If there is no law or agreement or standard to prevent the kind of transfer or misuse that you have discovered, you can use the evidence you have gathered to campaign for one to be implemented.

[box]
If you consider to take action, ensure that your information is accurate and double-checked. Never undertake a 'naming and shaming' action as an individual.
[end of box]

A. International initiatives by governments:

1. United Nations Small Arms Conference 2001 and Programme of Action
After preliminary investigation into the impact of small arms on civilians around the world, the UN convened a Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in July 2001. NGOs showed governments the impact of uncontrolled arms proliferation on human rights, and called for tough controls on both state and non-state weapons sellers. The result was a Programme of Action, in which governments committed to take various measures to control illicit gun possession and transfers. It is not legally binding. Some governments are making efforts; some are not. The Review Conference in 2006 will be an opportunity for NGOs to measure governments' progress and to set further goals. Website; http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html

2. UN Firearms Protocol
The UN Protocol Against the Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 May 2001. It commits states to common standards for the control of imports and exports of firearms, and for international co-operation on identifying and tracing firearms. Although it is a legally

binding treaty, it has not yet come into force because the required number of governments (40) have not yet ratified it.
Website: www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_signatures_firearms.html

3. Arms embargoes

Arms embargoes place total or partial restrictions on the trade in some or all types of weapons. They target a particular end-user, usually a national government or a non-state group that is posing an armed threat to a government. Embargoes can be imposed by national governments, regional bodies (e.g. the European Union), or on the international scale by the UN. They are imposed in response to serious crises such as the outbreak of conflict, gross violations of human rights, or the perceived existence of a terrorist threat.

Embargoes are rarely enforced or monitored with enough vigour to be effective. The huge rewards for suppliers and brokers operating illegally means that belligerents continue to be able to procure arms. They are also usually imposed once the actors in a conflict already have large quantities of arms. UN embargoes in Africa have been a conspicuous failure, such as those on Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

B. International civil society initiatives:

1. The Arms Trade Treaty

The proposed Arms Trade Treaty has been developed by international lawyers, human rights, human security and development organisations. The treaty would prohibit the international transfer of weapons where there is a clear risk that those weapons would be used for grave human rights abuses or to fuel violent conflict contrary to international law. It is based on governments' existing responsibilities under international law, and would close the loopholes in existing national legislation and regional agreements. (See a summary of its principles in the 'Appendix')

The Control Arms Campaign was launched in 70 countries in 2003 by Amnesty International, Oxfam and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). The campaign is pushing for governments to start negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty by 2006. About 25 States have already begun to champion the treaty, with Costa Rica, Finland, Cambodia, Tanzania and Mali taking an early lead.
Website: www.controlarms.org

2. IANSA

The International Action Network on Small Arms is the global network of civil society organisations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. It has more than 500 participating organisations, which work on small arms and MSP issues. They include policy development organisations, gun control groups, research institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victim groups, human rights and community action organisations. It brings their voices together and represents their views and their activities internationally to governments, the media and the public.
Website: www.iansa.org

C. African regional initiatives

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU): Bamako Declaration December 2000

The Bamako Declaration of December 2000 set out a common African approach to small arms. It is not legally enforceable, but is an important pan-African blueprint for the measures needed for small arms control. It calls on governments to create national agencies to co-ordinate activity on small arms proliferation, to train security services such as border guards, to criminalise illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession and use of firearms, and to destroy

surplus or seized weapons. The full text of the Bamako Declaration is at website:
www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/keydocs/Bamako_Declaration.pdf

West Africa: ECOWAS Moratorium
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed a Moratorium on the Import, Export and Production of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 1998, which was renewed in 2001. Rather like an embargo, but imposed within the region, it bans the import, export and manufacture of small arms by West African states. Despite widespread international support for its objectives, and support from civil society in West African countries, the Moratorium has done little to stem the illicit flow of arms across the region and to prevent or reduce the intensity of conflicts there. It is only voluntary; there is little that can be done to enforce it; and it focuses primarily on states and not enough on non-state actors.
Website: www.ploughshares.ca/content/CONTROL%20WEAPONS/EcowasMoratorium.html

Southern Africa: SADC Firearms Protocol
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Declaration and Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials were both agreed in 2001 to create regional controls on trafficking and possession. The Firearms Protocol is particularly important as it is legally binding, and requires the 14 signatory governments to harmonise their firearms control legislation, collect and destroy firearms, raise public awareness on the impact of guns in society, review controls on state-owned firearms, and improve mechanisms for marking and tracing guns.
Website: www.smallarmsnet.org/docs/saaf09.pdf

