THE PRINCIPLES OF LUSTRATION

In nearly all countries of Central Europe, there have been and continue to be efforts to clarify human rights violations in the period of communist/socialist party rule. In some countries, this clarification was seriously undertaken right after the end of the regime, that is from late 1989 or early 1990, in particular in the GDR and the Czech Republic. In some countries, such clarification was done on and off in the 1990s and continued after 2000, as in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Albania and the Baltic States. Other countries have only started after 2000, such as Slovakia, Serbia & Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Often the term lustration is used as a container word for such efforts. The Czech Republic coined the word (lustrace) in 1990 – actually adapting it from previous usage by the state’s secret service. Lustration (literary: 'clarification through light and fire') implies that individuals are screened for responsibility in human rights violations, on basis of documentation from the former secret services. In practice, the term lustration is used for the disclosure of personal files both for vetting initiatives and for inspection by victims and others concerned. Lustration may lead to decommunization, that is excluding, for a short or longer term, certain individuals for important public functions. It may also lead to what in various countries has been labelled 'national remembrance': an overview of the systematics of human rights violations in the communist period.

Lustration in the sense of vetting may typically be applied to functions including:

• President, vice-president, ministers and members of the government; 
• Members of Parliament; 
• Ambassadors, vice consuls and consuls; 
• Heads of government offices and administration units within ministries; 
• Employees selected by or nominated by the parliament and the government; 
• Officials of the local self-administration; 
• University professors; 
• Notaries, judges, state prosecutors and the Ombudsman; 
• Members of executive or supervisory boards of public enterprises and all firms and funds with a majority share of the property held by the state; 
• Secret service employees; 
• Officers of the army and the Ministry of the Interior; 
• Members of electoral commissions.
  Also lawyers, teachers, editors, journalists and others in responsible positions were included in some lustration laws.

International human rights organizations have published little on lustration efforts and initiatives for national remembrance institutes in Central Europe. Human Rights Watch has published a few reports, Amnesty International virtually none. Most of the regional overviews have originated from regional organizations, such as the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE), based in Thessaloniki, in cooperation with national experts and organizations.

The lustration efforts are ongoing, and this implies a role for the human rights movement of today, even if the facts date from decades ago. In countries where they were started early on, lustration efforts they are still the subject of much public attention (as in Germany) or of major public controversy (as in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary). In quite a number of other countries, particularly in the Western Balkans region, lustration has only recently come to the centre of public and parliamentary debate. Few individuals have been brought to trial – the highest numbers in the Czech Republic and in Germany.

The efforts in lustration and decommunization and should be assessed within the general framework of human rights remedies. Yet authoritative handbooks, in particular that by Dinah Shelton (2005), show only minimal interest in lustration-related issues. The striking feature of full-fledged lustration, with Germany as the most conspicuous example, is that it combines many elements addressed in Shelton’s book, including adjudication, disciplinary measures, monetary and non-monetary compensation, restitution, punitive damages, reparations for historical injustices and the establishing of a legal framework for the prevention of gross human rights violations. The human rights movement could play a role in bridging the gap between academic and legal studies produced within Central Europe and those originating in the international academic environment.

LUSTRATION: COUNTRY OVERVIEW

Germany (former German Democratic Republic)
`Purification' of former communists after the demise of the German Democratic Republic was far-reaching. For example, sixty percent of Saxony's educational officials and teachers were fired.
Germany is the only East European state which has brought forth a truth commission - two, in fact. Both have dealt with the legacy of the former Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the German Democratic Republic. The first commission, `Elaboration of the history and consequences of the SED dictatorship', was established in 1992. It studied the repressive apparatus of the Stasi, and repressive use of the judicial and prison system. It was a 16 member committee of inquiry from the federal parliament. Dozens of hearings were staged in the former East German section of the country, and many resulting `subgroups' still meet in various cities to discuss the SED legacy. An enormous amount of material, up to 150,000 pages, has been collected by this commission, and an official report has been published. A new Enquête-Kommission was set up in May 1995, labelled `Conquering the consequences of the SED dictatorship in the process of German unification'. Its terms of reference include three main issues: the ideological influence of the SED, the militarization of society and the penetration of society by the Stasi security apparatus.
Over 2,000 people are now employed in the archives' offices. The office has also compiled an analytical history of the GDR, which in 1995 already consisted of 15,000 pages and to which new studies continue to be added.
Everyone, including foreigners, has the right to inspect his/her personal files and find out to what an extent the National Security Service of the GDR (MfS, ‘Stasi’) influenced their own lives. One can obtain the application form for the inspection of your personal records by mail or via the Internet. After 12 weeks, one will receive initial information about whether indications of a file were found. Urgent cases are processed with priority. Records are also issued to scientists, representatives of the media and review initiatives for reviewing the history of the MfS. The BStU (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the National Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic) supports the civil service in its investigations to find out whether there are former members of the National Security Service among its employees. ‘With this possibility, legislature wants to reinforce the trust of the citizens in their administration.’ The investigation itself and the decision about the consequences are not up to the BStU but to the investigating office. This investigation possibility ends in 2006. There have been over 5 million applications since 1991. They include inspection of personal records (2 million), investigations (3 million) and research and media (15,000).
> For more information, see Case I – Germany.

Czech Republic
Almost two years had passed since the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia when the federal parliament adopted, in October 1991, the so-called screening or lustration law, the first legislation designed to protect the top state institutions and the state and public administration from the exponents of the former communist regime, including former CP secretaries, state secretaries, officers of the secret police (StB), and a part of its agents, collaborators and networks. The 1991 law banned former officials from holding positions for five years. The leader of the Czech Christian-Democratic Party estimated that a total of 300,000 people had somehow participated in the system of repressions. A somewhat blurred mechanism of selection from the 140,000 names in the secret police files then developed. Between 19991 and 1995, 200,000 requests for certificates have been received by Parliamentary Commission - these were declarations that one had never collaborated with the StB, the State Security Forces. More than 420,000 persons have been subjected to lustration.
The law passed in 1996 allowed for public access to the files of the communist secret police and the central and regional counter-intelligence departments. A second law regulating the opening of the former state security files to the public was passed by the Czech parliament in March 2002. It expanded the range of documents to be opened from the files of the main units of the so-called internal intelligence as well as from other parts of the former state security system.
The publication of the names of secret StB collaborators is currently under discussion in the media as it is turning out that the ministries have not published all the names as ordered by law. Tens of thousands of names from the end of the 1940s and the 1950s are estimated to be missing from the lists. No special institution was set up by law to take over the administration of state security documents and the process of their opening to the public.
The StB used a complex network of spies and informants to build cases against supposed dissidents. It is thought to have carried out more than 230 executions, jailed about 280,000 people on political charges, and confined around 7,000 people in mental institutions against their will. A list of the names of about 160,000 alleged collaborators was made public in the early 1990s by the former dissident and political prisoner, Petr Cibulka, who said he received them from a source with access to StB records. On 20 March 2003, the Czech Republic posted on the internet a list of people who collaborated with the secret police under the former Communist government. The list, containing over 100,000 names, was also available free of charge in printed form - 12 volumes with a combined weight of eight kilograms.
The office for the documentation and investigation of the crimes of communism (UDV) continues to investigate actions taken by government authorities and Communist Party members during the 1948-1989 Communist regime. According to the office, 25 former Communist-era secret police (StB) officers were prosecuted for their participation in anti-dissident raids in the Asanace operation (a concerted campaign of harassment, torture, and abuse directed at opponents of the Communist regime during the 1970s and 1980s). In December 2001, five senior Communist-era officials went on trial, charged with masterminding a plan to force dissidents to flee the country in the late 1970's. A former interior minister and four others are accused of ordering the secret police to use torture, beatings and psychological abuse against signers of the Charter 77 human rights appeal. Eighteen former secret policemen were sentenced to prison, with two additional sentences still pending; five other cases were still under investigation. In September 2005, two former secret police agents were charged with the torture and persecution of dissidents during the 1970s. Since 1989 the government has convicted 90 former StB officials and sentenced 26 to prison.