Central and East Africa: The Nairobi Declaration
The Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa was signed in March 2000 by Burundi, the DR Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Although not legally binding, it is an important statement of political intent. The states agreed on the need to harmonise firearms control laws, increase co-operation between their police forces and customs officers, collect and destroy weapons, improve the demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants, and improve police/community relations.
Website: www.saligad.org/declarations/declaraition_nairobi.html

D. National and Local Initiatives

Across Africa, governments and civil society are working on measures to reduce the threat to people's lives from weapons. These include:
- **Government or UN disarmament and demobilisation programmes** – such as in the Central African Republic where the government launched an arms collection programme offering jobs in exchange for weapons;
- **Governments enacting stricter laws on gun control** – such as in South Africa where the Firearms Control Act increased the restrictions on civilian gun ownership;
- **Police forces co-operating to collect and destroy illegal weapons** – such as Operation Rachel, a joint effort between the police forces of South Africa and Mozambique since 1995;
- **Non-governmental organisations working to increase public awareness** – such as the Centre for Peace Education and Democracy (COPE) in Liberia which launched a public education campaign using posters and radio to urge former combatants to turn in their weapons.

[box]
Halting the misuse of weapons by police and other state security forces
A major source of human rights violations in many African countries is the misuse of guns by the police. Not only do people get killed and injured by police using their guns without

respecting human rights, but the general level of gun violence in society remains high because civilians are unwilling to give up their own weapons if they do not trust the police.

Police must sometimes be permitted to use force or lethal force, in order to do their job of keeping communities safe and protecting people from life-threatening attacks. But the force used must not be arbitrary: it must be proportionate, necessary and lawful. And it must only be used in self-defence or against the imminent threat of death or serious injury. The international standards to control the use of force and firearms by the police are:

- UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
- UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials

Few countries in Africa have incorporated these standards into their national legislation or show respect for them in practice. They may lack political will, or may not have the funds for sufficient police training. The majority of Southern African countries, for example, allow the use of lethal force for the sole purpose of making an arrest, even where no life is under threat.

Find out what your national legislation says on police use of firearms, and if your government has signed up to these UN standards. As shown at the beginning of this chapter, you can then combine this information with your MSP monitoring and investigating work in order to campaign for better controls.
[end of box]

Part 4

Taking Action

1. Ideas for Action

If investigation of a human rights violation produces information about the use of MSP equipment, you may want to include that in your report about the violation, especially if it could help seeking redress for victims or bringing perpetrators to justice. For further action in this respect please refer to the other *Ukweli* handbooks.

You may also want to use the same information as a contribution to publicising MSP transfers, especially if you have suspicion about its legality.

The MSP trade and its consequences are international. An event involving MSP equipment may be local to you, but it could involve MSP forces trained by an overseas army or private company. The weapons and equipment they use may have been made by a company in another country, traded and transported by other companies or brokers operating in yet more countries. The event may have occurred because of a lack of laws or regulations, or it may have involved a breach of the law or of international commitments your government has signed up to.

There is much to say about taking action based on the information you found regarding MSP equipment. The main purpose of this manual is however to guide monitoring and investigating MSP equipment and to keep it handy-sized, this section on taking action has been kept deliberately concise[22]

Building a network
Your work will link into the work of others. The first step in taking action is to decide how and with which organisations or individuals you need to work. Building such a network is a vital step to achieving change.

Communicate the story
When you have some information on MSP equipment, a violation or a transfer, what do you do with it?

Communicate with a wide variety of people and organisations, such as:
- The victims;
- The public;
- The MSP force;
- The government;
- Companies;
- Traders;
- The international community;
- Non-governmental organisations and professional groups as appropriate;
- Journalists and media.

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[22] The 'Special Programme on Africa' of Amnesty International is considering to develop an MSP campaigning manual in the *Ukweli* series. Please also refer to the resource and training handbook *Action Against Small Arms,* published by International Alert, Oxfam GB and Saferworld 2003; available from Oxfam GB: Oxfam@bebc.co.uk.

Look at all aspects of your story to see whom you can communicate with, what you have to say and what you have to ask them.
Decide how urgent it is to get the information out: will a delay mean more violations may occur?
Use urgent actions only when necessary, otherwise their impact will be less.
Use simple, accurate statements that make your story easy to understand.
Consider any risks involved in publicising your information, for yourself and for others.