Slovakia
An August 2002 law allows public access to the files relating to the activities of the state security forces from 1939 till 1989. Apart from the opening of the existing files on the Slovak state security departments in a way that was almost identical to that applied in the Czech Republic, the law also defined the time of the totalitarian regime (1939-1989), with a particular emphasis on the crimes committed during the periods of the Nazi and the CP regimes. Another step was the creation of the National Memory Institute (UPN) which began operating in the Ministry of Justice on 1 May 2003. Apart from administering the StB files and enabling public access to them, the institute also carries out historical research.

Hungary
From 1989, there were immediate demands for lustration in Hungary and there had been no fewer than ten legislative initiatives by late 2002. The first of these was the unsuccessful 1990 Demszky-Hack bill. A more restrained proposal was tabled by the government in May 1991, which almost three years later resulted in a screening law that required the occupants of between 10,000 and 12,000 posts to be vetted for their past links with the Communist domestic secret police, the 'counter-insurgency squads' that suppressed the 1956 revolution and the fascist Arrow Cross.
In 1996 a parliament then dominated by the Socialist (ex-Communist) party passed a new law that narrowed the scope of the screening legislation so that it covered only 500-1,000 posts including parliamentarians, ministers and the most senior officials in the public administration, judiciary and state institutions and media. In 2000 the next government, led by the right-wing, anti-Communist FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) expanded the scope of the legislation again to encompass all radio, television and internet news editors, 'influential' print-media editors and staff, all judges and prosecutors and the members of the national and county presidia of political parties entitled to state funding. This amounted to some 7,000-8,000 posts in total. The legislation was also extended from its original expiry date of 2000 to 2004.
Hungary created an independent lustration court, which, having access to the secret services files should have investigated the high-ranking officials. The main targets were those who had connections with the Directorate on Protection of the State from Reactionary Forces in the Communist Interior Ministry. The names of those who were working with it, but refused to quit their current posts after the investigation, were supposed to be published in the official press-Hungarian Gazette. About 600 persons were subject to lustration. Targets proven to be collaborators were ‘advised to leave office,’ but this ‘advice’ was not enforced.
Following the revelation in summer 2002 that the new prime minister, Péter Medgyessy of the Communist successor Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), had worked with Communist counter-intelligence, both the government and the opposition FIDESZ came forward with alternative proposals for a new, tougher, lustration regime.

Poland
The first post-Communist Polish government did explicitly reject a policy of lustration, exemplified by Mazowiecki's famous inaugural pledge to draw a 'thick line' under the Communist past. However, calls for a more radical approach were already growing louder in 1990-91 and came from Solidarity's right wing, which felt excluded from the Mazowiecki government. Meanwhile, with little fanfare, considerable personnel changes were being made in a number of important spheres of public life. For example, verification commissions were set up all levels of the legal system to examine individual service records and removed 10 per cent of prosecutors and 33 per cent of the staff in the office of the General Prosecutor.
The short-lived, more radically right-wing government of Jan Olszewski decided in 1991 that the interior ministry should vet all elected officials for links to the Communist secret services, and prepare a bill for a more encompassing lustration. This process culminated in the denunciation of 64 members of parliament (including many veterans of the democratic opposition) by Interior Minister Antoni Macierewicz. The furore that followed led directly to the downfall of the Olszewski government.
Later that year, six proposals were under consideration in the Polish legislature, the most substantial of which was a bill drafted by the Congress of Liberal Democrats. Other centrist and liberal parties were not ready to support it, so it died along with the other bills in committee.
Lustration then resurfaced throughout the 1990s The matter's periodic resurgence peaked in December 1995 with allegations that the ex-Communist premier, Józef Oleksy, had been a Soviet and Russian spy. In response, Poland adopted a lustration law in June 1997, which covered all elected state officials from the president downwards, including parliamentary candidates, together with all ministers and senior state functionaries above the rank of deputy provincial governor; judges and prosecutors; and leading figures in the public electronic and print media. As a result of amendments passed in 1998, the law's scope was stretched to include all barristers, bringing the total number of officials subject to lustration to approximately 23,000.
The law on lustration bans from office for 10 years those persons caught lying about their past. The law requires officials to provide sworn affidavits concerning their possible cooperation with the secret police. The public interest spokesman (lustration prosecutor) then verifies the affidavits and brings suspected cases of misrepresentation before the lustration court, a special three-judge panel whose decisions may be appealed. Several high-profile cases have come before the court.
In 2000, Parliament agreed on a chairman for the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), a body mandated by the lustration law to organize all Communist-era secret police files and eventually give citizens access to their files. From the 2004 Annual Report of the IPN (the last report available in English):
The prosecutors of the Institute’s Commission continued previous investigations as well as launched new investigations in recently revealed crimes committed between September 1, 1939 and December 31, 1989. The notion of crime against the Polish Nation embraces the Nazi crimes, Communist crimes, crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes committed on persons of Polish nationality – disregarding the place of crime, as well as crimes committed on persons of other nationalities, provided the crimes had been committed on the territory of Polish State. On June 30, 2004 the prosecutors of IPN Divisional Commissions conducted 1,359 investigations, including 363 cases of Nazi crimes, 918 cases of Communist crimes and 78 cases of other crimes (war crimes and crimes against humanity). The Institute’s archives amounted to 79,920.65 meters of acts. Since the first applications were submitted on February 7, 2001 till June 30, 2004 15,485 persons have asked to access their documents produced by security apparatus. In the period covered by this report, the IPN archival office has realized 8,205 applications for accessing documents/status of grieved person (three times more than in the previous year). 2,658 persons have been declared to be grieved parties and 5,063 were denied that status due to lack of documents collected purposely and secretly by security services and in the case of 484 persons (5%) IPN archivists have found documents proving cooperation with security services. The grieved persons have access to all materials found in IPN archival resources, there is no time limitation nor a non-disclosure provision. Before the documents in a form of a copy are disseminated, the personal data of grieved persons, other persons – including functionaries, employees and agents of state security services - are being blackened.
In January 2005 Rzeczpospolita's journalist Bronislaw Wildstein published on the Internet a list of people who may have collaborated with the Polish security service during the communist years. Nearly 240,000 surnames of people whose files are kept in Poland's Institute of National Remembrance, which is in charge of the archives of the country's security service, were published. The list includes staffers, informers, and people they planned to recruit. The publication alarmed the Polish special services, for along with the names of former agents the names of currently active spies were published. The website list was an enormous popular success, but much remains unclear about why individuals have been included in it.
In February 2005 the appeals court in Warsaw overturned the two-year suspended sentence handed down by the district court in May 2004 to former interior minister Czeslaw Kiszczak for his role in the 1981 killings at the Wujek mine. In August the district court determined that the case was a ‘Communist-era crime’ that should either be heard by the institute for national remembrance (IPN) or be dismissed on the basis of an expired statute of limitations. In October the Katowice distict court again began hearing testimony, including that of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who testified that Kiszczak had not authorized the use of firearms at the Wujek mine.

Romania
In December 1989, the state security (Securitate) department numbered a total of 15,312 persons, of whom 10,140 were officers. In 1990, A large number of Securitate officials and agents were recruited by the provisional government almost immediately, and they were integrated into the structure of the new intelligence services and into the governmental apparatus. Between 1990 and 1992, slandering campaigns became a permanent feature in Romanian politics.
The setting up of the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives, created to unveil the activities of the former political police, did not lead to any serious results. The new institution did not even have the material needed for its work, since the secret services refused, under various pretexts and with the tacit agreement of President Ion Iliescu, to hand over the archives of the Securitate.
There are now efforts going on to establish an Institute for National Remembrance, after NGOs had collected much documentation on Securitate activities and files.