Use legal obligations
- If laws or regulations have been violated, demand that the government punish those responsible.
- Lobby for laws to be strengthened, or for national laws to incorporate references to, and be based on, international human rights standards.

Support the victims
- Ensure that the victims are fully informed about what is happening.
- Ensure that they are happy to have their story told, and understand where it might be used. If possible, get them to tell it in their own words in person.
- Build a network to support them in case of harassment by MSP forces or others.

Training
- Organise awareness-raising and training events for your organisation and other NGOs on MSP issues.

Public awareness
- Organise public events, discussions or demonstrations.
- Ask well-known public figures to support your campaign and to make statements.
- Ask the public to become monitors and to provide information to you.

Government action
- Present a report to the appropriate minister or department responsible for a transfer or a violation of human rights using MSP equipment.
- Lobby members of parliament to ask questions on your behalf, or to call for official inquiries.
- Demand that the rules and guidelines governing the use of MSP equipment be made available to the public and are enforced.
- Ask the government how the equipment was obtained and to provide full details of the transfer.
- Ask the government to uphold its international and regional commitments.

International action
- Identify any aspect of the story that could have an international dimension.
- Supply information to international organisations so that they can take action on your behalf in the country of origin of the equipment, or to put pressure on your government from outside the country.
- Raise any international obligations that the government has broken with the bodies responsible.
- Establish regular contact with individuals in international organisations.
- Liaise with the MSP team at Amnesty's International Secretariat in order to activate the international Amnesty International MSP network.

2. Useful Contacts

A. African Organisations

African Human Security Initiative (AHSI)
A network of 7 African NGO research organisations, recently publishing a set of books on human security in Africa (among which a book on small arms and light weapons). The seven NGOs are: African Security Dialogue and Research, Africa Peace Forum, Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, Institute for Security Studies, South African Institute of International Affairs, and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding.
Website: www.africanreview.org

Africa Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG)
An action-oriented research group providing an African perspective in the search for solutions to the problems of human security, peace and stability, and the socio-economic conditions on the continent. It has 17 chapters throughout Africa. The international secretariat is in Nigeria:
302 Iju Works Road, Agege, Lagos, Nigeria
Telephone: +234 14 925 535; Fax: + 234 14 924 480
Email: afstragcentre@linkserve.com; Website: www.afstrag.org/

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)
Based in Uganda, but with programmes all over Africa, is a training and capacity-building organisation that has been involved in conflict mediation and work through the media for peace building.
PO Box 5211, Kampala, Uganda
Telephone: +256 41 234 405; Fax: +256 41 255 033
Website: www.cecore.org

Centre for Defence Studies
A research and development unit affiliated to the University of Zimbabwe. It acts as a conduit between civil society, business and the armed forces in dealing with peace and security issues of national or regional significance.
8 Langham RD, Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe
Telephone: +263 4 744 488; Fax: +263 4 794 094, +263 4 744 451
Email: gadzinesas@yahoo.com; Website: www.uz.ac.zw/units/cds

Center for Media, Education & Technology (C-MET)
C-MET was founded in June 2000 dedicated to media development, human rights and the support of civil society institutions. It is based in Sierra Leone.
Website: www.cmetfreetown.org/CMET/Mission.stm

East Africa Action Network Against Small Arms (EAANSA)
The network involves 10 countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo. The organisation aims to build a coalition of NGOs working on the issue of small arms and light weapons. It aims to work with the media in building civil society awareness of the issue and can put you in touch with grassroots organisations based in any of its member countries.
C/o People with Disabilities, PO Box 5460, Kampala, Uganda
Telephone: +256 31 262 134; Fax: +256 31 262 134
Email: pwd@imul.com

Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA)
Publishes monographs, articles, manuals and a quarterly journal on security and development in Africa. FOSDA stimulates debates through seminars and workshops; it

provides training on peacekeeping, election processes/monitoring, and post-conflict reconstruction.
PO Box CT3140, Accra, Cantonments, Ghana
Telephone: +233 2 181 1291; Fax: +233 2 181 1322
Email: fosad_africa@yahoo.com; Website: www.fosda.org

Gun Free South Africa
Played a critical role in reducing the supply of firearms in South Africa and reducing demand by challenging the acceptance of firearms. The organisation is involved with policy research, public outreach activities and regional and international work.
PO Box 31532, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, Gauteng 2017, South Africa
Telephone: +27 11 403 4590; Fax: +27 11 403 4596
Email: info@gfsa.org.za; Website: www.gca.org.za

Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU)
Based in Kenya and is a small local organisation which undertakes human rights advocacy and direct support for victims of torture.
Website: www.imlu.org

Institute for Security Studies
Its Arms Management Programme focuses on security and development needs in Southern, Eastern and Central Africa. The organisation maintains a website www.smallarmsnet.org that allows people to contribute and access information about small arms proliferation in Africa.
PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, Pretoria, 0075, South Africa
Telephone: +27 12 346 9500; Fax: +27 12 460 0998
Email: iss@iss.co.za; Website: www.iss.co.za

SaferAfrica
Works on policy and advocacy work for community peace and security in all its aspects. It has regional offices in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.
173 Beckett Street, Arcadia, Pretoria, 0083, South Africa
Telephone: +27 12 481 6200; Fax: +27 12 344 6708
Email: saferafrica@saferafrica.org; Website: www.saferafrica.org

Réseau Africain Francophone sur les Armes Légères (RAFAL)
This Frenchspeaking African Network on Light Weapons has the goal of promoting public knowledge of small arms proliferation. It is dedicated to sharing information, research, training and publications in francophone African civil society.
Xavier Zeebroek, c/o GRIP; 33, rue Van Hoorde; B-1030 Bruxelles, Belgium
Telephone: +32 2 240 1148
Email: x.zeebroek@grip.org

Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)
A think tank committed to providing data and information on human security and security sector dynamics in Kenya and the sub-region of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa.
PO Box 56622. Chiromo Road, Nairobi, Westlands 00200, Kenya
Telephone: +254 20 444 9503; Fax: +254 20 444 8903
Email: sric@sric-ke.org

Southern Africa Defence & Security Network (SADSEM)
Co-ordinates a network of researchers including the Centre for Defence Studies (CDS) at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare; the Centre for Foreign Relations in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania; the Institute Sociadade e Administracao, linked to Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo; and the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Namibia in Windhoek.

Website: www.pdm.mgmt.wits.ac.za

West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA)
Based at FOSDA is an organisation that brings together gun violence prevention NGOs from all over the 15 countries involved in the ECOWAS Moratorium – Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
Contact details same as Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA).

B. International organisations

Many of these organisations will have local contacts or be working with local organisations in your country.

Amnesty International (AI)
Amnesty has campaigning sections throughout Africa. In particular the MSP Team at the international secretariat can offer help and advice on all aspects of MSP documenting and research. AI has developed an international MSP network with about 50 co-ordinators in just as much countries around the world.
International Secretariat, 1 Easton Street, London, WC1X 0DW, United Kingdom
Telephone: +44-20-74135500; Fax: +44-20-79561157
Website: www.amnesty.org

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)
An independent, non-profit organisation dedicated to promoting peace and development through the transformation of military-related processes, functions, activities, assets and structures effectively.
Website: www.bicc.de/smallarms.html

Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)
Aims to promote the values of democracy, peace and human rights in Africa and especially in the West African sub-region. Offices in Nigeria and London.
Website: www.cdd.org.uk

Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP)
The Peace and security research and intelligence group, GRIP, is spending a good deal of its energy publishing on small arms and light weapons, marking and tracing, and brokering.
Website: www.grip.org

Human Rights Watch
HRW researchers conduct fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses in all regions of the world, which are then published in dozens of books and reports every year, generating extensive coverage in local and international media.
350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor, New York, NY 10118-3299, United States of America
Telephone: 1-(212) 290-4700; Fax: 1-(212) 736-1300
Email: hrwnyc@hrw.org; Website: www.hrw.org

International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)
An international network of organisations, working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The IANSA website has contact information for all members of the network. The organisation can help you find a group near working against small arms in your country or region.
International Secretariat, 50 Westminster Bridge Rd, Unit 302, London SE1 7QY, United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 (20) 7953 7664; Fax +44 (20) 7953 8222
Email: contact@iansa.org; Website: www.iansa.org

International Coalition to Ban Landmines
A network of more than 1.400 NGOs working for a global ban on landmines. Assists victims of landmines, provides risk education, works on banning and clearing landmines. Has many contacts with groups across Africa working on landmines and other MSP issues.
110 Maryland Ave NE, Box 6 ,Suite 509, Washington DC 20002, United States of America
Telephone: +1 202 547 2667; Fax: +1 202 547 2687
Website: www.icbl.org

Redress
Works to obtain justice and reparations for survivors of torture anywhere in the world.
3rd Floor, 87 Vauxhall Walk, London SE11 5HJ, United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7793 1777; Fax: +44 (0)20 7793 1719
Website: www.redress.org/index.html