Bulgaria
Lustration is focused on the security sector and its networks of agents and informers. The initial lustration act in Bulgaria prohibited to state security officials membership in a political party. Persons who had participated in CP-led governments were dismissed from high or medium rank positions, the network of the intelligence agents of the political police was cut back, the politically motivated informer network was dissolved, and the political functions of the security sector were eliminated.
In 1991, the Grand National Assembly decided that the state security archives should neither be taken out of secrecy nor destroyed. Since 1992, every citizen has the right to ask for, and if the conditions are given, to obtain a ‘clean past certificate’ from the Ministry of Interior. The Panev law, adopted in December 1992, requires individuals holding leading positions in academic institutions to provide a written statement about their past employment and communist party activities. If an individual held specific positions within the communist party, the state security mechanism or the party educational institution, or taught courses in certain communist-related areas of history and the social sciences, he or she would be dismissed. In 1994, it was estimated that some 9,000 top managers of enterprises, 14,000 officers in the state security agency, 90 percent of government administrators and one-third of all diplomats had already been removed under the Panev law. Government and opposition politicians alike expressed concern that the disqualification process was degenerating into a political power struggle in Bulgaria. In January 1993 a Penal Code amendment closed access to personal files on national security grounds, and imposed criminal penalties for dissemination of information from the files.
The lustration law of 1997, the Law on Access to the Documents of the Former State Security, was designed to guarantee that no one involved in activities of the former state security would be allowed to hold a public office.
After 2001, the lustration laws were supervised by a parliamentary commission, the so-called Andreev (the name of an MP) Commission. Its findings were that out of the overall 1,225 members of the four consecutive parliaments since 1989, 129 had been collaborators of the former secret services, which makes approximately one tenth.
In 2002, a new law on the protection of classified information was passed. It set up a new system of preserving classified information and the mechanism for opening the files. In May 2006, the government reconfirmed its decision not to open files for personal inspection.

Albania
Two lustration laws have been passed. The first, which only affected the licensing of private lawyers, was passed in early 1993 and was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Albania later that year. The second, passed in the fall of 1995, was a much broader law. It was amended several times and also modified by a Constitutional Court decision; as amended and modified, it remained in effect until 31 December 2001, when it expired by its terms (except for one article, as indicated below), leaving in effect only Article 16, which provides that the files are now closed until 2025. The files of the Albanian secret services have never been available to the public.
A special commission was set up to establish the identity of people from Shkodër and neighboring districts who under communist rule from 1944 to 1991 had been liquidated for political reasons by security forces. This commission issued its first findings in October 1993. It said that the commission had uncovered six mass graves in Shkodër and had established the identity of forty victims. They suspected however that the total number of victims was around 2,000.

Croatia
The Draft Law on Removing the Consequences of the Totalitarian Communist Regime, proposed by: the Croatian Party of Rights (1998 and 1999) aimed to systematically bar high-ranking party and state officials of the former regime from holding high-ranking offices in the new state, if in the past these persons had violated human rights and opposed the establishment of democracy.
The Law on the Security Services of the Republic of Croatia has been applied since 1 April 2002. The key intention of the law is the establishment of an appropriate model of supervision of their work (internal and external control). The law makes no distinction between the period from 1945 until 1990 and the period after 1990. Principally, the law allows for access to the documents and material. In the period 1990-1996 there were an estimated 2,200 dismissals and appointments of judges and state attorneys recorded in the Official Gazette.
In Croatia there have as yet been practically no major public debates on the past.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
There is no lustration law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The issue of free access to information has been regulated within a broader legal act, the Freedom of Access to Information Act. A significant public debate on the files issue arose after the publication of the bestselling four-volume set ‘The Guardians of Yugoslavia’ by Ivan Beslic in November 2003. The book includes top-secret documents from the Bosnian branch of the former Yugoslav State Security Service (SDB) and a list of 1,350 names of informants and operatives active from 1970 until 1990.
Some comprehensive vetting efforts have taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the police and the judiciary. In a (de)certification process of police officers, UNMBIH (the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) vetted approximately 24,000 police officers between 1999 and 2002. With respect to the judiciary, three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils screened the appointments of approximately 1,000 judges and prosecutors between 2002 and 2004. This process is still ongoing.

Macedonia
The law on the access to the files of the secret service was enacted in 2000 (‘Law on handling personal files kept by the State Security Service’). By the enactment of this law, 15,000 files were made accessible to the persons who had been observed and prosecuted by the state security services. The law determined the period from 1945 till the day it entered into force (in July 2000) as its time of application. A deadline was set, which granted the possibility of raising requests for access within one year after the law had come into force; this meant that a request could be raised during a one-year period, until mid-July 2001. The Ministry of Interior Affairs never presented the precise number of accessed files to the public. The report that the Ministry had prepared for the Parliament was also never made public.

Serbia and Montenegro
A lustration law was passed, the ‘Accountability for Human Rights Violations Act’, in May 2003. It applies to all human rights violations that occurred after 23 March 1976, the day that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came into effect. The overall number of affected persons is unknown. The Commission for Investigation of Accountability for Human Rights Violations has nine members. Three members are judges of the Supreme Court of Serbia, three members are prominent legal experts, one member is a deputy public prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia and two members are deputies of the National Assembly holding a degree in law, elected from different electoral lists. A decree on removing the confidence mark from files of the secret service was adopted in Serbia on 31 May 2002, but was declared unconstitutional in October 2003. A decree under the same title was adopted in Montenegro in September 2002, which was not declared unconstitutional.
President Kostunica established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in March 2001, but some of the most distinguished designated members had serious objections with respect to the objectives, competencies, and powers of this commission and refused to participate. Some years later, the commission had just vanished, without having undertaken any substantial activities and without having achieved any tangible results.

Lithuania
According to the Lithuanian mass media, in 2005 there were more than 1,000 personnel, all employees of the KGB, and about 4,000 former secret agents of the Soviet special services in Lithuania left un-lustrated. The ‘Law on the registration, recognition, reporting, and protection of identified persons who secretly collaborated with the former special services of the USSR’ was passed by the Sejm (parliament) in 1998 and amended in 1999. It demands that the former employees of the KGB and other Soviet special services inform a special commission of that status and be registered by it. During the established year and a half term close to 1,500 ex-agents and employees came to the commission on lustration. Their names are kept secret. The names of those who didn't come to the commission were supposed to be published. The law bars former KGB members from legal practice and working in banks, and also restricts their opportunities for taking jobs in private companies. But after promulgating the law, the Lithuanian government did not launch any further actions to screen former KGB members, and the law was quietly dropped, probably because of the lobbying by former employees of the Soviet special services occupying very high posts in the Lithuanian state structures.
In late 2005, committees of the Lithuanian Parliament started to discuss a new edition of the law in which new terms of lustration and principles of formation of the commission will be implemented.