Saferworld
An independent non-governmental organisation that works with governments and civil society internationally to research, promote and implement new strategies to increase human security and prevent armed violence.
28 Charles Square, London N1 6HT, United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7324 4646; Fax: +44 (0) 20 7324 4647
Email: general@saferworld.org.uk; Website: www.saferworld.org.uk

Small Arms Survey
An independent research organisation that serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms, and as a resource centre for governments, policy makers, researchers and activists. It produces an annual review of the international arms trade.
Ground Floor, Avenue Blanc 47, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Telephone: + 41 22 908.57.77; Fax. + 41 22 732.27.38
Email: smallarm@hei.unige.ch; Website: www.smallarmssurvey.org

C. Identifying equipment and investigating the trade

The MSP team at the *International Secretariat of Amnesty International* can provide assistance identifying equipment that has been used in a human rights abuse.

The *Internet* is a very useful resource for the identification of MSP equipment. Innumerable websites are maintained by manufacturing companies and suppliers, and also by individual weapons enthusiasts. If there is a serial number it is possible to find information about the equipment by simply typing that number into a search engine such as Google.

The following websites are particularly useful for identification of MSP equipment:

Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

A useful site providing comprehensive visual and technical descriptions of a wide range of military equipment.
Website: www.fas.org

Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT)
Publishes reports on arms exports and customs data from around the world. These are available in an easily searchable format on its website that also contains a section on the West African arms moratorium. NISAT welcomes any contributions to its research.
C/o Norwegian Red Cross, Hausmannsgate 7, N-0133 Oslo, Norway
Telephone: +47 22 05 41 66; Fax: +47 22 05 40 40
Website: www.nisat.org

For identification you can also refer to the following media:

Africa Confidential
A widely-read, international, fortnightly journal with a political slant. It frequently focuses on the roles of armies and armed struggles in the continent.
73 Farringdon Road, London EC1M 3JB, United Kingdom
Telephone: +44 (020) 7 831 3511; Fax: +44 (020) 7 831 6778
Email: info@africa-confidential.com; Website: www.africa-confidential.com

Reséau Journalistes Afrique de L'Ouest
Network of journalists in the French-speaking countries of West Africa who are engaged in the fight against the proliferation of small arms.
BP 4286, Dakar, Senegal
Telephone: +221 8 231 667, +221 6 370 837; Fax: +221 8 220 767
Email: mamadoukoume@hotmail.com

www.allAfrica.com
An on-line journal that publishes daily hundreds of news stories about Africa. It has a particular interest in stories with an arms or human rights perspective and has a useful search facility.

Witness
A media organisation that can provide your organisation with the equipment and training to record human rights abuses. Using video cameras, they help expose human rights abuses to the world via television, grassroots advocacy and Internet broadcasting.
353 Broadway, New York, NY 10013, United States of America
Telephone: +1 212.274.1664 ext.201; Fax: +1 212.274.1262
Website: www.witness.org

Military magazines*:*
Many different publications are available, some produced commercially, some for national MSP forces.

Jane's
A huge commercial publisher covering all aspects of MSP technologies.
Website: www.janes.com

New SOJA
A magazine aimed at the Nigerian soldier, but includes some MSP information.
Website: www.nigerianarmy.net/magazine/Ns4Pdf/Page%2006.pdf

SA Soldier
The official magazine of the South African Department of Defence.

Website: www.mil.za/Magazines/sasoldier/default.htm

Appendix

Summary of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

A proposal for an ATT has been in development for several years. The aim of the proposal is to make comprehensive arms control a reality by closing any loopholes that currently exist and having the following *principles* included in a UN convention.

- International arms transfers cannot take place unless authorised by a licence issued by the state.
- Authorisations for a licence should comply with the following minimum criteria:
  - States should not authorise arms transfers that violate their existing obligations under international law in relation to the transfer of specific weapons or the transfer of weapons to specific end users;
  - States should not authorise arms transfers if they think that these arms are likely to be used:
    - in violation of the UN Charter;
    - to commit serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law;
    - to commit genocide or crimes against humanity, or to be diverted for these uses.
  - States should not authorise arms transfers without taking into account the impact of the transfers on regional security and sustainable development, as well as the likelihood of diversion.
  - States should report on international arms transfers to an international authority that will be established to ensure accountability and transparency.

See www.armslaw.org for the full text of the treaty.