Latvia
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the KGB left only 5,000 file cards, which are now kept in the Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism. The files contain only the names of the agents and informants, but not what they have done. As the KGB files are patchy, anyone listed may have been a regular collaborator; or a scientist obliged to report on some overseas conference; or even a potential informer who was never used. But the most active agents may not be named at all, since the files of any apparatchik who reached a certain rank were normally destroyed.
The election laws from May, 1994 both for the Parliament and the municipal elections barred persons from standing for elections who had been on the staff of the USSR or Latvian SSR security services or security services of other countries or intelligence or counterintelligence staff. Anyone who was a member of the USSR or Latvian SSR Communist Party after 13 January 1991 (the day when the clashes with the Soviet Army started, before gaining Independence) was barred from standing for election. But the effect was scanty. Several glaring cases were initiated but quickly ended for there was not enough evidence. In January 2003 Parliament passed the European Parliament Election Law, rejecting restrictive proposals, so persons who remained KGB officers and Communist Party members after 13 January 1991 became eligible to participate in the European Parliament elections.
When in 2004 Parliament passed an amendment prolonging the jobs ban, the President vetoed it and pushed for a prolongation of the law on keeping the KGB files unpublished until 2014.

Estonia
In Estonia almost no KGB files were left, so the process was purely voluntary. In 1995 a law was adopted according to which all the Communist ex-functionaries and secret services employees were obliged to report (membership in Nazi Germany intelligence agencies was also listed as targeted activity). Only 1,153 of them did it, and from 1997 till 2004 only 250 names of those who tried to hide their connection to the oppressive regime were published. No other options were tried besides this voluntary confession based system.

LITERATURE AND WEBSITES

Ash, Timothy Garton (2000). History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Despatches from Europe in the 1990s. London: Penguin.
Boed, Roman (1999). ‘An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of Transitional Justice.’ Columbia Journal of Transitional Law37:357-402.
Brito, Alexandra Barahona de, Carmen Gonzalez Enriquez & Paloma Aguilar. eds. (2001). The Politics of Memory and Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BstU (2005). Siebenter Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin: BstU. At www.bstu.bund.de.
CDRSEE Project Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans (2004). Past and Present: Consequences for Democratisation. At www.lustration.net.
CDRSEE Project (2005). Manual on Lustration, Public Access to Files of the Secret Services and Public Debates on the Past in the Western Balkans. At www.lustration.net.
Elster, John (2004). Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, John, ed. (2006). Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy. New York: Columbia University.
Gay, Caroline (2003). ‘The Politics of Cultural Remembrance: The Holocaust Monument in Berlin.’ The International Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 9 (2003), p. 153-166.
Hamber, Brandon & Richard Wilson (2002). ‘Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies’. Journal of Human Rights Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2002).
Hayner, Priscilla (2001). Unspeakable Truths. Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. How Truth Commissions Around the World are Challenging the Past and Shaping the Future. New York: Routledge.
Horne, Cynthia & Margaret Levi (2002). Does Lustration Promote Trustworthy Governance? An Exploration of the Experience of Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: Trust and Honesty Project.
Huyse, Luc (1995). ‘Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past.’ Law and Social Inquiry20:51-78.
Kritz, Neil, ed (1995). Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. 3 Volumes. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press.
Larsen, Stein Ugelvik (1998). Modern Europe after Facism, 1943-1980s. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.
Offe, Claus & Ulrike Poppe (2004). ‘Transitional Justice in the German Democratic Republic and in Unified Germany’. Lukas H. Meyer, ed., Justice in Time: Responding to Historical Injustice. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,. pp. 239-269.
Ost-Europa Archiv Berlin website: www.osteuropa-zentrum.de/oe-archiv.
Rosenberg, Tina (1996). The Haunted land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism. New York: Vintage Books.
Schlunck, Angelika. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. At
Shelton, Dinah (2005). Remedies in International Law (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Unverhau, Dagmar (1999). Lustration, Aktenöffnung, demokratischer Umbruch in Polen, Tschechien, der Slowakei und Ungarn. Munster: LitVerlag
Unverhau, Dagmar (2004). Das Stasi-Unterlage- Gesetz. Münster: Wilhelm Hopf Verlag.
US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
Williams, Kienan, Kieran Williams, Aleks Szczerbiak & Brigid Fowler (2003). Explaining Lustration in Eastern Europe: A Post-Communist Politics Approach. Falmer (UK): Sussex University Institute.
> See also ‘Literature’ in Case I – Germany.

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